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Introduction 
 
The division of the Korean peninsula can be considered as a regional variation of the 
broader global context that has characterized the post-Second World War period, with the 
affirmation of the US and Soviet spheres of influence and the crystallization of the Cold 
War system. Moreover, the Korean War (1950-1953), that came a few years after the 
formal division of the peninsula (1948), is considered as one of the first peripheral clashes 
between the two superpowers that characterized the bipolar world until 1989. 
This fundamental role at the regional level, inside the global arena, has led many analysts 
to investigate the case thoroughly and develop different theories on the division of the 
Korean peninsula and on the possibility to resolve this open question. 
In many respects, the history of Korea over the last seventy years can be regarded as that 
of a “victim” of the international structure of the Cold War. Without the intervention of 
the superpowers, in fact, the division would have been unlikely to materialize and likewise 
the war; this systemic perspective based on the international context seems to be so 
dominant in driving the following historical development of the peninsula. This does not 
mean, however, that during the period following 1953 the politics of two states have been 
directed respectively from Moscow/Beijing and Washington, rather, already during the 
‘60s, the affiliation with the guidelines of the two blocks, in terms of ideology and 
development model, was much diluted if not totally separated, as in the case of the 
indigenous model of “developmental state” put in place by the authoritarian regime of 
Park Chung-hee in South Korea. 
The area where the influence of the “Cold War system” had its stronger impact was that of 
international relations and security policies, characterized by approaches of containment 
and confrontation, typical of the logic of the two superpowers. This approach, almost 
unique case in the whole world, in Korea survived the very end of the Cold War and the 
bipolar division of the world, after 1989. 
The United States promoted a commitment to security based on strategic containment of 
China and the USSR – and their “forefront” in Pyongyang – and on the protection of the 
allies: South Korea and Japan. In the context of power relations and alliances that came 
out of the Second World War, the weight of such an approach would have been therefore 
ineluctable for the leadership of the government in Seoul. Even at the end of the Cold War 
the long roots of this approach will push the US State Department to hardly tolerate, when 
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not openly oppose, the various attempts of paradigm shift towards a new approach in 
inter-Korean relations, no longer based on containment but on engagement. 
Since the beginning of the ‘70s it began to emerge the possibility of a new approach based 
on peaceful coexistence, with the possibility of establishing forms of cooperation in 
various fields. The first efforts in this direction were very mild and mostly related to 
changes in the international environment, in particular the détènte between the two blocs 
and the Sino-American rapprochement, and to tactical adjustments of the national policy, 
rather than a long-term strategy that has as its ultimate goal in reunification. Over the 
years, this approach has been consolidated, in particular after key events, such as the 
democratization in South Korea in 1987 or the end of the Cold War, with the fall of the 
Soviet Union in the early ‘90s; these changes opened new opportunities to set a more 
cooperative relationship with long-term goals. In this perspective, the real watershed has 
been represented by the election of the first progressive president in South Korea, that led 
to the apex of this new policy of constructive engagement, along with that of his 
successor, with the clear aim of attaining a situation peaceful coexistence between the two 
countries, pre-requisite for a long process that could have led to the reunification of the 
peninsula. 
 
Although most of the studies on the relations between the two Koreas focus on security 
issues, particularly the confrontation, military confrontation and tensions that have marked 
the seventy years of division of the peninsula, the prospect of inter-Korean cooperation 
can It is considered an interesting lens to analyze the development of relations across the 
38th parallel. The development of cooperation is in fact all the more essential as you are in 
a situation of conflict and rivalry. It can be considered as an effective and useful for 
exiting a state of this type and move towards a goal of reconciliation. In the Korean case 
this is even more imported because the long-term goal of regimes and governments that 
have taken place in both states Koreans was, and still is, that of the reunification. 
As previously mentioned the division of the peninsula is the result of the defeat of Japan - 
a colonizing power foreign - at the end of World War II and the following rivalry which 
materialized between the US and the USSR. For these reasons, it has no intrinsic 
motivation and internal that can be sought in history, in culture or in the Korean 
population. The next seventy years of division, the Korean War of 1950-53, and the strong 
ideological and military confrontation between the two blocs have helped to freeze it and 
make it even deeper; to the point of creating a kind of deadlock from which it seems 
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impossible to find a constructive way out - I mean as constructive a way which did not 
involve a regional military conflict, inter-Korean or inside one of the two countries. 
Despite this background bleak, over the decades have been conducted various experiments 
and various long-term projects in inter-Korean cooperation. If the division and the War 
until the 70s we can not really speak of relations between the two countries from 1972 
onwards however the dialogue has always been present, although, for some periods, in a 
very ephemeral. The signing of the Joint Statement of 1972, although it may seem today 
as a purely formal exercise and no real practical consequence, has marked a turning point 
in relations between the two Koreas. For the first time, in fact, Pyongyang and Seoul 
begun discussions constructive dialogue and cooperative aimed to establish some key 
points in the management of mutual relations and to accept the fait accompli on the 
peninsula that there were two separate state entities, which had to find a modus vivendi to 
co-exist. This time ago then appeared the term "coexistence", which, although it may seem 
very far from that of "reunification", does provide a fundamental improvement. Do not 
forget that only 19 years before the two countries were involved in the Korean War and 
who were still formally at war - as indeed they still are today. For these reasons, the time 
horizon selected to analyze the development of inter-Korean cooperation begins with 
1972. 
The next few years, although at first glance it may seem that the process of rapprochement 
has been interrupted, in reality the dialogue continues. The Joint Declaration in fact give 
way to a series of meetings between representatives of the two countries to address some 
of the outstanding issues - first and military aspects of security, along with humanitarian 
issues caused by the division of the peninsula and the Korean War, as the meetings of 
separated families or the exchange of prisoners of war, even after economic and cultural 
aspects - and not so bury the results achieved on July 4, 1972. 
In this climate of ups and downs you then reach the second crucial point for the Korean 
peninsula, the end of the Cold War. This epochal event had led many scholars and 
observers of the region to advocate a collapse of North Korea - as had happened to the 
socialist regimes of Eastern Europe - and a unification by absorption, as had happened in 
Germany. In fact, as we shall see later, the North Korean regime showed great resilience 
to adverse external events and managed, despite enormous difficulties, to survive this 
wave of global change, However, a change in the system of this magnitude could not have 
result also on inter-Korean relations. The end of the bipolar had, in fact, released many 
new possibilities for the actors who were previously linked to the two opposing blocs. In 
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this new context, the South Korean government is promoting a new approach to North 
Korea - but also to China and the Soviet Union / Russia - which will go under the label of 
Nordpolitik. This new approach will be strongly marked by a desire for dialogue and 
cooperation and will lead to fundamental results in this field. The peak will be reached 
with the signing of the so-called Basic Agreement - signed in 1991 and in force since 1992 
- but the whole process of negotiation which will lead to such a result is one of the leading 
examples of political cooperation between the two Koreas. 
This new emphasis on a constructive management of relations between the two Koreas 
will not be interrupted even before the outbreak of the crisis linked to the North Korean 
nuclear program, and will find its maximum effect with the election of President Kim 
Dae-jung as president of South Korea in 1997. By this date will inaugurate a period of 10 
years - President Kim will be followed by the election of Roh Moo-hyun, who will 
continue the efforts of his predecessor - in which the engagement, dialogue and the 
construction of mutual trust become the official policy of South Korea against the North. 
During the "progressive decade" we will be achieved the greatest results in terms of 
political, economic, cultural and humanitarian. For these reasons, 1997 can be considered 
as the third crucial point in the development of inter-Korean relations. Unlike the previous 
two, however, in this case the propulsive thrust to the change comes from within the 
panorama of the inter-Korean relations, by its primary actors, and not by stresses and 
changes coming from the environment and from its international balance of power . The 
new approach inaugurated by President Kim Dae-jung - the so-called "Sunshine Policy" - 
and the positive response of the North Korean regime will launch this new cycle of 
cooperation on the peninsula. Nevertheless, the weight of international actors can not be 
totally ignored; In fact, as we shall see, if at first the US administration led by President 
Clinton will line up in favour of the "Sunshine Policy", with the election of George W. 
Bush and the so-called "war on terrorism" American opposition to a more conciliatory 
approach with North Korea will create many problems in the process of cooperation 
between the two Koreas. 
The time horizon selected for this analysis is that of 2007 and, specifically, when in 
December 2007 the presidential election in South Korea lead to the election of 
conservative President Lee Myung-bak. the new president decides for a halt to the process 
of rapprochement with North Korea and most of the projects of inter-Korean cooperation, 
connecting the box to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, which from 2002 
onwards had become increasingly urgent. This dual choice, in sharp contrast with the 
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previous ten years, will lead to a strong hardening of positions and a virtual suspension of 
dialogue and cooperation. Such suspension will then increasingly deepened because of the 
events that are taking place during the presidency of Lee. The election of Lee also has a 
further consequence; if, in fact, before the intransigence of the US position it was 
mitigated by the conciliatory policy of South Korea and its role of "facilitated" dialogue 
with the new presidency conservative South Korea further strengthens the US position 
slightly inclined to dialogue. 
The election of Lee Myung-bak is not the only example of interruption of the cooperative 
process between the two Koreas since 1972 forward. During the second half of the '70s 
and early' 80s, in fact, the progress that had been made with the Joint Declaration are 
reduced to a minimum, and then take off again from the mid-80s. Similarly the years 
ranging from 1992 to 1997, in which the presidency of South Korea was elected Kim 
Young-sam, represent a step back from the process of the Basic Agreement. But even with 
Kim Dae-jung, the cooperation will be resumed and, building on the results achieved in 
the early 90s, further deepened. After 2007, however, not only it is interrupted the path 
taken ten years earlier, but the voltage levels high systematically eliminate the results in 
terms of cooperation achieved earlier - with the crucial exception of the industrial park of 
Kaesong. In the current state of things then, cooperation between the two Koreas is in a 
state of almost total deadlock. For these reasons, 2007 was identified as the deadline for 
our analysis of the cooperation between the two Koreas. 
 
After identifying the time horizon of research and the critical issues that will be analysed 
key is necessary to have a framework through which to analyse the relations of 
cooperation between the two Koreas. First, the areas in which this cooperation 
materializes are different, ranging from political and diplomatic cooperation in the 
economic, through the cultural and humanitarian. The first two are the main framework of 
inter-Korean cooperation. The first attempts in fact focus on the scope political - such as 
enshrining the basic principles of relations between the two countries (peace, 
independence, national unity) or provide for mechanisms to avoid military escalation - 
with humanitarian and cultural as a residual. With the progressive decade - in particular 
with the second five - the economy plays a central role, alongside politics, and is 
identified as a key area, not only for cooperation, but for a true path of national 
reconciliation. The creation of projects such as the joint Kaesong industrial park, are 
examples of a win-win strategy that is seen as a possible path to create a strong 
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convergence of interests which could, in turn, lead to deeper cooperation in the field 
political. During this evolution, the humanitarian and culture still exist, although in the 
second floor. The former involve mainly the issue of separated families and, in the second 
half of the 90s, the supply of food and agricultural assistance to the North. The sudden 
disappearance of the support of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the famine of the 90s 
will make this vital assistance to Pyongyang and will also become an important tool in the 
hands of Seoul to influence the behaviour of North Korea. For these reasons, in the 
following chapters we will analyse all these different areas, with particular attention to 
cooperation in political-diplomatic-military and the economic. 
North Korea and South are two sovereign states, inserted in the international community 
and, for this reason, we need to build a framework of analysis that will remake the theory 
of international relations. In this context, studies on cooperation are many, and our goal 
will be to identify what are the strategies that countries can implement to achieve this. As 
we have just seen, however, on inter-Korean relations insist different levels of analysis. 
First, cooperation between the two Koreas has always been strongly influenced by the 
global and regional context, which is also the primary cause of the very existence of these 
reports, as has caused the division of the peninsula. Then there is the actual level of inter-
Korean relations, in which the two Koreas interact with each other, as primary actors of 
the report. Finally, we can add a further level of analysis, which refers to belonging 
common of the two Koreas to the Korean nation. As we will see in fact, for centuries the 
Korean Peninsula has been politically and culturally united; the division of 1945 is not 
based on any previous justification but only the consequences of the Japanese colonization 
and the dynamics of the Cold War. For this reason, despite the division the two countries 
have continued to maintain the same language, the same traditions, the same cultural 
identity, to the point that both defined themselves as the only legitimate political 
representative of the entire Korean population. This common historical, cultural and 
linguistic, creates a base from which one can not ignore the analysis of inter-Korean 
cooperation. As we shall see, in fact, one of the strategies through which you can get 
cooperative interaction is based precisely on the existence of a set of shared meanings that 
create an in-group in which both actors are inserted. To maintain the theoretical scheme all 
three of these levels will split the conditions that make the cooperation into three groups: 
 
1. the structural conditions, which refer to the international context in which they 
act the two Koreas and the balance of power in force; 
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2. the variable conditions, which refer to the interactions between the two Koreas 
and how they can take action to get cooperation; 
3. the constructed conditions, which refer to the existence of a background of 
common identity to which you can entrust to obtain a success of the cooperation. 
 
This scheme, later will be applied to the main examples of cooperation that we will 
identify the time horizon of our analysis; in this way we will be able to analyse the causes, 
conditions and strategies that have characterized a particular interaction, as well as the 
results it has achieved, both in absolute terms and in comparison with what were the 
expectations of the actors at the beginning of process. 
 
The first part of this work will then be devoted to the analysis of the theory of cooperation 
within the world of international relations. You will first be given a definition of 
cooperation, which will be used during all the work, and then will be analyzed the most 
common approach to the interactions between states in international relations, namely the 
rational choice. Later, we will outline the main strategies of cooperation which are found 
within the theoretical panorama of international relations, so that we can get to the 
construction of an inclusive paradigm, which may include - through the use of so-called 
analytic eclecticism - both strategies related the rational choice, the approaches of 
different types, with a particular attention to constructivist. The latter will in fact provide 
the theoretical basis to incorporate into our framework also the aspect of identity shared 
by the two Korean states. Proceeding in this way, then we will build a system of 
multilevel analysis that allows us to consider all 3 dimensions outlined above. 
Within this analysis cooperation attention will be placed on two features that are part of 
these interactions: the time and trust. The time variable is indeed crucial to quantify the 
chances of success of cooperation, both because its sustainability is linked to its long-
term, both because of the importance that is given to the future interactions of the two 
actors is one of the keys to success cooperation. Moreover, despite the trust is not 
necessary for cooperation among states, it becomes a key variable when cooperation is 
meant to be stable, long-term and aimed at a specific purpose, such as the resolution of a 
strategic rivalry like that between the two Koreas. 
Having dealt with the theory and elaborate a scheme that takes into account the specific 
characteristics of the inter-Korean relations and give us the opportunity to analyze all the 
different levels, the second part will be devoted to the reconstruction historical policy on 
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the Korean Peninsula took the horizon under consideration. The first part will deal with 
the one that will define the "Korean National Tragedy" from the beginning of Japanese 
colonization (formally net 1,910) at the end of the Korean War (1953). It is in this time 
that is consumed before the loss of independence and the subsequent loss of national unity 
for the Korean population - founding characteristic of inter-Korean relations. 
Subsequently will be addressed and analyzed the three historical ruptures that we 
identified earlier - Rapprochement of 1972, the end of the Cold War presidencies 
progressive in South Korea - with a particular focus on the perspective of the history of 
international relations, which, as we have seen , they have had a decisive influence on the 
development of the Korean Peninsula. 
Finally, the third and the fourth chapter will be devoted to the analysis of real inter-Korean 
cooperation. After outlining the theoretical tool and the historical and political context, the 
third chapter will focus on the major events of political cooperation between the two 
Koreas. The key points will be the Joint Declaration of 1972, the Basic Agreement of 
1992 and the inter-Korean summit in 2000 - with the joint declaration signed on the 
inside; of course for each of these three examples we will not only analyze the last step, 
but the whole process of dialogue and negotiation that led to that outcome. Also in the 
third chapter will prey also examines the efforts of political and diplomatic cooperation 
carried out by the South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, who has focused his policies 
more towards cooperation in the economic field, with a focus on the second international 
summit Korean 2007 and the role that South Korea played within the multilateral 
framework of the Six Party Talks, created to solve the nuclear issue of North Korea. 
The fourth chapter will be dedicated to economic cooperation, cultural and humanitarian. 
The first will have a greater weight, both for the variety of projects and interactions 
implemented, both for the role that economic cooperation can play in key policy towards 
national reconciliation. With this perspective will be given great importance especially to 
the inter-Korean policies of Presidents progressives, 1997-2007, which will give the 
maximum impetus to this type of interaction, hitherto virtually absent. An event of great 
importance, which will be given ample space, consists of the joint industrial park in 
Kaesong, which is an example of successful cooperation and long-term, but also a 
possible example for future developments of rapprochement, not only in statement. 
The goal that we propose in this way is to have a clear political-historical reconstruction 
of the development of inter-Korean relations that could form the basis for a multilevel 
analysis and understanding of the inter-Korean cooperation. To do this we doteremo also 
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of a theoretical tool that is able to address the complexity of this phenomenon and its 
different levels of analysis. If, in fact, the cooperation represents a small proportion of 
inter-Korean relations, dominated for long periods of tension, military confrontation and 
clash, but it is also a practical way to achieve a rapprochement and a shift of strategic 
rivalry, with the aim a process of national reconciliation. 
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First Chapter 
The evolution and development of cooperation among 
States 
 
The development of cooperative relations can not be considered one of the main features 
of the history and evolution of relations between North Korea and South Korea. Since the 
tragic birth of two separate states, in fact, conflict, confrontation, tension and rivalry have 
been the key features of this relationship. The trauma of Japanese colonization has been 
followed by the division of the peninsula, due to the onset of the global bipolar order. In a 
short time that, the intention of the winning powers, a temporary division before the 
national reunification and the recovery of independence for the Korean population, 
became a status quo that has lasted until today. In addition, the Korean War, which lasted 
from 1950 to 1953, added a further trauma to this already complicated situation. This 
negative event contributed decisively to freeze the situation that was created from 1945 to 
1950, and even further exacerbate the conflict between the two Korean states. From this 
point onward, the governments of North and South Korea presented themselves, 
respectively, as the only legitimate representatives of the Korean nation, and considered 
each other as the main enemy. 
Such a tense situation logically left little room for cooperation. However, since the ‘70s, a 
series of changes in the global arena made possible the beginning of a process of 
rapprochement, which continued especially during the 90s, thanks to a new impetus that 
came from the end of the Cold War and the bipolar balance of power. This path reached 
its highest expression in the late ‘90s and early 2000s, when two consecutive South 
Korean progressive administration have implemented a change of approach compared to 
the past, focusing on cooperation and dialogue with the North, rather that containment and 
confrontation. 
This process of rapprochement has brought with it the development in practice of 
cooperative interactions between the two Koreas, which, in turn, have led to positive 
results regarding the level of tension on the peninsula, the volume of exchanges and 
contacts, the process of national reconciliation. 
For these reasons, it is essential to carry out a preliminary analysis on the nature of 
cooperation in international relations and in the relations between states. Most of the 
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studies in this regard have focused on the role that cooperation can assume in this context, 
the probability that it will occur or not, its relationship with the fundamental 
characteristics of the international system. Less attention has been given to cooperation 
strategies, to the concrete possibility that states, with a clear will to achieve such a result, 
may have to make sure that a cooperative interaction reaches a successful end. Indeed, 
there are a number of conditions on which the actors can act to increase significantly the 
possibility to cooperate productively. 
The goal of this chapter will be to examine the various theoretical approaches that have 
addressed the issue of cooperation, in order to elaborate, from them, a comprehensive 
framework that can be applied to the case of inter-Korean relations, which, as we will see 
at the end of the chapter, can be considered as an example with peculiar and almost unique 
characteristics. 
 
 
1.1 The creation of cooperative relations 
 
The dilemma of how to deal with other individuals in a social context has intrigued people 
for a very long time. Usually, every single people create a scale of values, placing at the 
apex its own needs and the needs of those belonging to its affective and social around. 
Inside this scale of values, a further distinction, again based on relevance, is created. In 
this case, at the top are placed the most important needs for the individual and its own. In 
these contexts, every individual has an incentive to be selfish and give little or no 
importance to the needs of the others who are not part of their affective or social around. 
In a situation of this kind it seems to be little or no room for cooperative interactions. 
 
A context with these characteristics has been defined as “State of Nature”1. Following 
Hobbesian approach, the main feature in the “State of Nature” is egoism. Individuals 
compete with each other to maximize their own interests, regardless the needs of the other 
actors involved in their social context. On that basis, the only way to achieve cooperation 
is the presence of a central authority that can impose its power over individuals in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The “State of Nature” is a hypothetical concept, particularly used in moral and political 
philosophy, to denote the conditions of people living before the creation of societies and social 
structures. Among the most important philosophers who used this concept, even with opposite 
characteristics, there are: Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, Montesquieu, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. 
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social context. This central authority is identified with a strong government that imposes 
rules and laws to emerge from the “State of Nature”2. 
Even if we consider the “State of Nature” situation from a less pessimistic point of view, 
the development of cooperative relationships seems to be difficult to achieve. In fact, as 
clearly described in Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt” example3, the consent of all the 
actors and the equal interest in the project are not sufficient to ensure that cooperation 
takes place4. The individuals will always have an incentive to “catch the hare”, get enough 
food for himself and let his fellows starve. A relationship based on cooperation, thus, 
requires the presence of incentives that can ensure – or at least make it as likely as 
possible – that the other actor(s) will fulfil its commitment.  
A further problem that concerns cooperation is related to time. Most of cooperative 
relations raise the issue of ‘future time actions’. In fact, if we cannot know with certainty 
what will be the behaviour of all actors throughout the entire interaction; at the very 
moment in which we have to decide how to act we cannot know, without doubts, if all the 
individuals involved will respect the commitments or if someone will decide to defect. 
This dilemma is the so-called “shadow of the future”5 and introduces the importance of 
information and communication among the actors for the successful outcome of the 
cooperative interaction. 
 
These considerations about interactions among individuals can provide useful lessons also 
for bigger contexts. In particular, quite often relations among States have been compared 
to relations among individuals. All the theorists of social contract, being Hobbes, Spinoza, 
Locke, Rousseau or Kant, created an analogy between States and individuals in a “State of 
Nature”. The main reason lies in the fact that, just like States, people in that situation 
coexist without a central authority that can impose its will over every individual. This 
consideration has been widely accepted and revived by many neo-realist scholars, starting 
from Kenneth Waltz6.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Hobbes, Thomas [1651] 1958, Leviathan, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis. 
3 The ‘Stag Hunt’ story was described for the first time by Jean-Jacque Rousseau in A discourse on 
inequality. The scenario presents two hunters who can either jointly hunt a stag or individually 
hunt a hare.  
4 Waltz, Kenneth N. 1954, Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press. New York. 
5 Shubik, Martin 1970, ‘Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of Prisoner’s Dilemma: Three 
Solutions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 14, pp. 181-94.  
6 Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959, Man, the state and war. 
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The idea of anthropomorphizing the State and relations among States has been accepted 
and pursued by other school of thought. The constructivist approach, for example, 
recognizes the state as a collective actor to which can be attributed characteristics of 
individual actors, such as identity, interests, and intentions7. 
  
Which are the reasons why an individual should refrain from satisfying its own essential 
needs to collaborate with other individuals and achieve greater collective gains later? Who 
or what ensures that all the other people will do the same? Under such circumstances it is 
convenient to cooperate rather than exploit the work of other individuals? How such 
circumstances, that can assure cooperation from other actors, can be created? All these 
questions are crucial to understand how to create cooperative relations among individuals. 
And among States. 
 
 
1.1.1 Definition of Cooperation !
In spite of – or perhaps thanks to – the pessimistic context presented before, cooperation 
among states has become a subject of great interests for political scientists and scholars of 
international relations. The first step to start analysing international cooperation must be 
the identification of the main object of study. A widely accepted definition for 
international cooperation comes from the work of Robert Keohane: 
 
“intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating 
realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy 
coordination”8 
 
The central point of the definition lies in the last sentence. Cooperation implies the active 
process of negotiation between the parties, called “policy coordination”. Using the 
definition given by Charles E. Lindblom, policy coordination takes place when the two 
parties decide to adjust their policies in such a way to reduce, or even avoid, any negative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Wendt, Alexander 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
8 Keohane, Robert O. 1984, After Hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political 
economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 51-52. 
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consequence for the other9. At the starting point, from which the interaction begins, the 
goals of the two parties don’t need to be the same. The process of policy coordination 
serves precisely for this scope. Even if the interests do not coincide, the States can 
negotiate their policies in order to avoid, or at least reduce, the negative outcomes for the 
other. 
 
The lack of coincidence of interests and goals between actors is a key feature for 
cooperation. A situation of perfect coincidence implies that there is no need for 
coordination between the two sides, since the policies of one automatically facilitate the 
achievement of the goals of the other. This is true even in a situation characterized by 
selfishness, in which the behaviour of an actor does not take into account the other. These 
kinds of situations are characterized by harmony and cooperation is unnecessary10. 
Distinguish cooperation from harmony gives the possibility to identify the two main 
characteristics of a cooperative interaction: action and mutual gains. The first one implies 
that there must be an effort to reduce the distance that separates the goals of one actor 
from the goals of the other, a process of negotiation and adjustment of the policy to reach 
a situation of mutual gains. From this perspective cooperation is not the simple absence of 
conflict, rather it comes directly from situations of conflict and it can be considered as a 
strategy to react and overcome these kinds of situations. The opposite of conflict is not 
cooperation but harmony, and where harmony reigns cooperation does not take place. 
 
Inactivity is in sharp contrast to cooperation, but also unilateral behaviour, in which the 
actors do not take into account the interests and goals of the others, but pursue only their 
own. More broadly, we can consider discord as the main opposite to cooperation. Discord 
can take place in two different ways. After recognizing the differences in goals and 
interests between the two parties – and leaving the ‘world of harmony’ – if no attempts to 
adjust the policies to each other’s objectives are made, thus the result is discord. Both 
actors continue to pursue policies aimed at achieving self-interest goals, considering the 
other responsible for any damage or constraints. In this way, conflict is not overcome but 
is intended to increase. 
The second situation in which discord drives the relations between States occurs when the 
policy adjustment takes place but encounter resistance. The efforts to induce the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Lindblom, Charles E. 1965, The intelligence of democracy, The Free Press, New York. 
10 Keohane , Robert O. 1984, After Hegemony. 
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counterpart to change its policy, in order to be more compatible, fail and policy conflict 
remains. 
Creating cooperation can be, thus, considered as a strategy that, starting from a situation 
of conflict, tries to find an effective and proactive way to solve the conflict and meet the 
interests and needs of both parties involved. 
 
 
1.1.2 Cooperation and Rational Choice Theory 
 
Most of the studies dealing with cooperation among states find its rationale in the concept 
of maximization of gains. Every party that intervene in the interaction is willing to take 
full advantage of every relation, therefore it will choose to cooperate if and only that 
choice grants it the most benefits. When studying cooperation the most important and 
most debated approach is based on the theory of rational choice, a framework for 
understanding and modelling social and economic behaviour. The concept of rationality 
must be interpreted as “wanting more rather than less of a good”. More specifically, an 
individual – or a state, as in this case – acts as if balancing costs against benefits to arrive 
at action that maximizes personal advantage11; thus rationality is seen as a property of 
patterns of choices, rather than of individual choices. According to the rational choice 
theory, then, actors will develop strategies to make decisions in such a way to maximize 
their gains, in relations to costs. 
 
The most classic example of these strategies of decision-making is the so-called game 
theory - also called interactive decision theory. Specifically, it is "the study of 
mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-
makers"12. In practice, it is the effort to reduce to a mathematical model - usually 
expressed through a matrix - the interaction between the actors, including: the number of 
players, the information and the actions that each one has available at any given time and 
the payoff to which each player’s decision leads. The second step consists in looking at 
the possible results and finding the equilibrium situations, a stable situation in which each 
actor maximizes its own benefit and from which, therefore, has no incentive to deviate. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Friedman, Milton 1953, Essays in positive economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
12  Myerson, Roger B. 1991, Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
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From its birth, with the work of the mathematician John von Neumann in the mid-40s13, 
game theory had an enormous development and application to a vast number of different 
fields. Besides disciplines related to mathematical and economic spheres, game theory has 
been widely used in the study of political science and international relations. 
A common classification divides these games into zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. In 
zero-sum games the total benefit to all players in the game, for every combination of 
strategies, always adds to zero, a player benefits only at the expense of others. By contrast, 
non-zero-sum games work under the assumption that pure conflict is dropped from the 
game and the players face outcomes where they can both lose or both win, where 
coordination and cooperation emerge as alternatives to pure conflict. In principal, most 
real world situations in both economic and political fields are of a non-zero-sum nature.  
 
Although game theory has often been employed as a theoretical tool for international 
relations, it has been criticized on the basis that the theory generally requires more 
information than it provides answers. Who are the relevant actors? Which are the rules and 
the payoff structures? Is the game a one-shot or a repeated game? Furthermore, game 
theory can’t incorporate all of the available information, for example: the historical 
framework of the game environment and the dynamics of the foreign policy making 
process. Similarly, some critics argued if game theory can be relevantly applied to 
complex phenomena, such as international relations, without incorporating psychological 
and cognitive elements. Deborah Welch Larson, for example, points out that simple game 
models omit many of the processes that are. In fact, critical factors in international 
relations, such as: the images of the opponent, double standards or the significance of 
reciprocity14. 
In addition, game theory is often criticized for assumptions made on the rationality of 
decision makers. According to Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman, “rationality implies 
some objective criterion of self-interest which guides actors choices. But there may be no 
objective criterion that defines the interests of a nation, in which various sub-units pull 
and tug toward conflicting goals” 15.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Von Neumann, John and Morgenstern, Oskar 1944, Theory of games and economic behavior, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
14  Larson Welch, Debora 1988, ‘The psychology of reciprocity in international relations’, 
Negotiation Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 281-301. 
15 Goldstein Joshua S. and Freeman John R. 1990, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in 
World Politics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 12. 
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Game theory, as all the theories, indeed is hindered by shortcomings when applied to 
pragmatic cases in international relations. However, in general, game theory has been 
widely applied to international politics as metaphor, analogy, or model rather than as a 
theory16. 
 
In studying world politics, especially the emergence of cooperative interactions between 
states, game theory has been - and still is - essential to many scholars that start from the 
premise that the international system is anarchic, since there is no central authority that 
can impose its will on the states. If the decision of how to interact is left, almost freely, to 
the decision of the single actors, there must be an incentive toward cooperation to make it 
possible, otherwise the shadow of egoism and defection will never be eliminated. Given 
the characteristic of rationality - as defined above - that these scholars attribute to states, 
this incentive can be found in maximizing the benefits, through the model of decision-
making created by game theory. The two main school of thoughts that based their analysis 
of cooperation between states on game theory, though reaching opposite conclusions, are: 
(neo)realism and neo-liberalism. 
 
According to realism17 - which over time has taken a considerable number of different 
interpretations - international relations are based on four propositions18, which govern its 
development and strongly characterize the possibilities: 
 
1. The international system is anarchic, there is no central authority that has the 
power to impose their will on states. This situation of anarchy puts states in a state 
of constant danger and uncertainty about their survival and the behaviour of the 
other actors, so the international system is characterized by constant antagonism; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Snidal, Duncan 1985, ‘The game of international politics’, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 
25-57 
17 Major realist works include: Carr, Edward H. 1964, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Harper Torchbooks, London and New York; 
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., 
McGraw-Hill, New York; Aron, Raymond 1966, International Relations: A Theory of Peace and 
War, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, N.Y; Waltz, Kenneth N. 1954, Man, the State and 
War, Columbia University Press. New York.; Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979, Theory of International 
Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York; Gilpin, Robert 1981, War and Change in World Politics 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Mearsheimer, John J. 2001, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, New York. 
18 Donnelly, Jack 2008, ‘The Ethics of Realism’, in Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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2. The most important actors in the international system are the states; 
3. The states are considered rational and unitary actors, aimed at maximizing their 
own interests; 
4. The fundamental concern of the states is their survival, which is why they try to 
maximize their - military - strength and deal, almost exclusively, with issues 
related to power and security. 
 
As a corollary to these last two assumptions, there is then a further central point consisting 
that the so-called security dilemma19. In this situation, the efforts made by a country to 
increase its own security, regardless of the real intentions, lead to increased insecurity of 
the other actors, who perceive such measures as potentially threatening20. In fact, because 
of the lack of clear and certain information about the intentions of the parties, the actions 
that a state put in place to increase its security - such as acquiring new systems of weapons 
or increasing the defence budget - will be considered as potentially expansionist moves by 
opponents, that will respond increasing its military equipment and thus triggering a 
dangerous spiral. 
Given his understanding of anarchy, realism says that individual well-being is not the 
fundamental interests of States; survival is their main interest. Raymond Aron, for 
example, suggested that “politics, insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to 
signify – in both ideal and objective terms – simply the survival of states confronting the 
potential threat created by the existence of other states”21 and Robert Gilpin notes that 
individuals and groups can seek truth, beauty and justice, but “all these more noble goals 
will be lost unless one makes provision for one's security in the power struggle among 
group22”. 
Driven by this interest in survival, the states are very sensitive to any erosion of their 
relative power, which is the ultimate basis for their security and independence in an 
international anarchic system. Thus, realists believe that the main objective of the states, 
in any relationship, is not to achieve the highest possible gain or profit. Instead, the 
fundamental objective is to prevent others from making progress in their relative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The term was originally coined by John H. Herz in 1951, in the book Political Realism and 
Political Idealism. 
20 Jervis, Robert 1978, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 
pp. 167-174. 
21 Aron, Raymond 1966, Peace and War, p. 6. 
22  Gilpin, Robert 1984,‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International 
Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 304. 
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capabilities23. For example, Carr suggested that “the most serious wars are fought in order 
to make one's own country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another from 
becoming militarily stronger”24. Along the same lines, for Gilpin the international system 
“stimulates, and may compel, a state to increase its power; at the least, it necessitates that 
the prudent state prevent relative increases in the power of competitor states” 25. Indeed, 
states may also increase their absolute capacity, if doing so prevents others from getting 
even greater gains. This is because, as suggested by Waltz, “the first concern of the states 
is not to maximize the power, but to maintain their position in the system”26. 
States seek to avoid increases in other’s relative capabilities. As a result, the actors 
estimate their performance in any relationship in terms of the others’ performance. Thus, 
the states are positional, not atomistic, in character. Most significantly, positionality may 
affect the willingness of states to cooperate. They fear that their counterparties may obtain 
relatively higher gains and, therefore, will surge ahead in relative capabilities27. 
State positionality, then, creates a “relative gains problem” for cooperation. That is, a state 
refuses to join, leaves, or greatly limits its commitment to a cooperative relationship if it 
considers that the counterparts achieve, or are able to achieve, relatively higher gains. The 
actor will avoid cooperation, although participation was providing it, or would have 
provided it, with large absolute gains. In addition, a state concerned about the relative 
gains may refuse to cooperate, even if it is convinced that the partners will be able to keep 
their commitments to a joint agreement. In fact, if a state believes that a proposed 
agreement would provide all parts absolute gains, but would also generate favouring 
relative gains, the greater certainty that the partners would adhere to the terms of the 
arrangement will only accentuate his concerns. Thus, a state concerned for relative gains 
could respond to a greater certainty that the partners would have keep their promises with 
a lower rather than a higher willingness to cooperate. 
Faced with both problems – cheating and relative gains – states seek to ensure that 
partners respect their promises and that the interaction produces "balanced" achievements 
of gains. According to realists, the balance and fairness of gains distributions maintains 
pre-existent balance of capabilities. According to Hans Morgenthau, states offer their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Grieco, Joseph M. 1988, ‘Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique to the newest 
liberal institutionalism’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 485-507. 
24 Carr, Edward H. 1964, The Twenty Years Crisis, p. 111. 
25 Gilpin, Robert 1981, War and Change, pp. 87-88. 
26 Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. 
27 Grieco, Joseph M. 1988, ‘Anarchy and the limits of cooperation’. 
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partners “concessions”, in return, they expect to receive approximately equal 
“compensation”28. 
Moreover, the relevance that realists give to the uncertainty for the future, in close 
connection with the supreme goal of survival, constitutes an additional challenge for 
cooperation. A cooperative interaction may in fact bring such high gains to the counterpart 
to make it a tough opponent to face in the future, stronger than what it would have been if 
the cooperation never took place. The decision on whether or not to cooperate, together 
with the uncertainty towards the future, can become a matter of survival for realists. 
A system with these characteristics leaves little room for cooperation, seen as a residual 
component of relations between states, dominated, instead, by confrontation and 
competition. Besides the risk of being cheated, cooperation is always linked to the 
position of a state in the system. 
 
The major challenge to realist views – also on cooperation – was the emergence of 
liberalism and especially, liberal institutionalism. This new wave of challenges started in 
the 1940s and the early 1950s when liberal institutionalists sought to refute the realist 
understanding of world politics – namely the previous four propositions. First, they 
rejected realism's proposition about the centrality of states. According to the “functionalist 
integration theory” 29, the key new actors in world politics were specialized international 
agencies and their technical experts, for neo-functionalists: labour unions, political parties, 
trade associations, and supranational bureaucracies. Another major contribution to 
liberalism in international relations has been the so-called “(complex) interdependence 
theory” 30 , emerged from the early ‘70s; for the interdependence liberals the new 
protagonists of international relations, besides the states, were multinational and 
transnational organizations and corporations. The second critic countered the realist view 
that states are unitary or rational agents. Functionalists, for example, argued that authority 
was becoming decentralized within modern states and that a similar process was underway 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985, Politics Among Nations. 
29 For functionalist works see: Mitrany, David 1966, A Working Peace System, Quadrangle Books, 
Chicago; Mitrany, David 1976, The Functional Theory of Politics, St. Martin's Press, New York; 
Sewell, James Patrick 1966, Functionalism and World Politics: A Study on United Nations 
Programs Financing Economic Development, Princeton University Press, Nev Jersey; Haas, Ernst 
B. 1964, Beyond Nation-State: Functionalism and lnternational Organization, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford. 
30 For complex interdependence see: Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. 1977, Power and 
Interdependence, Little, Brown, Boston. 
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internationally. According to interdependence theorists, states and international relations 
were increasingly characterized by “multiple channels of access”, which gradually 
weakened the grip on foreign policy held by central decision-makers. Third, liberals 
argued that states were becoming less concerned about power and security. The costs of 
war were becoming increasingly high, due to the development of nuclear weapons and the 
mobilization of national population. Furthermore, the growing economic inter-dependence 
left the states more dependent – and therefore more vulnerable – from each other for the 
achievement of goals that were increasingly essential (economic growth, social stability, 
full employment, etc...). Finally, liberal institutionalists rejected realist view that states are 
fundamentally unwilling to cooperate, that cooperation is residual in analysing relations 
among states, finding instead that states increasingly viewed one another not as enemies, 
but instead as partners needed to secure greater comfort and well-being for their home 
publics. 
 
But the real challenge to realism, in terms of cooperation theory, came from the so-called 
neo-liberalism or neo-liberal institutionalism31. The main feature of this new approach, 
emerged from the second half of the Seventies, was its acceptance of some of the key 
assumptions of realists. In contrast to earlier versions of liberal institutionalism, the 
newest one accepts realist arguments that states are the major actors in world affairs and 
are unitary and rational agents. It also accepts realist relevance given to anarchy to explain 
state motives and actions32. Unlike realists, however, neoliberals argue that the possibility 
of cooperation in the international system are much more frequent. Neoliberals argue that 
realism is wrong to discount the possibilities for international cooperation and the 
capacities of international institutions. They claim that, contrary to realism and in 
accordance with traditional liberal views, institutions can help states in working together. 
Thus, neoliberals argue, the prospects for international cooperation are better than what 
realism allows. The interactions, in fact, are not always a zero-sum game, but also positive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Major neoliberal works: Axelrod, Robert 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation Basic Books, 
New York; Axelrod Robert and Keohane, Robert O. 1985, ‘Achieving Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, World Politics, Vol. 38, pp, 226-54; Keohane, Robert O. 
1984, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton; Lipson, Charles 1984, ‘International Cooperation in Economic and 
Security Affairs’, World Politics, Vol. 37, pp, 1-23; Stein, Arthur 1983, ‘Coordination and 
Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, in Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.), International 
Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: N.Y., pp, 115-40. 
32 Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O. 1985, ‘Achieving cooperation under anarchy’. 
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sum games where the goal for every actor is to maximize its own benefit, regardless of the 
result obtained by the counterpart33. Neo-liberals in fact posit that states seek to maximize 
their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the relative gains achieved by others. 
Cheating is seen as the greatest hindrance to cooperation among egoistic states, but 
international institutions can help states overcome this obstacle. Thus, conditional 
cooperation among states may evolve in the face of international anarchy and selfish 
interests34.  
Among the various ways to foster cooperation – such as: strategies of reciprocity, 
extended time horizons and reduced verification and sanctioning costs – neo-liberals place 
great emphasis on another factor: international institutions. In particular, neo-liberals 
argue that institutions reduce verification costs, create iterativeness and make it easier to 
punish cheaters. In the opinion of Arthur Stein, “regimes in the international arena are also 
created to deal with the collective suboptimality that can emerge from individual 
behaviour”; In other words, if we consider states like single individuals that compose the 
society, then international institutions are compared to the creation of a “state” to resolve 
collective actions problems inside the society35.  
As Keohane suggests “in general, regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering 
the likelihood of being double-crossed”36. Hegemonic power may be necessary to 
establish cooperation among states, neoliberals argue, but it may endure after hegemony 
with the aid of institutions. As Keohane concludes, “When we think about cooperation 
after hegemony, we need to think about institutions”37. 
International institutions, whether in the form of regimes, laws, treaties, or organizations, 
help provide these necessary conditions for cooperation. By having rules about what 
constitutes a violation of a relationship, institutions help increase the confidence of each 
state that it will not be exploited and that its own cooperative move will be reciprocated. 
By establishing formal mechanisms of surveillance, institutions enable states to see what 
other states are doing, again enhancing confidence that a defection will be seen and a 
cooperative action will be followed by the same. By creating rules and procedures for 
surveillance and sanction, all parties can have greater confidence that violations will be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Lipson, Charles 1984, ‘International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs’. 
34 Nye, Joseph S. 1988, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’, World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-
251. 
35 Stein, Arthur 1983, ‘Coordination and collaboration’, p. 123. 
36 Keohane, Robert O. 1984 After Hegemony, p. 97. 
37 Ibidem, p. 246. 
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punished. By formalizing these relationships, institutions help reduce each state's discount 
rate for future gains while increasing each state's expectation that the relationship will 
continue into the future. 
 
In essence, neoliberals do not deny the anarchic nature of the international system, but 
argue that there is a need to emphasize the varieties of cooperative behaviour within a 
decentralized system. Neo-liberal thinkers often employ game theory to explain why states 
do or do not cooperate and their approach tends to emphasize the possibility of mutual 
wins, where similar interests can be arranged and compromised for joint benefit. Although 
states may be liable to defect without a central authority monitoring the accommodations, 
countervailing forces often exist, forces that cause states to keep their promises and to 
resolve the prisoner's dilemma. 
 
Notable advances in neoliberal claims, with regards to cooperation, were made by Robert 
Axelrod38. The experiments made by Axelrod served as the cornerstone for the following 
neoliberal literature about cooperation between states. 
Recognizing that “there is no common government to enforce rules, and by the standards 
of domestic society, international institutions are weak”39, Axelrod developed an approach 
to cooperation that could bypass the theoretical reluctance on the attainability of 
cooperation. States in anarchy are often entangled in situations of mixed interests, a 
condition often referred to as non-zero-sum and can be described by the prisoner's 
dilemma40. The model chosen by Axelrod to represent the interactions is the prisoner's 
dilemma itself, in particular the iterated prisoner's dilemma, in which players do not know 
which will be their last interaction. The methodology used by Axelrod was to ask several 
players to elaborate different strategies (ranging from very simple to extremely complex) 
and, through a computer tournament, see which was the winning strategy in an iterated 
prisoner's dilemma game. 
Despite this game has a dominant strategy – to defect – when it is repeated indefinitely, 
the winning strategy emerged from the computer tournament is the so-called “Tit for Tat”. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Axelrod, Robert 1984, The evolution of cooperation, Basic Books, New York. 
39 Ibidem, p. 4. 
40 The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was invented in 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher and 
then formalized by Albert W. Tucker shortly thereafter. In this game there are two players, each 
one with two choices: cooperate or defect. Each must make its choice without knowing what the 
other will do. According to the payoffs in the game defection yields a higher payoff than 
cooperation, but if both defect both do worse than if both cooperated. 
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This strategy, one of the less complex, starts with a cooperative choice and then does what 
the other player did on the previous move. The characteristics that guarantee the victory to 
the strategy of “Tit for Tat” are basically four: 
 
1. Nice – it is never the first to defect; 
2. Retaliating – the response to defection is immediate and deters from repeating it; 
3. Forgiving – gives the possibility to recover the collaboration after a defection; 
4. Clear - is easily recognizable and predictable. 
 
With the computer tournament Axelrod showed how cooperative behaviours might 
emerge without other attributes, usually regarded as fundamental. For example, the “Live 
and let live” system adopted by French and German soldier on the Western Front of the 
First World War shows how cooperation might be the more rational way of interaction in 
a state of total lack of friendship and can develop even between antagonists41. The 
analysis of cooperation in biological systems adds that, under certain circumstances, it is 
not even necessary that the actors are able to appreciate the consequences of 
cooperation42.  
While foresight and friendship are not necessary for the development of a cooperative 
interaction, they can be helpful. In this sense, Axelrod draws some useful conclusions 
from his experiments, a sort of ‘best practices’ to make cooperation more likely. 
The first recommendation deals with envy. Unless a player does not seek the destruction 
of the opponent – unlikely event in a cooperative relation – it is not a zero-sum game, so 
there’s no need to set a strategy to beat the other but a decision rule that allows the 
greatest possible gain for us. We should not be envious of the success of the other party. 
From this proposition becomes crystal clear the main difference between neoliberal and 
(neo-)realist scholars about cooperation. For Axelrod, in fact, it is not relevant what the 
other actor gains from the interaction, the only consideration that matters is if we 
maximize our benefit. The focus is on the absolute gain and not on the relative gain. 
Conversely, realists put the emphasis on the fundamental goal of states to prevent others 
from achieving advances in their relative capabilities. Hence, the most important 
consideration in every interaction is the concept of state positionality, that can inhibit any 
willingness toward cooperation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Axelrod, Robert 1984, The evolution of cooperation. 
42 Ibidem. 
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The second suggestion asserts that it is not good to be the first to defect, because this 
choice is convenient only when future time is not relevant, so in a single shot game or if 
the weight we give to future interactions is extremely low. In this case, Axelrod introduces 
the fundamental concept of the shadow of the future. The importance of future time 
actions for cooperation is clearly illustrated by Axelrod’s experiments. In fact, in a single 
shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game the actors have a dominant strategy to defect; it’s only with 
the introduction of “future” that cooperation becomes the rational choice and “Tit for Tat” 
strategy becomes the winning strategy. During the computer tournament, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma was iterated and the players didn’t know in how many interactions they would 
incur with each counterpart. So, no one could exploit a defection on the last move – for 
which they would not have paid any sanction.   
The third recommendation emphasizes the relevance of reciprocity, both for cooperation 
as for defection. The concept of reciprocity is key for a sustainable and long-term 
cooperation. It will be central also for the creation of trust-based relationship between 
states. 
The last one says that being too clever is not a good choice. Although it may seem 
counterintuitive, it actually stresses again the importance of future time for cooperation. In 
fact, if the goal is reaching cooperation predictability becomes an advantage and too 
complicated strategies might not be understood by the counterpart and, thus, not be 
predictable. 
 
Despite cooperation can be a rational choice – if not the most rational – also 
spontaneously, without any action by the actors, there are ways to change the conditions 
on the ground and make it more attracting. In other words, if an actor has the will to reach 
specific cooperative interaction, it may adopt certain behaviours to make it more likely. In 
the analysis of Axelrod, obviously, these methods are always connected to the rationality 
of the choice of the actors. 
 
As seen above, in the rational choice analysis of cooperation a great importance is given to 
the variable w, the weight that an actor gives to future interactions compared to the 
present. In addition, the probability to meet again the same actor in the future and re-
interact with it plays a decisive role. The first method to promote cooperation is, therefore, 
to amplify the importance of the future. 
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If w is very low and there is little possibility that the interaction will take place again in 
the future, or if the future interaction is poorly valued compared to the immediate benefits 
of a possible defection, then cooperation will probably fail. 
To change the situation, the actors can make interactions more durable and more frequent, 
in order to increase the value given to future interactions. Actors can organize interactions 
that restrict the presence of other players, or they may concentrate the interactions in 
space, or they can decompose the issues to create a greater number of possible 
interactions. Decomposing interactions promotes the stability of cooperation and reduces 
the immediate gains of cheating compared to the future gains of a sustained long-term 
cooperation. All of these strategies can be – and have been – implemented practically in 
relations between States. 
 
A second way of promoting cooperation deals directly to the losses and gains of an 
interaction. In fact, assuming that we are trapped inside a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, 
the best thing to do to avoid the dominant strategy of short-term defection is to transform 
the interaction so that it is no longer a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Changing the payoff structure 
can be an excellent way to break the deadlock. For example, what the state structures do 
within them, through laws and prison, is precisely to get out of Prisoner's Dilemmas and 
make sure that the individuals who make up the national community do not take 
advantage of the situation. Changing the payoff structure should not thus be so drastic to 
get out from the framework of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In fact, it is enough to change them 
so that the incentives for future cooperation in the long-term outweigh the incentive for 
immediate defection. 
 
Although it may sound moralistic, a further method to promote the development of 
cooperation is teaching altruism and reciprocity. While in the first case the application to a 
society such as the international community is difficult, regarding the concept of 
reciprocity things are different. 
The core of “Tit for Tat” winning strategy is precisely in reciprocity. After starting with a 
conciliatory gesture, in fact, Axelrod’s experiments tell us that to reciprocate every move 
of our opponent is the winning strategy. In this way, cooperation is supported and 
defection punished. Strategies based upon reciprocity can teach all the actors in the 
community how to interact with each other and that trying to be less then cooperative will 
be punished – and, therefore, it will be not profitable. The other’s reciprocity helps to 
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police the entire community by punishing who tries to exploit cooperation; this decreases 
the number of uncooperative individuals and the probability to have to interact with them 
in the future. 
 
The last way that can foster cooperation and make it more likely concerns the 
improvement of recognition abilities. The ability to recognize the other's behaviour 
through previous interactions and to recall its main features, as well as to become 
recognizable in the same way by the others, are key features for a long lasting cooperation. 
The problem of the inability to recognize the identity, the will, the actions of the other 
players are particularly relevant in the relations among States. Very often it is the lack of 
information and the inability to obtain credible and verifiable information that affect 
relations between States. Furthermore, frequently the actions taken by one State can be 
misinterpreted from the others. As in the case of the Security Dilemma, in fact, many of 
the means by which a state seeks to increase its security tend to decrease the level of 
security of others. A defensive move is hence perceived as a threat for others43. As John 
Mearsheimer said: “Uncertainty about the intentions of other States is unavoidable, which 
means that States can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions”44. 
Uncertainty becomes a crucial point for relations between States and, thus, for the 
development of cooperation between States.  
Despite the work of Axelrod focuses on the development of cooperation at the general 
level and in a spontaneous way, the conclusions of his experiments can be applied also in 
contexts characterized by the presence of social structures. These structures contribute to 
the formation of the interactions and to the development of cooperation. In particular, if 
we focus on cooperation among states, even if we accept the proposition that anarchy 
dominates the international system – like realists and neo-liberal – the presence of 
international institutions – broadly defined as “recognized patterns of practice around 
which expectations converge” 45  – with the characteristics identified by Axelrod as 
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44 Mearsheimer, John 2001, The tragedy of great power politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New 
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45  Young, Oran 1982, ‘Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes’, 
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facilitators towards cooperation, plays an crucial role in creating and fostering stable and 
long lasting relations based on cooperation46. 
 
The approach to cooperation based on rational choice theory was also the subject of much 
criticism. In particular, the importance that is given to game theory and the reduction of 
international relations to mechanistic payoff matrix appeared to many scholars far away 
from describing the reality of relations among states. Many efforts have been made to 
introduce the greatest possible number of variables within the decision-making systems, to 
try to make them as close as possible to reality, however, the results have been to create 
very complicated, but not so satisfactory, structures. 
Moreover, the rationality of the actors, in making their decisions, has been questioned 
many times. The rational choice theory presupposes that each actor performs the choice 
that will ensure it greater benefits, based on its interest. But when the main actor is a 
complex organization, such as a state, it becomes very complicated to decide which choice 
is the best one, according to a rational national interest which consists of many variables, 
such as: special interest groups and sub-groups, characteristics of leadership, domestic 
variables, social and economic interests, etc…!!
Despite the great relevance of these criticisms, the model of rational choice – used more as 
a model or an analogy rather than as a real theory – becomes crucial in the study of 
cooperation, and not only for the huge preponderance that it has been having in the 
development of such studies. The recommendations that come from the approaches based 
on this theory – especially from the neo-liberal – may give some fundamental indications 
to identify which are the strategies that states can use as tools towards the achievement of 
a positive cooperative interaction. 
 
 
1.1.3 Strategies of cooperation 
 
After defining what cooperation is – and is not – the following step consists in outlining 
the different forms in which cooperation can be translated into practice. Scholars 
interested in inter-state cooperation have established several different criteria to categorize 
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the strategies implemented by states to create and develop cooperative interactions, 
focusing on different relevant feature that intervene in relations of this kind. 
The division proposed by Oran Young in 1989 is based on the level of initiative that each 
party assumes to start the cooperation. A cooperative interaction, in fact, is always 
characterized by the presence of one or more actors. Therefore, we can divide the different 
cooperation strategies into three groups, depending on how many, and which are, the 
actors who take the initiative and lead the process. 
Basically, following Young, we can identify three different cooperation strategies, based 
on which actor takes the leading role47. Cooperation can emerge tacitly, without explicit 
communication or an explicit agreement; in this case none of the actors guide the 
cooperative interaction, but it emerges spontaneously because it turns out to be, rationally, 
the most profitable choice. The core assumption of spontaneous cooperation lies in the 
idea that, under certain circumstances, cooperation emerges because, in a rational choice 
framework, it is the most profitable way of interaction between the actors. There is not a 
communicative process through which the two actors agree to cooperate. Rather, it is a 
calculation of costs and benefits by which the actors realize the fact that the cooperative 
interaction is the one that produces more benefits for all. As Axelrod’s work clearly 
explains, using his framework of analysis, based on iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, 
cooperative interactions can emerge also without an explicit and conscious action aimed at 
its achievement. 
Cooperation can also be negotiated through a bargaining process in which both actors take 
the leading role. This appears to be the most common type of cooperation and it is easier 
to identify than is tacit cooperation, since in the latter the counterfactual is difficult to 
establish. The prominent works of Robert Keohane and Kenneth Oye on inter-state 
cooperation and international institutions, for example, focuses precisely on negotiated 
cooperation.  
Finally, cooperation can be imposed. It may seem counterintuitive but if the stronger part, 
while imposing an adjustment of policy to the weaker side, agrees to adjust its own policy, 
to better meet the interests and goals of its counterpart, then cooperation takes place48. 
Following the definition given before if there is a mutual adjustment of policies and if 
there are gains for both the actors – even if the distribution of gains is highly unequal – the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 This distinction is based on: Young, Oran 1989, International Cooperation: building regimes 
for natural resources and the environment, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
48 Gowa, Joanne 1986, ‘Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and 
International Relations’, in International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 167-186. 
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interactions can be considered as cooperative. The definition itself says nothing about how 
the distribution of mutual gains form cooperation will be distributed. 
Despite the enormous importance of having clearly defined what constitutes a cooperative 
interaction and what is not and of dividing the cooperative interactions in different 
categories, based on the role that each actor plays, this says little about the most important 
question: under which conditions cooperation is likely to occur? 
 
Following the distinction created by Helen Milner different strategies to create the 
conditions for cooperation can be identified49. These strategies can be implemented in 
different conditions, depending on the degree of involvement of each actor in the 
interaction. 
The first strategy comes directly from the distinction previously made between realism 
and neo-liberal approaches to cooperation; in particular, it is related to the dichotomy 
between relative gains and absolute gains. Despite the huge difference in the possibility of 
realization of cooperation between states that this distinction has, there is a common point 
for both. Indeed, following the work of one of the leading theorists realists cooperation, 
Joseph Grieco, for the realization of cooperative interaction is necessary that the gains are, 
for both parties, balanced or equitable50. This means that the distribution of benefits has to 
maintain the balance between the capabilities of the states that existed before the 
cooperation. In this way, there arises the problem of relative gains but it has an absolute 
gain for both parties, and for the system as a whole. This notion of balanced exchange 
sounds very similar to Axelrod’s strategy of Tit for Tat or to the concept of reciprocity 
introduced by Keohane51. In fact, combining the neo-liberal pursuit of absolute gains with 
reciprocity what results is very close to the realist assumption that states focus on relative 
gains to achieve cooperation. Saying, as the idea of reciprocity implies, that the absolute 
gains received from cooperation must be roughly equivalent is to say that states must not 
achieve relative gains over one another at the end of the interaction. So the first strategy 
that can be used to increase the chances of cooperation is to create an interaction after 
which the gains will be balanced and equitable for all parties involved, so as to reduce the 
risk of betrayal and the fear of strengthening disproportionately the counterparts. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Milner, Helen 1992, ‘International Theory of Cooperation among Nations: Strenghts and 
Weaknesses’, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 466-496. 
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A second strategy deals with the number of the actors involved in the issue of the 
cooperation. The hypothesis is that “the prospects for cooperation diminish as the number 
of players increases”52. This concept has been introduced and discussed by Kenneth Oye 
in his volume Cooperation under Anarchy. Oye argues that with large numbers of actors 
the probability of defection increases and also the feasibility of sanctioning the defection 
is reduced. A high number of actors, in fact, creates serious problems for collective action 
by states. Following this argument the ideal number of players in an interaction seems to 
be two – as reinforced by an extensive use of two-person games as models for these 
interactions. Actually, the relationship between the possibilities of cooperation and the 
number of actors is more controversial than it might seem. For example, with a high 
number of partners is easier to distribute gains in such a way that there are fewer risks of 
excessive relative gains for one of the parties. In addition, any losses caused by the lack of 
cooperation of one of the actors might be distributed among a larger number of partners, 
in order to be more tolerable and to socialize the costs, as well as it would be possible to 
form coalitions of states against possible defectors. Finally, even if many actors are 
involved in an interaction, it can be divided into more restricted situations, addressing 
more limited issues and with a small numbers of partners at once53.  
Although the relationship between the number of actors and the possibility of cooperation 
is not yet fully clarified, we can still posit that a reduction in the number of partners can 
help the success of the cooperative interaction, as it makes defections more controllable – 
and possibly sanctionable; it also gives the opportunity to create a structure of payoffs as 
favourable as possible for the small number of actors involved among which share – and 
balance – the gains. Finally, with few actors it becomes more manageable the problem of 
information – and lack of certain information – and communication among the partners. 
 
One of the most important aspects of cooperation has to do with the actors’ expectations 
about the future. Their willingness to cooperate, in fact, is influenced by whether or not 
they believe they will continue to interact indefinitely. As Axelrod clearly showed with his 
experiments, in a prisoner’s dilemma situation every actor has a dominant strategy to 
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defect; things change when iteration is introduced54. The repetition of the interaction 
makes the cooperative outcome more likely because, over time, the value of continued 
cooperation starts to outweigh the benefits of a one-time-defection. This situation 
depends, obviously, on the weight that each actor give to future interactions, on the rate at 
which each player discounts anticipated gains: the more strongly future is discounted, the 
less likely is cooperation.  
This framework introduces two crucial variables for cooperative interactions: what 
conditions generate iteration and the discount rate that induces cooperation. The last one 
can be considered as the inverse of the variable w (weight) introduced by Axelrod. Both 
these variables are difficult to estimate accurately. What is certain though is that the actors 
can act in such a way to change them and make the chances of cooperation more or less 
likely55. Like the number of players, the degree of iteration and the discount rate may be 
alterable and may depend on the perceptions and expectations of decision makers. These 
circumstances make subjective evaluations very important. If the goal of one of the actors 
involved is to build a stable and long lasting cooperative relation, then it has to intervene 
on the perception of the shadow of the future of the counterpart.  
For example, one of the actors can subdivide the cooperative process in many single 
interactions with an increasing value of the potential gains for the parties involved; in this 
way it will create an incentive to remain engaged in view of future higher benefits. In the 
same way, increasing costs in case of defection can be imposed as the parties advance in 
the cooperative process to make cheating increasingly difficult and costly. The available 
tools for the states to act on the iteration are manifold: gains, costs, structure of payoff, 
importance of the addressed issues, etc… Future time actions are so crucial in cooperation 
that modify the importance of future interactions is one of the most powerful tools that can 
be used. 
 
A further strategy to foster cooperation centres on the role of international regimes, which 
can be defined as sets of norms, principles, rules or decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge56. But international regimes are not just a collection 
of elements which occur simultaneously and cause the phenomenon. They are social 
institutions and their analysis is directly tied to the study of institutions in general; social !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Axelrod, Robert 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation. 
55 Axelrod Robert 1981, ‘The emergence of cooperation among egoists’, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 306-318. 
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institutions are recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with 
collections of rules or conventions governing the relations among the occupants of these 
roles57. According to the neo-liberal perspective, regimes are the main instrument to 
realize inter-state cooperation. Regimes, they say, facilitate cooperation through the 
functions they perform for states. First of all, they mitigate the effects of international 
anarchy by aiding in the decentralized enforcement of agreements. The focus is on the role 
regimes play in solving the problem of defection, the problem of cheating – considered as 
the main obstacle for cooperation. Regimes are seen as improving each side’s information 
about the behaviour of the others, especially about the likelihood of their cheating and 
actual compliance to the agreement. Furthermore, they change the pattern of transactions 
costs of cooperating by reducing the incentive to violate regime principles. Hence, 
regimes reduce states’ uncertainty and their fears that others will defect and, in turn, their 
propensity to do the same58. 
Even this argument has been the subject of various criticism. Some scholars noted that the 
very existence of an international regime indicates the existence of a series of decisions, 
taken by the states, towards cooperation. The process of formation of the international 
regime requires an earlier bargaining process to cooperate and a distribution of power 
surrounding it that strongly influences the regime itself. Another harsh critic to this 
cooperation strategy has to do with the distribution of power, seen as underlying regimes 
and as the main responsible for changes in them. Given their concerns about relative 
positions, states are likely to disagree about the amount of information they will release to 
others and about the principles that define the regime. These principles are crucial because 
they determine how the regime imposes costs and benefits on different actions; both this 
issues and the provision of information are highly political issues and thus highly 
influenced by the distribution of power in the system and in the process that leads to the 
creation of the regime59. Given these circumstances, it may seems that international 
regimes can’t help in explaining how the tacit or explicit bargaining begins and develops 
and the relevance of the distribution of power may indicate that the distribution of relative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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gains in the interaction will hardly be “balanced” and “equitable”. Actually, if an 
established regime in one issue aids in the negotiation of cooperation in another, then the 
hypothesis of the international regimes creation as a strategy towards cooperation may 
have a broader significance. 
 
A further strategy of promoting cooperation among states leaves aside the rational choice 
approach and the basic pre-requisite of neo-liberals and realists, by enhancing the role of 
“epistemic communities” in advancing cooperation. Such a community is a “professional 
group that believes in the same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to accept them, 
and shares common values; its members share a common understanding of a problem and 
its solution”60. The role of an epistemic community might seem similar to that of a regime; 
one difference between the two lies in the type of information provided by each one. Both 
types can reduce uncertainty, but whereas a regime gathers data on the preferences and 
compliance of other members, an epistemic community furnishes particular information 
that coordinate states’ expectations and advances negotiations and promote cooperation61. 
Besides having strong affinities with the regime argument, the concept of epistemic 
community can be easily accosted to the constructivist theory and its non-rationalist 
approach to cooperation. In neo-liberal and realist approaches the structure of the 
interaction, as well as actors’ identities and interests are exogenous to interaction, so they 
do not change but are stated before the interaction takes place. The analysis focuses on the 
choice that each actor makes, so it is a behavioural analysis. A constructivist analysis 
instead focuses on how expectations, produced by behaviour, affect identities and 
interests. In other words, the process in which players learn how to interact with each 
other – and how to cooperate – through the iteration of the interaction is at the same time a 
process of reconstruction of interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms and 
the construction of new shared identities among actors62. A constructivist analysis is 
cognitive rather than behavioural since it treats the elements that form the structure of the 
interaction – and identities and interests – as endogenous to and instantiated by interaction 
itself. The evolution of cooperation transforms the identities and the vital interests of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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actors, in a process that goes further from the mere rationalist distribution of gains and can 
reach the point of creating new shared identities among the actors and strongly reinforce 
the persistence of cooperative interactions63. 
The strategy of epistemic communities and the constructivist interpretation of cooperation 
share also a major problem. Both, in fact, seek to explain the extensiveness, the durability 
and the consequences of cooperation rather than its initiation. The development of 
cooperation into the creation of new, shared identities and interests among states is crucial 
for sustaining cooperation over time. The persistence of regimes, for example, past the 
point that the powers involved have an apparent interest in sustaining it, is one of the most 
puzzling issues for neo-liberals; a constructivist answer in which institutions have gone 
beyond the strategic game-playing self-regarding units, posited by neo-liberals, and have 
developed an understanding of each other as partners in some common enterprise, even if 
apparent underlying power and interests have shifted, might be the a more comprehensive 
explanation64. 
However, this does not tell us much about the conditions under which the cooperative 
interaction might appear in the first place and about the strategies that a state might 
implement to reach this objective. The existence of prior international regimes involving 
the actors can be a facilitating condition for the emergence of an epistemic community. 
Sitting down to negotiate an agreement among friends (as opposed to adversaries or 
unknowns) affects a state's willingness to start with a cooperative move. Perhaps, it would 
no longer understand its interests as the unilateral exploitation of the other state; instead it 
might see itself as a partner in pursuit of some value other than narrow strategic interest. 
The greatest contribution that such approaches can provide to find the conditions of the 
development of cooperation might be in the analysis of the internal processes of the 
interaction’s structure, which should not be considered as exogenous and immutable but 
as an active part – and therefore changeable – of the interaction itself. In addition, the 
analysis of the creation of epistemic communities and shared interests and identities 
among the actors might represent a fundamental key interpretation for a stable and long-
term cooperation. 
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A final strategy that can contribute to promote cooperation suggests that imbalances of 
power, in particular in the form of hierarchies, are conducive to cooperation. This 
argument resembles the theory of hegemonic stability. The differences in balance of 
power and influence give to the stronger actors a greater role in organizing the system and 
the possibility to shape the interactions among actors in the preferred way. This kind of 
cooperation is closer to the third variety we previously define, namely the imposed 
cooperation. The asymmetries of power contribute to the achievement of a cooperative 
solution of an interaction because the stronger states are able to provide benefits to the 
others to induce cooperation, as the benign version of the hegemonic stability theory 
suggest.  
This approach to cooperation has several similarities with the so called “hegemonic 
stability theory” 65 . As Robert Gilpin expressed it: “the Pax Britannica and Pax 
Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and 
security. Great Britain and the Unites States created and enforce the rules of a liberal 
international economic order”66. The central preposition of the theory states that order in 
world politics is typically created by a single dominant power and that the maintenance of 
that order requires continued hegemony67. This implies that, according to this approach, 
cooperation also depends on the presence of a hegemon in the global system.  
Following the assumptions of hegemonic stability theory, we can define hegemony in 
world politics as the preponderance of material resources owned by one single power; this 
preponderance – not only in military power but also in economic and commercial terms – 
must be enough to enforce the preferred rules of the hegemon over the system. The 
concept of hegemony implies also another aspect that distinguish it from mere dominance; 
using the Marxian contribution to the debate given by the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci, 
hegemony express the unity of objective material forces and ethico-political ideas, through 
an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate 
groups68. The value of this twofold conception of hegemony is that it helps to understand 
the willingness of the partners of the hegemon to defer to the leadership; deference is 
needed to establish a structure of the system that can ensure the enforcement of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hegemon’s preferred rules; it might be too expensive, and even counterproductive to 
achieve this goal by force. This second conception of hegemony gives the possibility to 
establish the legitimacy of the dominance and thus to create an international regime with 
its own characteristics.  
Hegemonic power and the international regimes established under the hegemon combine 
to facilitate cooperation. The hegemon, in fact, has a strong incentive to maintain the 
stability of the system that was created under its guide and that ensures the protection of 
its vital interests. For this reason it will coerce the actors in the system towards 
cooperation and stability. The presence of an hegemon reduces transaction costs, with 
providing fundamental public goods to the system, and uncertainty – and thus the risk of 
cheating – since each actor can deal with the hegemon and expect it to ensure consistency 
for the whole system. The formation of international regimes can ensure legitimacy for the 
standards of behaviour which govern the system69. 
If the first fundamental proposition of the theory of hegemonic stability can be regarded as 
correct, the second is more controversial. In fact, as Keohane clearly explains, reducing 
the possibility of cooperation among states to the presence of a hegemon might be too 
simplistic. Although we must recognize the role of facilitator of cooperation to the 
presence of a hegemon, it cannot be considered as a prerequisite to the implementation of 
cooperation. As previously described, there are several different strategies that an actor 
can put in place to achieve the goal. Furthermore, the very creation of an international 
regime by the hegemon can be the foundation for a sustained cooperation after the decline 
of the hegemonic power. Multilateral institutions, for example, can provide some of the 
sense of certainty and confidence that a hegemon formerly furnished. The expectations, 
transaction costs and uncertainty that so deeply influence cooperative interactions can de 
affected by international regimes. International institutions change rational calculations of 
interest, facilitate mutually advantageous bargains and increase credible information 
among the actors. It also emphasizes the greater convenience of maintaining existing 
regimes rather than creating new ones70. 
 
All the strategies discussed above can be implemented by states to create favourable 
conditions for the development of cooperation. Moreover, many of them are not mutually 
exclusive but they can be used simultaneously, in different moments during the same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Keohane, Robert O. 1984, After Hegemony. 
70 Ibidem. 
 47 
interactions, or even they can create the conditions to bring out the possibility of 
implementing new strategies. Thus it becomes possible to try to encompass these various 
strategies within a single approach – which we define comprehensive – that can be later 
used to analyse the structure, development and results of the interactions between the 
states. 
But before developing this paradigm of cooperation is essential to address two crucial 
issues in any cooperative relationship and, in particular, in the relations where the goal of 
the actors is to achieve a sustainable and long lasting cooperation: the problems of time 
and trust in cooperative relations. 
 
 
1.2 Time and Cooperation 
 
In the analysis of the development of cooperation among states a prominent role should be 
recognized to the variable of time. The influence that time has on cooperation and on the 
possibilities of cooperation to occur is enormous. In fact, most of main problems 
previously highlighted in the analysis of interactions between states and cooperation 
strategies are related to the issue of time. 
As seen above, the main problem that afflicts states in their decision to cooperate or not is 
the risk of cheating (exploit the cooperation of the counterpart through defection) and the 
issue of potential gains. Both are strictly linked to the problem of uncertainty in the 
international system because of the lack of a central authority that imposes its will on the 
actors. A major cause of this uncertainty is precisely the time variable. 
First, in real situations it is very difficult that the exchange, which constitutes the basis of 
cooperative interactions, occurs in a simultaneously. Very often there is a time lag 
between the actions of the parties involved. And this time lag creates a window of 
opportunity to cheat and exploit such cooperation without having to pay any cost. 
Precisely the existence of this possibility strongly contributes to the creation of that 
uncertainty that makes cooperation among states so difficult to achieve. Several of the 
strategies listed before have to do with this problem. The creation of international regimes, 
for example, is primarily intended to reduce the uncertainty of the behaviours of the 
counterpart and raise the costs for a possible defection, in order to limit the problems 
created by the time lag. Similarly, the presence of a hegemon plays the same role – with 
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its authoritative power over the system – and also the presence of an epistemic 
community.  
If we address the main concern of realists about cooperation – that is the problem of 
relative gains – it also has it roots in the problem of future time situations. In fact, since 
uncertainty dominates the international system, according to the realist perspective, 
besides the risk of being cheated there is also the risk that a partner will achieve 
disproportionate gains from cooperation and, thus strengthened, might someday be a more 
dangerous enemy than if they had never worked together. For neoliberal theory, the 
problem of cooperation in anarchy is that states may fail to achieve it and the worst 
possible outcome is a lost opportunity. For realists, cooperation implies these dangers plus 
the much greater risk, for some states, that cooperation might someday in the future result 
in a loss of security or, even, the lost of independence71. 
 
But this is not the only way in which time influences cooperation. In fact, if it is true that 
the time gap creates uncertainty and that this uncertainty is one of the main obstacles to 
the realization of cooperation, it is also true that time – seen as a long-term perspective – 
can be a fundamental facilitator of cooperation. In the previous part, we already 
introduced the concept of the “shadow of the future”, that can also be included in the game 
theory model as the variable w – meaning the weight of possible future interaction on the 
current one72. 
As we previously saw, the iteration of the interaction is crucial for the success of 
cooperation, otherwise, in many cases, the actors will always have an incentive to take 
advantage of the situation and defect. The shadow of the future is closely related to 
iteration, because simply, iteration implies a shadow of the future. The shadow of the 
future can only be lengthened when there is a strong prospect for continued interaction. 
Generally, the future is less important than the present, in other words, the payoff of the 
next move always counts less than the payoff of the current move. First, players tend to 
value payoffs less as the time of their obtainment recedes into the future. Second, there is 
always some chance that the players will never meet again. When players value future 
payoffs relative to the present, the likelihood that they will defect today lessens. Due to 
this logic, there is the need to enlarge the shadow of the future in order to promote 
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cooperation. If the future is important relative to the present, it is also important for the 
stability of cooperation. 
From this perspective, enlarging the shadow of the future can improve the chances to 
achieve cooperation. According to Axelrod, there are two ways to enlarge the shadow: by 
making the interactions more durable and by making them more frequent73. Making small 
moves rather than a few large moves, and thereby increasing the shadow of the future, can 
make reciprocity more effective. 
 
The issue of time in cooperation – and the shadow of the future – introduces a further 
aspect that can’t be left out. The iteration of interactions or, at least, the prospect of new 
future interactions between the parties plays a crucial role to achieve cooperation. But how 
does future time intervene in the long term perspective of cooperation? In other words, 
what happens if the will of the actors – or at least of one of the actors – it’s not to simply 
achieve cooperation during a set of interactions but rather to achieve a long term goal that 
implies a long progression of cooperative interactions? Enlarging the shadow of the future 
can be seen as a sort of “strategy” for achieving cooperation, but it can also be considered 
as a structural characteristic of the relation between the actors. For example, if two states 
share a common border we might expect that, due to this simple geopolitical condition, 
they have high chances of interacting many times in the future. The same process might be 
recognizable if two states share a common interest on a specific geopolitical area or on a 
specific issue (ensuring the supply of resources or maintain vital routes of trade and 
communication free). This proximity – not only in geographical terms – makes almost 
inevitable the presence of a shadow of the future.  
Things get even more complicated if the dyad of actors who interact is in a state of 
“strategic rivalry”. The main features of this kind of relation is that the states regard each 
other as competitive and as threatening. To view other states as competitive they have to 
be roughly in the same capabilities league; to be perceived as threatening one of the two 
countries – or both – must have done physical harm to the other in the past, or project 
some probability of doing such harm in the present of future74. If these two characteristics 
are applicable to a dyad, than it can be considered a strategic rivalry. The problem with 
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these relations is that the situation is unstable and can degenerate into overt enmity or 
even real conflicts. 
In this cases, cooperation can be considered not only as a way of conducting interactions 
with the counterpart, but also as a real strategy toward the resolution of the rivalry or, at 
least, toward the reduction of the chances of degeneration into conflicts. 
A key factor in reaching the goal of a long-term cooperation, aimed at a specific goal, is 
the presence of mutual trust between the actors involved. 
 
 
1.3 Trust and Cooperation 
 
The previous examination on creating cooperative interactions highlighted a key point in 
the analysis of cooperation among states. Most of the strategies listed, in fact, focused on 
the installation of cooperation among actors that, in the moment in which they start the 
relation, find themselves in a state of hostility, enmity or, at least, mutual suspicion. 
Following the realist perspective, the vast majority of relations among states have such 
features. Given the premises postulated by the four basic propositions of the theory, the 
international system is characterized by a constant threat to national security, against 
which the decision makers of each state must cope.  
Even the neo-liberal perspective focuses on the study of cooperation among actors 
mutually suspicious. In fact, by accepting some of the realists’ structural conditions, they 
aim to show that, although in a hostile environment, states have good chances to choose 
cooperation rather than defection. For example, the emphasis in all of Axelrod’s work on 
the emergence of cooperation between selfish actors and on the spontaneity of cooperative 
relationships, which are established because they represent the solution that provides more 
gains to the parties, even in lack of coordination or communication. Similarly, the 
emphasis that is placed on the fundamental role of the institutions, in particular 
international regimes, which dominates the neo-liberal approach from Keohane’s work 
onward, shows how coping with uncertainty and risk of cheating is the main priority in the 
study of cooperation. 
 
Among all these cases a common feature can be highlighted: the lack of trust between the 
considered actors. The focus of much of the study of international cooperation has been to 
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theorize a mode of development of such interactions in contexts dominated by mutual 
suspicion and hostility. Nonetheless mutual trust can be considered as a key facilitator in 
the creation of cooperative relationships and, above all, in the preservation of long term 
cooperation. Trust, in fact, plays an important role in eliminating the uncertainty present in 
the international system – at least for specific relations between states – which severely 
limits the cooperation. It also makes available a greater extent of more credible 
information between the actors. Finally, it contributes to limit the real and potential costs 
(from transaction costs to the costs of sanctions in case of defection) of the interactions 
between the actors. 
For this reason it is essential to analyse the concept of trust between states: define it, study 
the strategies of creation and operation, examine its effect on interactions and cooperation. 
 
 
1.3.1 Definition of Trust 
 
The study of the concept of trust in social science is not an easy task. The volume of 
theories on this apparently simple concept can be intimidating to say the least. 
Nevertheless, a close analysis of this vast literature offers the chance to outline at least 
three common features present in all the main theories of trust: risk, interdependence and 
positive expectations75. 
Every relationship based on trust implies a risk. This risk comes directly from the 
uncertainty about the actions that the other actor will take, as a reaction to our own 
behaviour. If one actor could know precisely and without question, how their counterpart 
would react, then no trust would be needed. The insecurity that comes from uncertainty is 
a pre-requisite for trust that, in this sense, can be considered as a strategy to overcome 
insecurity and danger76. Similarly, if the interests of the two actors involved in the 
relationship coincides, then trust is no longer necessary. If both actors want to achieve the 
same goal, it is certain that both will act harmoniously towards the mutually desirable 
result. When uncertainty disappears, trust disappears as well, because we no longer need a 
strategy to overcome risk if we know how our counterpart will act.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Lane, Christel 1998, ‘Theories and issues in the study of trust’, in Lane, Christel and Bachmann, 
Reinhard eds., Trust within and between organizations, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 1-
30. 
76 Simmel, George 1978, The philosophy of money, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
 52 
 
Second, for the realization of a relationship based on trust, a certain degree of 
interdependence must exist between the actors. The trustworthiness of our counterpart 
becomes relevant only if the realization of our activities depends on the actions the 
cooperation of the other actor77. Obviously, trust is not the only basis for a relationship. 
There are several other functional equivalents to trust, meaning there area a variety of 
tools to overcome the risk problem that lies in the unpredictable behaviour of the 
counterpart. The most common – probably more common than trust itself – is power78. In 
an asymmetric relationship in which one actor can exploit a higher degree of relative 
power, it can also force the weaker side to act according to the interests of the stronger 
party. In this way, the uncertainty of the behaviour is overcome and so is the risk that trust 
implies. This situation of dependence, without any real choice for the weaker party, is 
typical of a zero-sum game situation, based on an asymmetry of power between the 
parties. Obviously, a situation of this kind has nothing to do with trust. If we take into 
consideration the global system and  the relations among states, the relevance of power as 
a functional equivalent to trust becomes crystal clear. On the other hand, interdependence 
means that there is no asymmetry of power between the parties, or that this asymmetry is 
not a strong enough factor to give one actor the power to impose his will on the other. In 
this case, power cannot work as a functional equivalent of trust to overcome risk and 
uncertainty. The vital interests of both parties must be taken into account during the 
relationship so as to reach a positive-sum game in which both parties can take a win from 
the table79. 
 
The third pre-requisite for a trust relationship has to do with the expectations each party 
holds regarding the behaviour of the other. Given the impossibility of completely 
overcoming risk, both parties must believe that the other will not try to take advantage of 
this uncertainty. In every situation of this kind there is always the risk of exploitation, the 
risk of one party pretending to act in a trustworthy way and then betraying the good will 
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of the other for their own gain80. For example, if the actors find themselves in a situation 
with Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs (the actors have a dominant strategy to defect regardless 
of the behaviour of the other), the risk of exploitation is very high81. Thus, to avoid this 
kind of dilemma it is necessary to elaborate strategies in order to reduce this risk of 
exploitation and foster a common understanding between the parties that both, given the 
existence of risk but also of interdependence, will not try to take advantage of the good 
will of the other. So for a good result, in terms of trust, the actors should have positive 
expectations about the future behaviour of the counterpart. “Trust is based on an 
individual’s theory as to how another person will perform on some future occasion”82, as 
David Good puts it. Following this path we can arrive at giving the most simple and 
general definition of trust: “Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of other”83. 
Placing trust in someone else we act as if we knew the future, we anticipate the future 
behaviour of the counterpart84.  
But the anticipatory belief is not sufficient for the creation of a relation based on trust; the 
actors must also face the future actively and take the risk, by committing themselves to 
action with, at least partly, uncertain and uncontrollable consequences85. 
 
According to Seligman, we can also make a further differentiation between three different 
types of trust, that will be useful in the analysis of this concept in international relations: 
abstract, functional and personal, based on the entities involved and the quality of their 
relationship. Abstract trust is used to describe a relation between an individual or group 
and a system or principle, like the trust in democracy. Functional trust describes a purely 
functional relation between individuals. Personal trust refers to a quality in personal 
relationships that exceeds pure functionality and exhibits a stronger bond between 
individuals86. 
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Expectations about the future behaviour of the counterpart, especially in social contexts, 
are not given a priori, but are constructed by endogenous and exogenous variable and the 
experience made with previous interactions. Strategies aiming at fostering a common 
understanding between the parties and reducing the risks are at the core of the analysis of 
trust-based relations, especially in the field of international relations. The international 
community is a sui generis case among the various social units created by mankind. 
Following the assumption of a large part of theorist in international relations – realist and 
neo-liberals above all, as we previously saw – among states there is no central superior 
authority that can implement norms and rules, also with the use of force, when necessary. 
Furthermore, there is no shared identity among members of this society and no sense of a 
common good that goes beyond the interest of the individual. Rather, every single 
member tries to achieve its own goals and maximize its own interests, without giving too 
much attention to the effects that this pursuit has on the interests of others. In this sense, 
the international community is a selfish community. And the main instrument to 
overcoming uncertainty between members is power. If this is the case, why talk about 
trust? How can trust play a role in a community like this? Why not rely only on power? 
Well, clearly the previous description of the international community is too simplistic. 
Although it is undeniable that States commonly act to maximize their own interests, often 
the interests of one actor encapsulates the interests of another87. This means that, even if 
the two interests do not perfectly coincide, the interest of the truster is contained in that of 
the trustee, which considers it inline with their own interests. The encapsulated-interest 
account of trust is not about bald, unarticulated expectations, but rather about the belief 
that the counterpart has relevant motivations to act in a certain way, taking deliberately 
into account my interests because they are mine and also part of its own interests88. In a 
case like this, the two actors can cooperate in a positive-sum game, based on trust.  
 
This perspective on trust has a strong rational basis. In fact, if an actor always trusts 
everyone or act basing on generalized expectations, it doesn’t meaningfully trust anyone. 
The expectations about the future behaviour of the counterpart should be grounded in 
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strong rational assessments, and the encapsulated-interest perspective gives precisely this 
basis89.  
There are also other conceptions of trust, which lack this rational foundation. For example, 
come scholars focus on the moral dimension of trust and on the moral commitment to be 
trustworthy90. If one actor believes that the counterpart has such a commitment, it can 
easily cooperate with confidence that the other will fulfil the expectations. Unfortunately, 
as we noted in the analysis of cooperation among states, realistically we cannot assume 
that such a moral commitment is inherent in the structure of the international system. 
Another conception of trust is connected to the dispositional accounts of trustworthiness 
and trust91. From this perspective trust and trustworthiness are considered as inherent 
characteristics of certain actors, thus they are wholly non-relational. Trust is not related to 
specific social contexts and specific actors with specific interests and preferences but is a 
general feature that some actors have toward any counterpart on any possible issue at 
stake in the interaction. As in the previous case, given the previous characteristics of the 
international system, we cannot suppose that, in relations among states, such a general 
disposition toward trust exists. 
Although in the domain of international relations is realistically very difficult to resort to 
the last two conceptions of trust, we will try to integrate to the encapsulated-interest 
approach more facets of the concept of trust, attempting to show that it cannot be reduced 
to a purely rational calculation of costs and benefits. 
 
 
1.3.2 Trust and International Relations 
 
After defining what trust means in social science, we can try to apply this concept to a 
very peculiar realm in social sciences, that of international relations. Trust has been poorly 
considered over time by international relations scholars and, when it happened, it was just 
put in close relation to the study of cooperation and the rational choice theory. Even in this 
case, it was not treated as a central variable because, as Axelrod’s work pointed put, trust 
is not necessary for the emergence of cooperation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Ibidem. 
90 Becker, Lawrence C. 1996, ‘Trust as Noncognitive Security about Motives’, Ethics, Vol. 107, 
No. 1, pp. 43-46. 
91 Yamagishi, Toshio and Yamagishi, Midori 1994, ‘Trust and Commitment in United States and 
Japan’, Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 129-166. 
 56 
Rationalist accounts consider trust in a very narrow conception, basically related to the 
instruments provided by the rational choice theory. The actors rationally react to external 
preferences with a calculation of costs and benefits, based on information about 
incentives, objectives and preferences. Trust simply describes successful cooperative 
behaviour and can be derived from the combination of preference structures, incentives 
and objectives and connected to the systemic context and concomitant role expectations of 
the actors – that are interchangeable – involved92. 
Recently, however, scholars in international relations have recognized trust as a central 
element in the political sphere and also started to criticize the poverty of purely rationalist 
accounts of trust. They have realized that a reduction of individual actors to rational 
egoists guided by external factors, derived from a precise conception of international 
anarchy, not only misses the complexity of decision-making but also ignores the inter-
personal nature of trust relationships93. Trust is one of the so-called “social emotions” – 
emotions that requires the representation of the mental state of other people – and for this 
reason has a number of facets that go beyond a simple rationalistic representation. Even if 
we refer to complex organizations, such as states, we cannot simply rely on purely 
rationalistic perspective, completely ignoring the social, relational and cognitive 
components of this concept. Trust involves both rational reasons and an “emotional 
base”94: without the first part it would be “blind faith” towards anyone in any situation; 
without the second one it would be simply calculated risk, it would be a consequence of 
incentives in which the need of trust and the opportunity to trust would be eliminated95. 
In the last years, several scholars of international relations recognized the importance of 
trust and of a broader concept of trust that goes beyond a rational theory approach. 
Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, in their work on the Security Dilemma, highlighted the 
fundamental relevance of the human factor in trust relationship – even if the 
conceptualization of this variable is not clear – and try to place themselves halfway 
between a rationalist and a psychological approach96. Brian Rathbun, drawing from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sociological theory of Eric Uslaner on “generalized trust” of “moral trust”97, takes a more 
assertive way and interprets trust as a specific attribute of some actors who have a higher 
propensity to trust other actors, regardless of the situation98. In this case, trust is 
considered as dispositional, as a fix characteristic of certain actors. The main weakness of 
this approach is assuming trust as an independent variable that some actors have and 
others have not, strongly limiting the range of actions and the possibilities in cooperative 
interactions. Deborah Welch Larson, in her studies on (mis-)trust, proposes a framework 
that put together rational choice, domestic factors and psychological factors as different 
sources of mistrust – and conversely trust99. 
 
All these innovative approaches can be very useful to develop a framework for trust-
building that takes into account both the aspects related to the rational choice theory as 
those related to the emotional side of trust. However, to understand how trust is involved 
in the formation and sustenance of international cooperation, we need to analyse what are 
the strategies that the actors – in this case the states – can take in their specific context – in 
this case the international relations system – to create mutual trust. 
 
 
1.3.3 Strategies of Trust-building 
 
Every relationship not based only on power asymmetries provides the ground for the 
flourishing of trust-based relations in world politics. They also represent the reason why 
trust has a strong rational foundation. A positive-sum game, in which the interests of both 
parties are taken into account, lead to a higher level of welfare for both parties and for the 
system as a whole. In the same way, being part of a community that shares norms and 
identities reduce, almost entirely, risk and uncertainty. 
First of all, a characteristic of trusting relationship is that trust is generally a three party 
relation: the actor 1 trusts actor 2 to do a specific thing in a specific context (3)100. If we 
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conceptions of trust – then we must always pay attention to the context in which the 
interaction takes place. The context – or the structure – consists in what is at stake in the 
interaction and in the external and internal variable that intervene during the interaction. 
Because of this changing structure, we can’t trust another actor in absolute terms, but we 
always have to refer to the context in which the interaction takes place. If the actors find 
themselves in a context without a central superior authority that can impose its will over 
the actors, just like the international relations realm, this structure dependency of trust is 
even more important. 
If we consider the distinction made by Seligman of three different kind of trust, we will 
focus on functional trust, that is the only type that can emerge between complex 
organizations such as states, but also on personal trust. In fact, as we previously stated we 
will try to integrate in our framework of analysis also elements from the psychological 
approach to trust and trust-building; we will try to evaluate the role that personal 
relationship between individuals and also personal characteristics play in the development 
of trust relationships. Finally, we will make also reference to the third kind of trust, the so-
called abstract trust; the role of abstract political concepts – such as democracy – as well 
as ideology may in fact have an influence on the development of relations of mutual trust. 
 
The strategies for building trust among States, even in a selfish community, are several. 
Mainly, we can consider three different paths towards trust-based relations, referring 
directly to the three main theories of international relations (realism, neo-liberalism, 
constructivism) to which we referred in the analysis of cooperation between states: 
incremental learning, institutions-based trust and identity-based trust101. After that, we will 
consider also the influence that domestic variables and dynamics of every single state have 
on the creation of mutual trust among states. 
 
Incremental Learning 
  
The approach to trust as a process of incremental learning between actors is based on the 
rational choice approach. As we previously described, this approach is shared in the same 
way between realists and neo-liberals. One of the central assumptions of incremental 
learning is that the motivation of states is variable and depends on what is at stake in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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relationship102. From this perspective trust and suspicion are learned responses to the 
behaviour of other actors; that means applying information derived from past experiences 
to facilitate a positive outcome of the interaction103. When deciding weather to trust or not 
a counterpart, according to incremental learning, the potential trustor reflect on their 
previous interaction with the potential trustee: the actors who proved to be trustworthy in 
the past will be trusted in the future, but the actors who proved to be unreliable should not 
be trusted, until new evidences come. If there are no previous interactions between the 
actors they can gather information from the interactions that each actor had with other 
counterparts in the past. This effort to build mutual trust step by step must start with small 
agreements on peripheral issues, for which the costs of cheating are low. As the evidence 
of trustworthiness of the parties grows, actors can gain more confidence and entrust their 
interests to the counterpart on increasingly significant issues104. One of the most famous 
examples of the incremental learning approach is the “Graduate Reciprocation in Tension 
Reduction” (GRIT), proposed by Charles Osgood in the 1960s. It was precisely a step by 
step approach to move away from the “Spiral of Fear” between USA’s and USSR’s 
nuclear arsenals, based on the idea of a gradual reduction of tensions, starting from initial 
steps of small significance that, would accumulate their effects over time until the final 
achievement of a nuclear disarmament105. 
The analysis, therefore, focuses on interactions inside co-operative relations through 
which information about the other actor is obtained and knowledge built. Trust is created 
through a pattern of rational learning based on previous behaviour. The uncertainty – and 
the risk – inherent in every trust relationship is quelled through the introduction of 
variables that can be calculated, such as: potential losses and gains of the two parties, 
relative power, initial advantages and costs of a potential conflict. All these variables 
adhere to a minimum trust threshold that paves the way for a cooperative relationship106. 
Such a scheme can create a sort of “Spiral of Trust” that leads to higher levels of mutual 
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trust with every interaction and offers the possibility of addressing increasingly important 
issues. 
The incremental learning approach is based on the necessity of a pre-existing cooperative 
relationship to offer the possibility of learning something about the counterparts; 
otherwise the suspicion that uncertainty implies remains. At least, a sufficient amount of 
credible information on the behaviour of the counterpart should be accessible from the 
observation of previous interactions with other actors; otherwise there are very few 
chances of reduce the risk and create positive expectations about the future behaviour. A 
different method that can be used to increase the credibility of the counterpart, in a 
framework based on rational choice, is to introduce a costly commitment in such a way as 
to increase the costs in case of defection. The use of this variable can be easily integrate in 
a game theory framework and intervene in determining the structure of the interaction – 
especially for what concerns preferences formation – raising the costs of defection and 
thus making cooperation more convenient and therefore more likely. 
Moreover, a further limit to the incremental learning approach to trust deals with what is 
at stake in the interaction. As previously stated, a trust relationship is a three party 
interaction in which the context plays a fundamental role. For this reason, it is not certain 
that a “Spiral of Trust” will continue over time, when the issues at stake grow in import 
and the possibility for gains through exploitation also rise, accordingly107. The willingness 
of the actors to give control over their interests to the counterpart wanes as the issues at 
stake increase in importance; conversely, as the stakes increase actors are more likely to 
focus on the dangers of a possible defection than on their counterpart record of reliability. 
Despite these critical points, the incremental learning approach is capable to produce trust 
based relationship; actors can gather reliable information about each other and learn to 
trust one another. But when important issues are at stake, it doesn’t guarantee that a 
“Spiral of Trust” can be achieved and last over time. For this reason, this approach can 
produce trust and cooperation on less important issues and can be profitably used to begin 
a process of trust building between actors that find themselves in a state of hostility. 
However, to create a stable and long lasting relationship based on trust it must be 
supported by other strategies.  
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Institutions  
 
The second approach to trust emphasizes the importance of the context in which the 
interactions take place. The creation of institutions, aimed at reducing the risk that 
uncertainty implies, fosters mutual trust. The establishment of a set of rules and norms that 
prevents one actor form acting opportunistically and guards against exploitation of the 
partnership, creates a context in which trusting each other is less risky and, consequently, 
less costly108. Actors with a history of rivalry hesitate to entrust their interests to one 
another because they fear that they may be unable to recover if the counterpart is cheating. 
Risk is one of the core assumptions of trust, so reducing risk dominates the logic of trust 
building among rivals. 
The means in which this favourable environment can be built are numerous. The classic 
institutionalism approach focuses on three aspects: information, monitoring and sanctions. 
Following the assumptions of rational choice, the goal of reducing uncertainty is key to 
achieve trust. For this reason, institutions focus on creating mechanisms to share reliable 
information among the actors. In addition, the process of gathering information goes on 
during all the interactions, through a system of monitoring that ensure that every actor 
fulfil its commitment. Finally, the newly created institution must put in place a 
sanctioning mechanism, that impose costs on participants, to discourage possible free-
riders or cheaters109. This means the creation of invasive structures with the ability of 
gathering information on the actors involved, monitoring their behaviour during 
interactions and imposing high costs when actors do not fulfil their commitments, 
consequently betraying the trust based cooperation110.  
A different perspective on institutions focuses on two different aspects. One of the main 
causes of distrust among states is the fear of exploitation, especially two different kind of 
exploitation: external and internal. The first one deals with the fear of being dominated – 
or even destroyed – by a rival in the global arena; the second one is the fear that 
establishing trusting relations will enable internal opposition to undermine the grip on 
power of the leadership through discredit campaigns. Both of these fears shorten time 
horizons of leaders, incentive to behave opportunistically and reduce the chances of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 Zucker, Lynne G. 1986, ‘Production of Trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840-
1920’, Research in Organization Behavior, Vol. 8, pp. 53-111. 
109 Wallander, Celeste A., Haftendorn, Helga and Keohane, Robert O. 1999, Imperfect Unions: 
Security Institutions over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, New York. 
110 Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. ‘Explaining cooperation under anarchy’.  
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creating trust111.  To avoid these risks, institutions should provide states with an “effective 
voice” in the decision making process of the institution and further grants them an amount 
of “breathing space” in the domestic context. These two features serve as a guarantee of 
survival for all parties, from both an external and internal risk. Giving actors an effective 
voice inside the institution provides the assurance that they will be able to affect the 
quality of collective decisions bearing on their long term interests112. In addition, it might 
be a signal of the intentions of all the parties involved to employ restraint in dealing with 
each other, further fostering the creation of mutual trust. The risk of being exploited by 
internal opposition groups can be solved – or reduced – by providing actors with breathing 
space. Very often, in fact, leaders who try to change long-standing rivalries through 
mutual trust create opportunities at home to mobilize support against the government; to 
avoid this risks, institutions must guarantee to every actor the possibility to reduce 
sensitivity to the domestic political consequences of the accords. Every actor involved 
must take into account the vital interests of the others and every actor has some flexibility 
to balance external commitments and internal requests from public opinion113. 
The insitutionalist approach, moving from a situation based on a fear of mistrust, faces the 
same problems of incremental learning. The higher the level of pre-existent mistrust, the 
more flexibility inside the institutions is required, the more likely the chance that, when 
matters a strained, States use the flexibility to withdraw from their previous commitments, 
after having benefited from cooperation114. 
 
Identity 
 
Just as realism and liberalism share some concepts regarding understandings of the 
international system, so the first two strategies of building trust can be unified under the 
same label of the rationalist approach115. The common feature they share is an emphasis 
posited on mistrust rather than trust. What drives the relationship is the fear of uncertainty 
that trust implies. These strategies are consequently characterized by the will to limit 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Majone, Giandomenico 1996, Regulating Europe, Routledge, New York. 
112  Hirschman, Albert O. 1970, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations and States, Harvar University Press, Cambridge. 
113 Hoffman, Aaron M. 2006, Building Trust. 
114 Rathbun, Brian C. 2012, Trust in International Cooperation. 
115 Ibidem. 
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damages, acquire more information, monitor the other actor, and impose high costs to 
defection.  
A second line of thought about the formation of trusting relationships suggests that they 
are a function of shared identity among potential co-operators. We can define identity as a 
set of norms that identity appropriate behaviour and a type of state one aspires to be or a 
group of states one aspires to belong to116. The Social Identity Theory creates a distinction 
between in-groups and out-groups117 and the perception of being part of one of these two 
categories leads to favouritism or discrimination, when the boundaries between groups are 
sharply drawn and immutable, when “it is impossible or at least very difficult for 
individuals to move from one group or another”118. Following this theory, states, like 
individuals, define and categorize themselves in terms of groups. The more they see 
themselves and others as members of well defined groups, the more likely they are to 
favor those they perceive as inside the group. Common group membership creates also a 
sense of obligation among members and this obligation inhibit the willingness to take 
advantage of gains that come at each other’s expense. In this way, the common belonging 
to the same group promotes the emergence of trust based relations. Actors sharing 
common meaning will be more prone to base their relations on trust, because they feel 
they are part of the same community119. In this kind of community survival is not at stake, 
so the actors can base their relationship on trust because the risk is minimal. 
Just like the two approaches previously analysed, identity based trust building has strong 
limitations. The problem lies in the necessity for the community to be closed and difficult 
to access. Most of the time, they are negatively defined. The existence of an “other”, 
external to the community, defines the community itself. So, relations based on mutual 
trust are possible only among the members of the community, members that, in terms of 
international relations, are often pre-allied States. The creation of mutual trust between 
enemies, rivals and adversaries is automatically excluded120. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Ruggie, John G. 1998, ‘What makes the world hang together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the 
Social Constructivist challenge’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 855-885. 
117 Mercer, Jonathan 1995, ‘Anarchy and Identity’, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 
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118 Tajfel, Henri 1978, ‘Interindividual behavior and intergroup behavior’, in Tajfel, Henri, ed. 
Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of inter-group relations, 
Academic Press, London, pp. 27-60. 
119 Hardy, Cynthia, Phillips, Nelson and Lawrence, Tom 1998, ‘Distinguishing Trust and Power in 
Interorganizational relations: Forms and Façades of Trust’, in Lane Christel and Bachmann 
Reinhard, eds., Trust within and between organizations, Oxford University Press, New York. 
120 Hoffman, Aaron M. 2006, Building Trust. 
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1.3.4 Comprehensive approach to trust in international relations 
 
All these three different approaches highlight the fundamental characteristics of mutual 
trust and trace different paths useful in building trust-based relationships. At the same 
time, however, all of them are bound by limitations in its implementation. Incremental 
learning and Institution based trust, coming from the same roots of rational choice theory, 
tend to focus on distrust and to be more appropriate for “short term trust relationships”. In 
fact, they can be very useful for overcoming or limiting the initial risk, that is inherent to 
trust, but show major limitations for a “strategic trust”, that is functional for a long-term 
cooperation. 
Identity based trust, instead, is difficult to begin because of the difficulty to be part of one 
of the in-groups. 
 
Thankfully each of these approaches to trust can complement the others. One can lead to 
the emergence of another, depending on the different strategic situation and on the specific 
actors involved in the relationship. For example, a relationship based on trust between to 
actor that find themselves in a situation of hostility can start with incremental learning, 
based on secondary issues, with the aim to test the ground and create a minimum level of 
mutual trust. Then, as the record of reliability of the two parties increases, the cooperation 
can move to more relevant matters and, concurrently, it can be institutionalized, with the 
creation of ad hoc institutions aimed at making cooperation stronger, more durable and 
less influenced by domestic changes affecting each of the actors.  
Finally, if the cooperation endures in the long term and the level of mutual trust continues 
to be fostered, shared meaning can be created and an identity-based trust emerges. In fact, 
after a long path of cooperation based on mutual trust, a new in-group, of which the two 
actors are part, can be created and trust can become a fundamental and structural attribute 
for the future interactions between the two actors. 
In this way, we can delineate a comprehensive approach to trust that encompasses the 
three different strategies. It can be used to start a process of trust building between hostile 
actors and it can be sustainable in the long-term; this kind of trust can be a strong base for 
a strategic cooperative relationship. 
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1.4 A Comprehensive approach to Cooperation 
 
With this new perspective on cooperation among states, we can try to delineate a 
comprehensive approach to the cooperation issue, taking the needed cues from the 
cooperative strategies previously analysed.  
While doing this, however, we must keep in mind a further distinction in the final aim of a 
cooperation process. In fact, cooperation can be implemented to address a specific issue 
that characterize a strategic rivalry and not to solve the rivalry itself and to reach a 
situation with lower levels of tension. For example, the cooperation between USA and 
USSR in terms of control and reduction of armaments – with particular emphasis on 
nuclear weapons – that took place from mid-60s and especially during the 1970s, was not 
aimed at solving rivalry and confrontation between the two actors involved, but only at 
addressing a specific and very dangerous issue. We can define this kind of cooperation as 
“tactical cooperation”, because of the limited range of its action and its goals. In this kind 
of situations, trust can be a facilitator of cooperation but is not so crucial; the incremental 
learning approach is the most suitable strategy for trust building, that can eventually 
evolve into an institution-based trust if the process of cooperation goes on. Similarly, the 
strategy of a balanced and equitable division of gains from the interaction can be 
considered as a very profitable cooperation strategy, as well as the limitation of the 
number of actors and the possible creation of international regimes. The main challenge in 
this case comes form the problem of future time actions. In fact, given the limitation in 
scope and means of the interactions, the shadow of the future might not be large enough to 
push the actors to keep on cooperating rather than cheat and exploit the immediate gains 
of defection. 
On the other hand, we can define “strategic cooperation” a cooperation process that can 
last in the long run and lead to the resolution of the considered strategic rivalry. 
Furthermore, it is specifically designed to achieve that goal, with a long-term vision. 
Instead of focusing on specific issue, it broadly takes into account every aspect of the 
relation between the two actors and identifies the issues in which the implementation of 
cooperation can be easier and faster. In this case, the goal of the process is not that of 
limiting and controlling rivalry on specific matters, but rather of change the very 
foundations of the relations and put an end to the strategic rivalry. 
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With this perspective, trust plays a crucial role. As we previously seen, cooperation can 
emerge also in situations in which trust is completely absent, characterized by enmity and 
hostility, but, besides being a facilitator of cooperation, it can guarantee the long-term 
sustainability. If we follow the previous definition of trust as encapsulated-interest, even if 
the interests of the two actors don’t coincide they must be both take into account and 
fulfilled – although not necessarily at the same level. This situation contributes decisively 
to stabilize and extend the prospect for a process of strategic cooperation, aimed at a 
specific goal. 
The kind of cooperation that we will consider will be the one we defined as strategic, with 
the goal of solving a strategic rivalry. To analyse this kind of cooperation we will develop 
a comprehensive strategy for cooperation. Following the assumption given by Peter 
Katzenstein and Rudra Sil on the so-called “analytic eclecticism”121, our approach to 
cooperation will try to encompass the different approaches to cooperation that we 
previously analyse – namely realist, neo-liberal and constructivist – to create a 
comprehensive paradigm to fully develop the different strategies to positively reach a 
cooperative interaction. 
 
If we go back to the definition of cooperation given at the beginning of the chapter, the 
most important parts are: the achievement of the objectives – at least in part – of the actors 
involved, and the coordination of policies. As seen before, the debate does not focus so 
much on what constitutes cooperation, but rather on the possibility that cooperation will 
be achieved and on the strategies towards it. 
The realist perspective, with its emphasis on the uncertainty that leads to the risk of 
cheating and the problem of relative gains, leaves little room for cooperation, within an 
international system defined by the four realist propositions. Neo-liberals, instead, argue 
that, despite anarchy is a precondition of the relations among states, cooperation has 
greater chances to be realized. In fact, Axelrod’s work shows precisely how actors can 
cooperate even in the absence of communication or mutual trust, only for the fact that it is 
the solution that brings greater benefits, thus reducing the importance of relative gains. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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If we take into account the different kinds of cooperation and cooperative strategies 
outlined before, we can trace the guidelines for a comprehensive analysis. 
First of all, within a specific dyad that constitutes a strategic rivalry, some cooperative 
strategies are structural and cannot be easily changed by the actors. Among these we can 
definitely consider the strategy that provides a strong asymmetry of power – or even the 
presence of a hegemonic state in the system. This is, in fact, a condition of the specific 
situation that is taken into consideration. Similarly the number of actors who take part in 
the interaction is closely tied to the specific situation and, even more, to the objective of 
the cooperation itself. As previously mentioned, in fact, the concept of cooperation that we 
will use is that of strategic cooperation, directed to the achievement of a specific long-term 
goal between specific actors. For this reason, the number of actors will be defined by the 
context in which the interaction take place and by the states that have a specific interest on 
the situation. 
Then, there are three strategies on which actors might intervene, to modify them and make 
cooperation most likely: the distribution of gains, the importance of the time variable and 
the creation of institutions. The problem of the position within the system after a 
cooperative interaction is critical. For realists is indeed one of the main obstacles to the 
success of such interactions. The concept of positionality permeates their whole analysis 
of cooperation and urges them to state that the improvement of one's position is 
counterproductive if the result is a greater improvement of the position of the other actor. 
Even for neo-liberals that issue is of paramount importance. In fact, Keohane’s idea of 
reciprocity and the Tit for Tat strategy explained by Axelrod put an emphasis on a 
balanced and equitable distribution of gains inside the interaction. A strategy to which 
actors can commit themselves is therefore to carefully maintain balanced the gains of the 
interaction in order to make it attractive and, at the same time, to avoid any doubts about 
the will to exploit the situation by one of the actors. 
Another key factor on which actors can work is the importance of future time actions on 
the present interactions. In fact, we highlighted how much the shadow of time is important 
to create and sustained cooperation. In this sense, the actors can resort to several different 
ways to make future weights more on present decisions. The splitting of an interaction in 
smaller ones, to spread on a longer time frame is one of these; as well as, to envisage the 
possibility of collaborating on issues of growing relevance that can ensure growing gains; 
until the perspective of a positive resolution of a strategic rivalry. 
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The third way through which actors can enhance the emergence of cooperation consists in 
the creation of international regimes. The presence of an institution, through which limit 
uncertainty and the risk of cheating, can help to foster cooperation, reducing the main 
obstacles. At the same time, the establishment of an international regime can participate in 
the success of cooperation in a broader sense. In fact, the existence of a regime that ties 
together some actors in a certain issue can be a crucial factor in the development of 
cooperation among the actors in other sectors; in fact, the cooperation between the parties 
gives the possibility to obtain credible information about the other one, thus reducing the 
uncertainty and the risks for a possible defection. For this reason, it can be useful, in some 
cases, to seek initial cooperative interactions in areas that are considered of lesser 
importance – and which imply lower costs in case of cheating – to use them in the future 
to obtain credible information and to build a record of reliability of the counterpart, in 
view of a possible subsequent cooperation in more sensitive issues. 
Finally, states can rely on the constructivist concept of epistemic community for 
cooperation. In this case, they can actively pursue the creation of this in-group that bring 
together the actors involved. The main problem lies in the necessity of the presence of 
shared meanings – usually a shared identity – between the actors to build such a 
community. In fact, the previous strategies have their roots in the rationalist approach to 
cooperation; therefore, the only needed feature to implement such strategies consists in a 
shared interest, in the possibility that both parties achieve their objectives through 
cooperation. The epistemic community approach, instead, implies the presence of 
something more than a mere calculation of costs and benefits. As previously described 
when we analysed the different strategies of trust building, the boundaries between in-
group and out-group are hard to cross; this is because their creation can not be based only 
on the existence of a common interest, but must be substantiated with the existence of 
common meanings between the parties, of a common identity, which can be based on 
many different factors, such as: a shared cultural backgrounds, a shared historical 
memory, or the sharing of some fundamental principles. 
 
The approach that will be used in the analysis of our case will then comprehend these 
different aspects. Starting from assessing the structural conditions of the interactions, we 
will highlight which are the balance of power between the actors – in particular if there is 
an asymmetry of power that can influence the emergence of cooperation – how many 
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actors are involved and which are their domestic conditions, in terms of power dynamics, 
that can affect the interactions with other states. 
Then we will test our comprehensive approach to cooperation. In other words, in the 
several cooperation processes that will be the object of the analysis, we will search for the 
different strategies that actors can put in place to achieve cooperation. The questions that 
will be addressed are: how the gains are shared among the actors? Are they balanced and 
equitable? Is the cooperation sustainable in the long term? What is the weight of future 
actions on the present interactions? Is the process of cooperation formalized in regimes 
and institutions? The created regimes favour a domino affect on other issues between the 
actors? 
Finally, the attention will be given to the possible creation of a new epistemic community 
that connect the actors, beyond the mere interest and gains. This stage can be considered 
as the apex of the cooperation process, in which it should no longer be supported by 
material gains and benefits, but in which the actors recognize themselves as part of the 
same in-group and take into account, in addition to their own interest, the collective 
welfare of the epistemic community within which are inserted. 
This division can then be synthesized by grouping the different conditions that give rise to 
different strategies for cooperation, in three separate groups. The first group, which can be 
defined as structural conditions, includes the characteristics of the context in which the 
interaction takes place; basically they are: how many actors participate in the interaction –
in this case in the analysis we will also distinguish between primary and secondary actors, 
depending on their weight and their involvement – and how the existing balance of power 
is configured – not only among primary actors but, more generally, in the international 
context in which the interaction takes place. The structural conditions will be considered 
as a kind of “exogenous variable” in the relation, because they do not strictly depend on 
the willingness of the parties involved or they can not be modified, except in a very long 
period of time. 
The second group includes instead the conditions on which the actors can influence in a 
more direct and immediate way, for a positive result of the cooperative interaction, but 
also to ensure that it becomes sustainable and profitable in the long run. This set can be 
defined as variable conditions and includes: the distribution of gains, the time aspect –
including the frequency of interactions and the weight that is given to future interactions –
and the process of institutionalization of interactions. Thanks to the possibility of 
intervening on these variables directly, they represent, in several situations, the best 
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opportunity for the actors to achieve a positive outcome in the cooperation. In addition, as 
seen in the previous paragraph, the second and third conditions are also very relevant in 
the process of creation of mutual trust between the parties. 
In the third group, we can include the possibility of creating an epistemic community that 
brings together the actors, ensuring that they feel part of the same community and thus 
perceive the cooperation process as a positive result, not only for their own interests and 
gains but for the well-being of a community to which they belong. This last feature can be 
defined as a constructed condition, because it can be modified by the actors but as long as 
there are – or are created – common and shared meanings; this process therefore requires a 
true construction of a common substrate that combines the actors inside the same in-
group. This condition also plays an essential role in building mutual trust between the 
parties. 
Throughout the analysis of the process of cooperation great relevance will be given to the 
issues, already analysed, of time and trust. In particular, we will observe how much the 
cooperative processes will be sustainable in the long term and what role the prospect of 
future possible interactions will play. Moreover, following the comprehensive approach to 
trust outlined above, we will try to identify the use of the three different approaches to 
mutual trust building. 
 
 
1.5 The Constructive Engagement Approach 
 
After having analysed the main approaches for the creation of cooperative relations among 
states, and the different strategies that can be implemented to lay a trust-based foundation 
for cooperation, we can thus introduce a practical approach that can be used by states to 
overcome deep mutual suspicion and distrust. In particular, as we previously underlined, 
for states that find themselves in a situation of strategic rivalry, and hence are far away 
from meeting the pre-conditions of trust and cooperation, usually the most common ways 
of interaction are related to (military) confrontation, enmity and competition.  
From this perspective, when one of the two actors aims at changing the behaviour of the 
counterparts it relies on the use of coercion and negative pressure122. Usually this pressure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Nincic, Miroslav 2011, The Logic of Positive Engagement, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 
3. 
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is made out of threats; threats that must be considered in a broad sense. In fact, beside the 
main coercive tool that can be used in the relations among states – that is the use of 
military force – there are also other means that might be inserted inside the same group. 
Negative pressure is a continuum that ranges from diplomatic criticism to military force, 
including steps in between, such as economic sanctions or subversive intervention. 
Diplomatic criticism can be public or not and it can vary substantially in relation to the 
practical conditions of the relationship between the actors. Also subversive intervention 
can be implemented in several different ways – and with wide degrees of secrecy – and it 
has the ultimate goal of changing the political leadership or the political system as a whole 
of one state to better meet the interests of the other. 
The most common ways of translating into practice negative pressure are the use of 
military force and economic sanctions. The first one has at least two different aspects. The 
use of force can be intended as the mere use of military attacks to change the behaviour of 
a state, but also as the power of coercion that the threat of the use of military force has on 
the behaviour of the counterpart. In this regard, we can distinguish between deterrence 
and compellence. In the first case, the purpose is to affect the other side’s calculation and 
convey the idea that the costs of an aggressive behaviour would be too high – and the 
chances of success too low – to make it worthwhile. The idea of compellence is, on the 
contrary, to use the power of coercive persuasion, assured by military capacity, to force 
the other side in doing something it otherwise would not do123. Deterrence is used until the 
provocation occurs, while compellence starts once it has occurred.  
Economic sanctions became, in recent years, the most used method of dealing with 
adversaries in the international arena, especially in situations in which wealthy nations are 
involved. The rationale lies in the assumption that economic problems that this kind of 
negative pressure cause can force the decision makers of the counterpart to abandon its 
behaviour and adapt its policies toward the interests and request of the states – or group of 
states – that imposed sanctions. The mechanisms that can bring to this change are 
basically two. First of all, the counterpart’s government might be put under pressure 
within its society for the economic pain that sanctions impose on the population; if the 
leadership does not undertake that kind of policy re-orientation, the sanctions may lead to 
the removal of the recalcitrant government. The goal of those who impose sanctions is that 
domestic deprivations would push segment of the society to rise against their leaders and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Art, Robert 1980, ‘To what ends military power?’, International Security, Vol. 4, No, 4, pp. 3-
35. 
 72 
replace them with a new group of decision makers whose international priorities are more 
acceptable by the international community – or the portion of the international community 
that imposed sanctions. In both cases the outcome is that baneful policies are abandoned 
as a result of economic pressure. 
Despite the extensive use that have been made of economic sanctions, there is no 
consensus on their effectiveness in changing the policies of the counterpart. Many 
scholars124 argue that this kind of negative pressure is ineffective, or, even, costly and 
counterproductive 125 . Also the most important study regarding economic sanctions, 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott126, which examines 115 
cases of economic sanctions from 1914 to 1990, reports a success only in 34% of the 
examined cases. In addition, several scholars have reconsidered this research results, 
further restricting the percentage of successful cases127. 
The straightforward reasoning that underlies the logic of economic sanctions – the greater 
the economic deprivation, the greater the suffering for the population, the higher the 
chances for a change of policy or regime – is, therefore, refuted by the largest part if the 
empirical evidences. The reasons behind the failure of economic sanctions are several. 
First of all, sanctions can lead to a sort of “rally effect” of a population around a 
government that can present itself as beleaguered by hostile foreigners; in addition, the 
target regime can present the internal opposition – if there is any – as connected to hostile 
foreigners, delegitimizing it and justifying a possible suppression of the dissent. It is also 
important to notice that usually economic sanctions tend to harm some segments of the 
society, that eventually might withdraw their support for the government, but, at the same 
time, they create new opportunities for economic gains – for example in the cases of black 
and grey markets, or smuggling activities – and new group of interest that might keep on 
supporting the regime. Finally, the effects of economic sanctions tend to decrease or 
disappear with the passing of time; in fact, very often the states that are target of sanctions, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Among the main scholars that carried forward studies on economic sanctions and consider them 
as ineffective: Haas, Richard (‘Sanctioning madness’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997, pp. 
74-85), Gavin, Joseph G. (‘Economic Sanctions: foreign policy levers or signals’, Policy Analysis, 
No. 124, November 1989, pp. 1-12.), Fisk, Daniel W. (‘Economic Sanctions, the Cuba Embargo 
revisisted’, in Chan, Steven and Drury, Cooper A., eds., Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory 
and Practice, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000). 
125 Haas, Richard 1997, ‘Sanctioning madness’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, pp. 74-85. 
126 Hufbauer, Gary C., Schott, Jeffrey J. and Elliott, Kimberly Ann 1990, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 
127 Pape, Robert A. 1997, ‘Why Economic Sanctions do not work’, International Security, Vol. 22. 
No. 2, pp. 90-136. 
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after an initial phase of political and economic readjustment, in which the economic 
consequences of sanctions are very onerous, are able to adopt a new modus operandi that 
allows to withstand long periods of deprivation.  
After having briefly analysed the main instruments of negative pressure, we can claim that 
often they are not viable options in trying to change the behaviour of the counterpart. The 
options that deal with the use of military force are very costly and increasingly less 
feasible in an international context that tends to condemn this kind of actions; at the same 
time, economic sanctions have repeatedly proven to be inefficient, if not even 
counterproductive. 
In addition, all these methods of political re-orientation have nothing to do with policy 
coordination, that is one of the basis of the definition of cooperation. Even in cases in 
which such methods are successful, they tend not to create cooperation, but rather 
coercion, and even in cases in which there is a relationship of imposed cooperation, it 
hardly assumes the characteristics of a stable and long-term cooperative relation, based on 
the concept of mutual trust. 
 
For these reasons, we can introduce a different method, instead of negative pressure, that 
can be used in the relations between dyads that find themselves in a state of rivalry, 
enmity or confrontation, and that can lead to the overcoming of mutual suspicion and 
distrust and to the emergence of profitable cooperative relations; this approach can be 
defined as engagement. 
In theoretical perspective, the approach that we can define as engagement comes directly 
from the development of the theory of international relations related to the concept of 
complex interdependence, emerged in a comprehensive and consistent way since the mid-
‘70s. According to the version given by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their 
paramount work Power and Interdependence, the fundamental characteristics of complex 
interdependence are three128: 
 
1. The presence of multiple channels that connect the various actors in the world of 
international relations: inter-state relations (the most classic form of relationship 
between states), trans-governmental and trans-national, particularly the latter two 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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can take several forms and involve a variety of actors (political, economic, social) 
that previously were almost excluded from the international relations arena; 
2. The absence of a strict hierarchy in the issues that states have to face and the 
expansion of the number of issues to be included inside the foreign policy agenda 
of a government; issues related to economy, energy, environment, resources, that 
should be considered alongside the issues of security, that traditionally occupied 
the whole agenda129; 
3. The reduced role of military force, in a global system in which interdependence 
prevails and the use of force, or its threat, can not be the only way to interact in the 
international arena, in many cases indeed it is absolutely inappropriate and costly 
and its effects unpredictable. 
 
The mechanism described above presents a representation of the ideal-typical paradigm of 
complex interdependence; not all situations on the international arena can be interpreted 
through these principles. Certainly, however, the introduction of the concept of complex 
interdependence gives the opportunity to introduce new assumption to analyse different 
situations and to seek new solutions to existing situations. 
Specifically, starting from the new features introduced with the complex interdependence 
theory, new approaches were developed, focused on the need to commit and engage with 
the adversary; no longer a logic of deterrence and containment but a constructive idea of 
reciprocity in international relations130. These approaches are defined as constructive 
engagement and can refer to all those cases in which positive incentives are used by one 
actor to influence the behaviour of the counterpart; in practice these methods can be 
distinguished for the means used: promises of rewards rather than threats of retaliation. 
Obviously, to achieve specific goals may be important to use a mixture of concessions and 
firmness, to maintain credibility with the opponent and do not show signs of weakness131. 
The cases in which engagement has been implemented show that, despite the fact that the 
theoretical basis always remains the same, there are many differences in the practical 
implementation of these policies. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Kissinger, Henry 1975, ‘A new national partnership’, Department of State Bullettin, February 
17, p. 199. 
130 Keohane, Robert O. 1986, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’. 
131 Schweller, Randall 1999, ‘Managing the rise of great powers: history and theory’, in Johnson, 
Alastair Iain and Ross, Robert, eds. Engaging China: managing a rising power, Routledge, 
London and New York, pp. 14-15. 
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An initial distinction that can be made is between conditional and unconditional 
engagement. In the first case the incentives that are envisaged are implemented only when 
a real change of political conduct from the opponent takes place, while in the second 
situation the incentives are not conditioned to logic of quid pro quo, but rather are used to 
deepen the ties between the two sides, creating a situation of interdependence that is 
conducive to change – preferably negotiated – in the political conduct of the opponent, in 
the long run; also this kind of engagement creates favourable conditions for the creation of 
a minimum level of mutual trust between the actors. Both approaches show significant 
strengths as well as weaknesses: the conditional engagement can indeed lead to important 
results in the short term and avoid any waste of resources, because nothing it’s given if 
first the actor does not get something in return. It is also true, however, that this approach 
puts in a political corner the opponent, by imposing an immediate change, forcing a 
situation, and thus might lead to a hardening of positions, a result contrary to the logic of 
constructive engagement. In other words, conditional engagement often does not provide 
the counterpart with what we previously described as “breathing space”, an amount of 
discretion to give the other player a margin to adapt their policies toward outside and 
make sure that this policy re-orientation does not have a destructive impact on domestic 
politics.  
Similarly, the practice of unconditional engagement raised a lot of criticism about the 
actual tangible benefits that it should ensure; an approach that brings practical results only 
in the medium or long term is very often considered as a policy of unilateral concessions, 
that do not get concrete results for the state implements them132. In several occasions the 
approach of unconditional engagement has been treated like a policy of appeasement. 
A further distinction in this theoretical framework can be drawn regarding the procedure 
for implementing incentives. As previously explained, the concept of complex 
interdependence, that constitutes the very foundation of the approaches, multiplies the 
issues on the foreign policy agenda, as well as the actors that play a role in the 
development of international relations. This new situation is reflected in the ability to 
leverage a wide range of incentives, as well as a wide spectrum of actors to put them into 
practice. It ranges from the traditional security scope to economics, passing through a 
wide variety of incentives at the political or diplomatic level (recognition of a state, access 
to specific international organizations). Similarly, they can be put into practice by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Govindasamy, Geetha 2005, ‘South Korea’s engagement of North Korea: policy considerations 
and challenges’, Malaysian Civilisation Portal, University of Malaya. 
 76 
governments, but also by international organizations, non-governmental organizations 
even by private entities; such fragmentation is functional to the role that the 
administrations involved decide to interpret in certain situation, for example by providing 
the means and the opportunity for a third party to carry out constructive initiative toward 
the opponent but without being directly exposed in the foreground. 
The economic incentives are probably the most used, because, in addition to raise the level 
of trust between the parties, they can also promote the development of conditions that 
affect the behaviour of the adversary. According to the vision of Keohane and Nye, 
economic interdependence that is created in this way might ensure new sources of 
influence on the counterpart133. In particular, when one of the two actors possesses a share 
of economic power well above the other’s – namely asymmetrical power – through a 
series of wisely used economic incentives one side can lead the other in entering a 
situation of dependency, and therefore enhancing the chances to influence its behaviour in 
foreign policy. 
 
The landscape of the policies that can be implemented by following the dictates of the 
approach of engagement is therefore very broad: it goes from forms of conditioned 
incentives to others that, at first glance, are given for “free”, but actually have the 
possibility to stretch their effectiveness on long-term strategies. Also, in soma cases the 
coordinated use of incentives and threats can play a significant role, insofar they do not 
undermine the cornerstone of the theoretical foundation, that is, the “positive” and 
“constructive” character of the approach. Finally, the distinction between the different 
leverages that a state decides to implement in the resolution of the dispute shows that the 
economic weapon present the double advantage to act as an incentive, just like all the 
other, and, at the same time, to create asymmetric interdependence, which is crucial in 
influencing the behaviour of the adversary. 
Going into the specifics of the case in question, inter-Korean relations, we can apply the 
categories previously outlined to identify which are the key features that an approach 
based on constructive engagement should have in this case, notwithstanding that, also in 
this situation, its application has not been strict but has undergone changes and 
adjustments in the course of the years and of the different governments that tried to 
implement it. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. 1977, Power and Interdependence. 
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1.6 Introducing Inter-Korean Cooperation 
 
The situation of inter-Korean relations, at least until the early ‘70s, stood out for a certain 
degree of simplicity. The Korean War had finally froze a situation of division that was 
created by the American necessity to contain Soviet expansionism; at the same time it 
pointed out how the coveted liberation from Japanese colonialism had come thanks to the 
intervention of foreign powers, placing therefore a serious threat on the possibility of 
independence in foreign policy by the two new born Korean states134. This subordination 
to the superpowers had serious repercussions also, and mainly, on inter-Korean relations 
and on any possible attempts at rapprochement, if not reunification. The victory of Mao 
Tse-tung and the Communist Party in the Chinese civil war (1949) further exacerbated the 
bipolar confrontation in Northeast Asia, turning the spotlight even more on the Korean 
Peninsula and its role in the global arena, dominated by the contrast between the two 
superpowers and their ideologies. 
Surely, such an approach had a solid foundation in the recent past of the Korean War, but 
also in the several occasions that highlighted the aggressiveness of the North; between 
1967 and 1968 there were several military provocations, culminating in the attempt to 
murder of South Korean president Park Chung-hee by a commando of special forces from 
across the border. In the same year, an American ship, the USS Pueblo, who crossed into 
international waters off North Korea, was seized and again the following year, a military 
US aircraft was shot down by Pyongyang’s aviation135. 
The overall picture shows so clearly how the relations between the two Koreas were based 
on total hostility and lack of mutual trust. The ideal soil for a logic of confrontation and 
containment. 
What becomes apparent is therefore a total lack of originality on the part of South Korean 
policy makers throughout the period of the Cold War with regard to relations with 
Pyongyang; flattened on Washington’s position of containment, in some cases they were 
even more intransigent than Americans, when, in late ‘60s and early ‘70s, they kept on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Cumings, Bruce 2005, Korea’s place in the sun, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, pp. 
185-186. 
135 The spy ship USS Pueblo was captured by North Korean navy on January 23, 1968, while in 
international waters off the port of Wonsan, where it was conducted; the crew was released only 
on December 23 of that year. The shooting down of EC-121 took place on April 15, 1969, by a 
North Korean MiG-17 over the East Sea 90 miles off the eastern coast, the 31 crew members were 
killed. For further information on the two crises see: Mobley, Richard A. 2003, Flash point North 
Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 crisis, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 
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insisting on the hard line, despite the US itself recommended a mild softening of positions 
to relieve tension, in line with the new Nixon’s strategy of opening towards China. The 
idea that a different paradigm, based on some form of engagement could lead to concrete 
results in terms of peaceful coexistence, possibility of cooperation and future 
rapprochement was not considered as a serious viable option. 
But from 1972 onward – and even more after the end of the Cold War – South Korean 
government began to implement new policies in relation to its northern counterpart. An 
approach no longer based on containment, confrontation, or rivalry characterized by high 
levels of tension, but on cooperation and on a kind of engagement that had as its primary 
objective the development of a conducive environment for negotiations and a minimum 
level of mutual trust, necessary for any development to unlock the situation. 
The beginning of the policies of cooperation and engagement on the Korean peninsula can 
be traced back to the early ‘70s, with the frail and somewhat opportunistic attempts of 
president Park Chung-hee. Subsequently, the push toward this approach by the first two 
governments post-democratization (in 1987 and 1992) has been much more determined 
and finally the fullest point has been reached by the two progressive administrations 
between 1997 and 2007. A large number of different administrations – authoritarian or 
democratic, conservative or progressive – that have been in charge over such a wide 
temporal arc logically have resulted in very different policies, even if in all of them we can 
identify different moments in which there is a clear will to find a form of cooperation with 
Pyongyang. 
 
The variety of approaches of engagement that have been carried out by South Korean 
governments toward North Korea is therefore very wide. Nevertheless, we can highlight 
some features that are part of the more complete expression of what can be termed as 
constructive engagement – and that found its realization with the progressive 
administrations from 1997 to 2007. First of all, the choice has been that of an 
unconditional constructive engagement; hence the non-subordination of commitments to a 
logic of quid pro quo. The rationale of this approach lies in the goal of creating or 
deepening links and interrelationships between the two countries, to reach a minimum 
level of trust necessary to enter into any form of negotiation, as well as a network of 
interdependence. A different approach would have been hard to implement into practice 
also because of the rigidity of the North Korean system, which creates very strong 
resistance to immediate changes on specific sensitive issues from outside, because of the 
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risk of weakening the leadership internally. Furthermore, the choice of the South Korean 
government in those cases was that of a long-term strategy, in which the non-conditioning 
of incentives to the fulfilment of specific obligations by the counterpart was more 
functional. Regarding the coexistence of incentives and threats, the preference is definitely 
for the first ones, to avoid the risk of falling into the logic of containment theories and 
undermine the constructive character at the base of the theoretical approach. 
Finally, as for the methods and the actors involved, we can highlight a multiplicity of 
different interventions. In principle, the choice of economic incentive appears to be the 
most fitting, to lower – and maintain low – the level of tension and to create space for the 
emergence of the asymmetric interdependence. The inter-Korean case is paradigmatic in 
this sense, given the abysmal difference of economic resources between the two actors and 
the possibility of exploitation by South Korea of the dependence that can be created by 
economic incentives. Obviously, further actions were required, both in the political and 
security aspects, but always in a secondary way compared to economic and scientific-
cultural relations. This choice of starting from low profile interactions has been applied 
also regarding the actors who implemented such incentives. In the first stage, in fact, the 
action of international organizations, non-governmental organizations and even private 
entities were privileged136, to give the government the opportunity not to expose itself 
immediately.  
 
After outlining the approach through which analyse the inter-Korean dispute, it is essential 
to lay the research questions that this study aims to clarify. The main purpose is related to 
the analysis of the policies of cooperation that have been implemented during the course 
of inter-Korean relations. With this perspective, we will use the theoretical framework 
outlined in this chapter to analyse the main examples of inter-Korean political, economic 
and humanitarian cooperation over the years. The method will be of submitting each 
example of interaction to the three set of conditions previously outlined, that can lead to 
the different strategies of cooperation: the systemic conditions, the variable conditions and 
the constructed conditions. In this way, it will be possible to find the main reasons that led 
to a positive result in inter-Korean cooperation, a rare event in a situation seven decades 
long and dominated, for most of its duration, by conflict and confrontation. In addition, we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 In many cases, the large industrial conglomerates will become the providers of economic 
incentives; first and foremost the Hyundai, whose founder was of North Korean origin, in 
particular with its branch of Hyundai Asan. 
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will analyse the development of the negotiation process that led to cooperation, again 
using the framework previously constructed; finally, we will compare the results actually 
achieved with the targets that the parties had posed at the beginning of the interaction.  
During this analysis, besides the development of cooperative processes, a great emphasis 
will be placed on two more aspects that can be considered crucial for inter-Korean 
relations. The first one is the just mentioned engagement approach – and in particular its 
constructive variant – that can be considered as a major mean for leaving a state of 
conflict and confrontation in a strategic rivalry dyad. Given the willingness of the actors to 
implement a re-orientation of their policy, to get out of this state, we saw in the previous 
paragraph that the systems of negative pressure, apart from being difficult to apply and 
uncertain regarding the results, are not functional for the creation of the basic features of 
cooperation, in particular policy coordination.!For these reasons the use of an approach of 
engagement is more functional to achieve the result. With this perspective, the interactions 
that will be considered in the following pages will also be analysed in this light, with the 
purpose of researching approaches of engagement that the different administrations might 
have used.  
The second feature on which we will focus our attention is the concept of mutual trust. As 
we previously noted, trust is one of the main characteristics of some cooperative 
relationships; in particular, it is of fundamental importance in trying to create a process of 
long-term strategic cooperation, to resolve a situation of chronic tension, such as that 
created by a strategic rivalry. Inter-Korean relations can be considered as a paradigmatic 
example in this respect and, therefore, the establishment of mutual trust between the 
parties will be one of the aspects – along with cooperation and engagement – that we will 
try to highlight during the analysis. The strategies to create mutual trust are varied and, in 
some cases, are comparable to those of the creation of cooperation. In particular, they can 
be traced back to some aspects of what we defined as variable conditions – the frequency 
of interactions and the institutionalization process – and, especially, constructed 
conditions. For this reason, the study of such characteristics, within the interactions 
between the two Koreas that will be taken into consideration, will be followed by an 
analysis of their role in the creation of mutual trust on the peninsula. 
As well as analysing the efforts toward cooperation and the policies, based on different 
assumptions, we will also try to capture a picture of the results achieved in the inter-
Korean dispute by the different pursued approaches. The perspective from which the 
analysis will be carried out will be that of trying to create a comparison among the 
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different processes of cooperation and of national reconciliation that have been 
implemented in the long path for a peaceful reunification of the peninsula. 
 
The case of inter-Korean relations is an almost unique example in the world of 
international relations. In fact, it can be seen as a single nation that was divided at the end 
of the Second World War, largely for reasons related to the global balance of power 
among the winners of the conflict – the USA and USSR – that was in formation in the 
second half of the ‘40s. For these reasons, the two states that have been formed continued 
to maintain a strong common cultural connotation: ranging from the language to the 
historical memory, from the traditions to the food, to all the cultural aspects inherited from 
the previous centuries of Korean history. This situation has meant that in the development 
of inter-Korean relations we can highlight specific features that characterize these 
interactions and must be placed at the centre of the analysis. 
First of all, we must identify several levels of analysis in these relations. On the one hand, 
in fact, we are in the presence of two sovereign states, part of the international community, 
which relate to each other like all the other sovereign states; in this sense, the terms, 
categories and patterns typical of international relations theory can be applied to the 
Korean case. On the other hand, however, we can highlight two further levels of influence 
in inter-Korean relations, one of higher order one of lower order.  
The influence of external powers in the division of the peninsula continued in the 
subsequent years, and undermined the possibility that the two countries could relate 
independently, for all the duration of the Cold War. For this reason, to understand the 
development of inter-Korean cooperation, it is essential to introduce in the analysis a 
further level, in which to place the evolution – or immobility – of the relations and the 
balance of power between the powers in the region, and their consequences on the 
peninsula. Alongside this perspective, however, we cannot ignore the presence of a set of 
shared meanings that are constituted by the cultural and historical heritage of the Korean 
nation. For this reason, we must also include a lower level, compared to the relations 
between the two sovereign states of North and South, that includes the importance of 
common cultural characteristics and the sentiment of a common Korean national identity 
that might be present in the two leaderships and populations. The very idea that the goal of 
inter-Korean relations must be the national reunification implies the existence of this 
substrate and the importance it holds for an analysis of the cooperation between the two 
states. 
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For this reason, the creation of the theoretical framework previously presented gives us the 
opportunity to analyse inter-Korean relations at different levels. The structural conditions, 
in fact, focus on the external factors and the influence of the international system and the 
balance of power in inter-Korean relations; the variable conditions represent instead the 
direct intervention of the two countries in their interactions, and therefore the clearest 
form of inter-Korean relations; finally, the constructed conditions refer precisely to that 
set of common characteristics and identity of the two states, which influence the process 
and, therefore, must be included within the model of analysis of cooperation. Through this 
framework we can thus have a broad and comprehensive picture not only of the 
development of the cooperative relations between the two Koreas, but also of the causes 
that led them to become successful or not. 
 
As previously stated, the policies implemented by South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun can be considered as an absolute innovation in managing the relations 
between the two Koreas. Nevertheless, their formulation and implementation is part of a 
process that was established more or less twenty five years before the beginning of the 
“Sunshine Policy” and that laid the first foundation in building a dialogue between Seoul 
and Pyongyang. It is therefore essential, before looking at the highest point on the 
approach of constructive engagement and cooperation, to retrace the early stages of 
cooperative interaction that, even though between ups and downs and in an discontinuous 
way, have moved away from the traditional framework of containment and started the new 
path of positive and constructive approaches. 
But before starting the analysis of the relations of inter-Korean cooperation, based on the 
theoretical model designed in this chapter, it is essential to provide a historical 
reconstruction of the political relations between the two Koreas. For this reason, in the 
next chapter we will analyse the historical and political evolution on the peninsula, 
starting from what can be considered the Korean “Great National Tragedy”, which began 
in 1910, with the Japanese colonization, then continued with the division of the peninsula 
after the end of the Second World War and culminated with the fratricidal conflict of 
1950-53. These historical events of paramount importance are the pre-conditions for the 
very existence of inter-Korean relations; in fact, these tragic experiences led to the 
division of the peninsula into two separate states, after centuries of Korean national unity 
and to the necessity of interactions between these two new actors. 
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Then, we will move on to take into consideration the various historical ruptures that made 
possible a change from the state of conflict, typical of inter-Korean relations, and created a 
space for the beginning of relations of cooperation and creation of mutual trust. With this 
perspective we will analyse the rapprochement of 1972, which culminated with the 
signing of the Joint Statement of July 4, and the end of the Cold War, which will create 
the conditions for the emergence of a period of cooperation – within the mark of the South 
Korean policy known as Nordpolitik – that will lead to the signing of the Basic 
Agreement, in December 1991. Finally, we will focus on the most important period in 
terms of inter-Korean cooperation, namely the progressive presidencies of Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun (1997-2007). 
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Second Chapter 
History of inter-Korean relations 
  
The analysis of the history of inter-Korean relations implies, starting from its name, the 
need for a historical explanation. The same existence of inter-Korean relations, in fact, 
requires the presence of various state entities placed on the geographic region defined as 
the Korean Peninsula. 
The development of political and social institutions on the Korean territories saw different 
phases. In some periods, a plurality of centres of power coexisted on the peninsula, but, 
from the tenth century onwards, the territory was characterized by the presence of a 
unitary state. 
Throughout the first millennium the territories forming part of the peninsula, with the 
addition of some parts of the Chinese Manchuria, were divided between different state 
entities. Around the first century AD, in fact, there was the emergence of three main actors 
in the area: the kingdoms of Silla, Baekje and Goguryeo; which gave the name to the 
historical period known as the “Three Kingdoms” period. At the same time, there were 
also other entities on the territory of lesser importance, such as the Confederation of Kaya. 
Around 562 A.D. Kaya was annexed to the kingdom of Silla and, shortly after, 
respectively in 660 and 667 AD, the same fate happened to the kingdoms of Baekje and 
Goguryeo. After a decade of clashes with the Chinese Tang Dynasty, in 676 the Unified 
Silla kingdom was able to obtain the unification of all the territories south of the Taedong 
River, most of those that currently are part of the two Korean states1. 
Even at that time, however, a first division between North and South began to take shape. 
After about thirty years after the defeat of Goguryeo, in fact, on the northernmost 
territories of the old kingdom, was created a new state entity: the kingdom of Balhae. 
Founded by Dae Jo-yeong, the son of a Goguryeo general, the new kingdom proposed 
itself as a direct successor of the previous one. 
The political and social decline that the Unified Silla began to suffer during the ninth 
century was the cause of the end of the period of the “states of North and South”. In 892, 
in fact, rebel troops led by General Kyon Hwon took control of the southwestern part of 
the peninsula, with the foundation of the kingdom of Hu-Baekje. A few years later, in 901, 
also in the northern part of Silla a new kingdom was formed with the name of T'aebong or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Riotto, Maurizio 2005, Storia della Corea: dalle origini ai giorni nostri, Bompiani, Milano. 
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Hu-Goguryeo. The so-called period of “Late Three Kingdoms”, however, had very short 
life. In 918, in fact, the kingdom of T'aebong, shaken by a domestic transition of power, 
changed its name to Goryeo and, in the space of twenty years, conquered the other two 
rival kingdoms on the peninsula2. 
With the beginning of the Goryeo era the unification of the Korean peninsula can be 
considered complete. Although in 1392 on the same territory a new dynasty was 
established, which began the so-called Joseon period, until 1945 there were no further 
division of the territory. 
Even during the period of Japanese colonization, the Korean peninsula, part of the 
Japanese empire for 35 years, suffered no cuts or territorial dismemberment of its 
territory. 
It was therefore with the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Japanese 
empire that Korea was divided for the first time in over a thousand years of history unity. 
 
 
2.1 The “Korean National Tragedy” 
 
2.1.1 The loss of independence 
  
The events that led to the division of the Korean peninsula into two separate states along a 
border that, in broad terms, follows the 38° parallel, trace their origins several decades 
before the intervention of the Allied Forces in East Asia and the surrender of Japan, 
August 15, 1945. In fact, from the second half of the nineteenth century until the end of 
the Second World War, the Korean peninsula, though still united from a geopolitical point 
of view, gradually lost its independence. This characteristic will be a major cause of the 
arbitrary division which will emerge in 1945. 
The reign of the Joseon Dynasty, which ruled over Korea since 1392, in the second half of 
the nineteenth century was already suffering from a major crisis. As happened to other 
important and ancient states of Northeast Asia, the nineteenth century marked a moment 
of great historical break with the past. 
For centuries the Joseon kingdom had been almost totally closed to any kind of exchange 
or influence from the outside, to the point of earning the nickname "Hermit Kingdom". !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Riotto, Maurizio 2005, Storia della Corea. 
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After suffering a first Japanese invasion, between 1592 and 1597, by Admiral Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, who wanted to use the peninsula as a launching pad for the conquest of Ming 
China, and two successive short Manchu invasions in 1627 and in 1636, the country had 
turned completely inward. The aim was, in fact, to limit as much as possible any contact 
with outside countries, except for China, whose the Joseon kingdom was a tributary state, 
and sporadic trade contacts with Japan3.!!
The events that led to the end of Korean isolation from the outside world followed, in 
general, what happened to its neighbours. The growing interest of the European colonial 
powers for new economic opportunities in Asia turned also toward the Korean peninsula, 
with the goal of breaking the isolation in which it was entrenched until the mid-nineteenth 
century. The first incident between the Joseon monarchy and the Western powers took 
place in 1866, with the French retaliation against the island of Kanghwa, after the killing 
of some Catholic missionaries by the government of Hŭngsŏn Taewŏn'gun, and the 
incident of the American merchant General Sherman, attacked and sunk after passing the 
limit of navigation allotted by Korean officials, which was followed by a US attack of 
retaliation (1871)4. 
In the Korean version of “Gunboat Diplomacy” a East Asian dynamic of power was added 
to the picture. The Joseon kingdom, as mentioned, was a tributary state of China and, 
although it maintained an almost total independence, was considered under the Chinese 
sphere of influence. The events of the second half of the nineteenth century, however, 
changed unequivocally the balance of power in the region. The Chinese empire was 
shaken by a great crisis and weakness, following the defeats of the Opium Wars, the 
signing of the so-called Unequal Treaties and internal rebellions. At the same time Japan, 
after the opening to the West that followed the arrival of the American fleet of 
Commodore Matthew Perry in Tokyo Bay, had embarked on a process of modernization 
and industrialization, in order to close the huge economic and military gap with the 
European powers. This new course of Japanese politics was characterized by a new 
interest towards the acquisition of colonies and protectorates, in the same way in which 
this was carried out by European powers.  
With these assumptions, one of the first targets to which Japan began to look with great 
interest was the Korean Peninsula. Now that the isolation in which the Joseon kingdom 
remained for long centuries was clearly unsustainable, Japanese efforts began to focus on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Oberdorfer, Dan 2001, The Two Koreas, Basic Books, New York, pp. 144-153. 
4 Gale, James Scarth 1972, History of the Korean People, Royal Asiatic Society, Seoul, pp. 310-311. 
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the penetration of its influence in the country. The first opening treaty of the former 
“Hermit Kingdom” was signed with Tokyo on February 26, 1876. The “Friendship 
Treaty” between Korea and Japan (also known as the “Treaty of Kanghwa”), could not be 
considered equal, but it still included the formula of “sovereign country” with reference to 
Korea, thus giving the appearance of curbing Japanese expansionism5. Actually, its main 
function was of eliminating the traditional Chinese influence on the peninsula. 
In 1882, as a defensive measure against its threatening neighbours, Korea signed a “Treaty 
of Amity, Commerce and Navigation” with the United States, the first one with a Western 
power. Later, Korea signed a treaty with Tsarist Russia, which had now realized the 
strategic importance of the peninsula. Between 1894 and 1895 Japan and China embarked 
on the so-called first Sino-Japanese War, which had as its main motivation the influence 
of the two powers over the Korean peninsula. The Japanese military supremacy in the 
conflict was decisive and led to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the definitive 
affirmation of Japanese power in the region, at the expense of China. The treaty 
recognized the full and complete independence of Korea from China. Actually, it 
sanctioned the definitive removal of the peninsula from the sphere of influence of Beijing 
and its entrance into that of Tokyo. 
In 1902, Japan strengthened its position by forming an alliance with Great Britain, which 
began to fear for Russian expansion in the East. In exchange for the British recognition of 
the Japanese “special interests” in Korea, Tokyo recognized English interests in China. 
Such moves alarmed Russia that decided to move its troops toward the peninsula, 
increasing tensions with Japan. To avoid confrontation, the Japanese proposed to the 
Russians to divide Korea into two zones of influence, whose boundary line would be the 
38th parallel, the same that will be chose by the Americans at the end of World War II. 
Because of the refusal of Russia, Japan made a surprise attack to the Russian naval base in 
Port Arthur, in February 1904, initiating the Russo-Japanese War, that ended the 
independence of Korea. The conflict lasted until September 1905, with the overwhelming 
victory of Japan and the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth; Russia withdrew its troops 
from Manchuria, while Japan secured its domination of Korea, which was informally 
annexed to Japan. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Seth, Michael J. 2010, A coincise history of Modern Korea: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the 
Present, Rowman and Littlefield Publichers, Lanham, p. 13.  
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In July of the same year, the US Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, approved the 
Japanese rule of Korea by signing a secret agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan, Taro Katsura, which in turn assured the non-opposition to US domination of the 
Philippines. Britain, which renewed its alliance with Japan in 1905, tacitly approved the 
Japanese intentions over Korea6. Now Tokyo had all diplomatic means to dominate Korea, 
and in November it officially became a Japanese protectorate. Five years later, the 
Japanese government decided to annex the peninsula. This decision represents the first 
moment of the Korean national tragedy. 
On 29 August, 1910, the Japanese government issued an edict in the name of the emperors 
of Japan and Korea, that established the merger of the two countries. Terauki Masatake 
was settled in Seoul as governor general and implemented some measures that did presage 
the worst for Koreans: meetings and political discussions were banned, strong censorship 
on the press, arrests of Koreans suspected of threatening the authorities7. 
During the thirty-five years of Japanese colonization, the colonial government laid the 
foundation for the development of economic, political and cultural aspects of modern 
Korea, and tried to implement a process of assimilation of Koreans to the Japanese 
culture. In the first decade of the colonization, defined by Koreans as “the dark period”, 
the Japanese, through a brutal, highly centralized, direct and intensive colonization, tried 
to deconstruct the millennial Korean culture. The economic and strategic needs of Japan 
were the primary goals to dictate the course of economic and social development in Korea, 
and not the interests of the Korean people.  
The political figure of the Governor General acquired a degree of authority that exceeded 
even that of the pre-colonial kings: he had the command of the military forces on the 
peninsula, controlled the police system, appointed most important officials, had extensive 
legislative and executive powers, became the largest landowner in the peninsula. The 
political repression was harsh and affected all the aspects of the country's cultural life. The 
colonial government even forbade Koreans to speak their language in public. Another 
thorny issue, which is still an open wound in the relations between the two countries, it 
was the practice of the Japanese soldiers of sexually abusing Korean women, the 
phenomenon of so-called “comfort women”. 
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7 Seth, Michael J. 2010, A coincise history of Modern Korea, p. 35. 
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In the early years of Japanese government, the opposition to the colonial regime was poor, 
consisting of groups of nationalists abroad and few internal dissidents. In March 1919, on 
the contrary, there was the formation of a true national resistance movement against the 
Japanese occupation, “the March 1st Movement”, the first to include not only intellectual 
and exile groups, but also women, farmers, residents of small and big cities, that 
considered Korea as a member of the international community of nations, and therefore 
independent. The demonstrations were quickly suppressed, but they represented a major 
embarrassment for the Japanese government, which began to think of reforming the 
colonial rule8. 
The 20s are considered a more moderate period of the colonization, compared to the 
previous and the following. It was also a period of cultural ferment in Korea, during which 
it became clear the distinction between a moderate nationalist movement, inspired by 
Western cultural and nationalists values, and a radical one, inspired by Marxism. In April 
1925, some young leftists founded the Korean Communist Party, the first party in the 
history of the country, but its representatives were arrested a few months later by the 
colonial authorities. 
In the 30s, the reinvigorated expansionism of Japan in Asia drastically reduced the 
cooperation with Western powers, and had a strong impact on the colonial rule in Korea, 
considered as a valuable source of raw materials, investment and trade, and a natural 
bridge between Manchuria and Japan. 
With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the colonial regime began a 
major campaign for the mass mobilization of the Korean people to support the costs of the 
war and all kinds of Korean organization was banned. The authorities tried to create a 
process of assimilation of Koreans into the Japanese culture – probably the highest point 
in this regard was the proclamation of the law that prohibited the use of Korean names and 
forced Koreans to adopt Japanese names – by propagating the idea of one single people. 
However, in practice Koreans were always in a lower and subordinate position to the 
Japanese9. 
The experience of colonization imprinted in the Korean population a strong sense of 
national identity and was one of the main element of the construction of the new natonal 
identities both in North and South Korea. Despite the failure of assimilation, the legacy of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Cumings, Bruce 2005, Korea’s Place in the Sun, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, pp. 148-150. 
9 Cumings, Bruce 1981, The origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the emergence of separate regimes, 
1945-1947, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 28-29. 
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Japanese colonization on the Korean Peninsula was complex: high governmental 
efficiency standards, necessary and infrastructure of a modern industrial society, reform of 
the education system. During the colonial the traditional Korean social order was 
disrupted and a new middle class and a class of industrial workers were formed. The 
Japanese colonial government, especially in the last years of the occupation, provided the 
example of a state-led economic development, of policies of mass mobilization of the 
population and propaganda campaigns, which will inspire the leaders of both North and 
South.  
 
 
2.1.2 The loss of National Unity 
 
The fate of the post-colonial Korea was decided by Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-
shek, during a meeting held in Cairo, in 1943, to discuss and decide the future of Japan 
and its colonies after the defeat. 
The three leaders announced, in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, that “in due 
course”, Korea will become free and independent. With this document, for the first time 
the Allies declared their plans for Korea. Roosevelt's idea was to put the Japanese 
colonies, starting from Korea, under a “trusteeship”, to assist and guide them once 
independent. The strong nationalistic aspirations of Koreans contributed to attribute to the 
expression "due course" the meaning of immediate independence10. 
The events that followed August 1945 determined the fate of Korea. After the American 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russian declaration of war against Japan, the 
advance of the Russian army in Korea and the signs of an imminent surrender of Japan, 
the Americans began to fear that the whole peninsula could end up in Soviet hands. US 
military forces were stationed in Okinawa, while the Russians were already on the 
peninsula; to avoid this situation, on the night between August 10 and 11, the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee commissioned two colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles 
Bonesteel, to determine a line of demarcation to divide Korea into two equivalent zones, 
on which USSR and United States would exert their influences. The two colonels, not 
prepared for this task, realized that the 38th parallel could be use as a demarcation line and 
proposed that US troops would station in the southern part of the peninsula, which also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Cho, Soon Sung 1967, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950: an evaluation of American responsability, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 19. 
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included the capital Seoul, and the Soviets in the north. This proposal was approved by 
President Truman and the General Order Number One was sent to Moscow. The Soviets 
accepted it immediately; Stalin probably accept that solution beacuse he was convinced 
that it would provide ample opportunity to participate in the occupation of Japan and even 
Europe, and probably he also thought that this agreement would distance the danger of a 
direct confrontation with the United States in Korea. The 38th parallel, that became the 
border between the two Koreas, is a totally arbitrary line and does not represent any 
historical, cultural or geographical division of the country11. 
In the south of the peninsula, in the meantime, the Japanese governor Abe Nobuyuki, 
aware of the consequences of the events, tried to organize the transition process and the to 
identify someone on his side to entrust the fate of Korea; many Koreans politicians 
refused to collaborate with the colonial authorities. Yo Un Hyong, a political moderate 
without any communist inclination and suppoerte of democracy and equality, accepted, in 
exchange for the release of all political prisoners, the guarantee that the preparation for 
independence would be freely managed by the Koreans and the security of food supplies 
for the following three months. Waiting for real elections, Yo established the Committee 
for the Preparation of Korea Independence (CPKI), with the function of maintaining peace 
and order on the peninsula. 
On August 15, 1945, the Japanese emperor Hiroito announced on the radio the surrender 
of Japan. The first reaction of amazement and shock for Korean people, were followed by 
joy and celebrations across the country. All symbols of the colonial era were shot down, 
and the traditional Korean flag was waving in all cities. In less than two weeks, a 
considerable number of local popular committees joined by the CPKI. 
On September 6, one thousand delegates of local committees gathered in Seoul, and the 
People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed, with Yi Sungman, a staunch anti-communist, 
in the role of President. Six days after the founding of the Republic, that represented a 
wide variety of political forces, a program of political and social reform in 27 points was 
published, which provided important interventions, such as: land reform, redistribution of 
land, nationalization of industries12. 
Meanwhile in the North, the Soviets, who arrived in Pyongyang on August 24, chose to 
work with the local committee headed by Cho Man Sik, to facilitate a peaceful transfer of 
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power. But, at the same time, they also started to increase the presence of communist 
leaders within the committee. 
Political issues had priority for the Soviet authorities in Korea. Their task was to 
implement the so-called “communisation” of the country: to establish a pro-Soviet 
government in their occupation zone. This need was made even more urgent by the fact 
that most likely, after 1945, Americans would have transformed Japan, and probably 
South Korea, in two american military bases, and then for the Soviets was crucial to have 
a sort of protective “buffer area” in the north of the peninsula. In early September 1945, 
various groups of self-government, the People's Committees, had already been created, 
with the support of the population. However, in the fall of 1945 the Soviet authorities 
realized that the alliance with the nationalists was not easy. Cho Man Sik was trying to 
exploit his position to bear forward his political strategy, in contrast to the Soviet one, and 
was against the decision of establishing a trusteeship in Korea. 
When Soviets had to choose the most appropriate communist leaders to defend their 
interests on the peninsula, the choice fell on the members of the 88th Brigade of the Red 
Army, which included Kim Il-sung and other 66 soldiers, who entered Wonsan on 
September 19. On October 14, 1945, Kim Il-sung was presented publicly to North 
Koreans, at a gathering in honor of the Soviet army, as a hero of the anti-Japanese 
guerrilla and a high-level political. By that time, he took in his hands the control of the 
local communist movement, supported and assisted by the Soviet Union, and removed the 
local communists who opposed him13. 
In the spring of 1946 it was clear that the project of a trusteeship over Korea and the 
foundation of a unified Korean government would not have been realized. It was at this 
point that the Soviets decided to create an independent state in the north.  
While in that part the reorganization of the occupied territory, implemented by the Soviets, 
continued, in the South there was a total political chaos and the American administration 
revealed the lack of preparation and the confusion of the directives from Washington. 
Ameircan General John Hodge, the military governor of Korea, did not recognize the 
authority of the committees and their widespread popularity in the South, nor the People's 
Republic, but concentrated in his hands the power to build a new government, ignoring the 
desire for independence of Koreans. He also decided to hand over all power to the United 
States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), backed by landowners and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Lankov, Andrei 2002, From Stalin to Kim Il-sung: the formation of North Korea, 1945-1960, Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick, p. 17. 
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businessmen. The attempts put in place by USAMGIK to start economic and social 
reforms were not successful and this prevented a further acquiring of legitimacy of the 
occupying forces in the eyes of South Koreans, who in the fall of 1946 started 
demonstrations all over the South. Meanwhile, Hodge identified in Sungman Yi, a staunch 
anti-communist, nationalist authoritarian, the best person to rule the country14. 
A single year has been enough to sanction that the two parts of the peninsula embarked on 
two separate and different roads. Most likely these outcomes were not considered in the 
original intentions of the occupying powers, but they were the unintended result of the 
military occupation. Nor the Koreans would have ever wanted or expected that their 
country would have been divided. 
 
The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which 
resulted in the beginning of the Cold War, played a crucial role for the division of the 
Korean peninsula. 
The Soviets claimed that the parties and organizations that opposed the “trusteeship” 
should not have been represented. The Americans, who did not want to stay for long in 
Korea, decided to defer the issue to the United Nations. In November 1947 the United 
Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was established, with the task to 
supervise the organization of general elections and the formation of an independent 
Korean government. The goal was to ensure that by March 1948 all powers were given to 
a national parliament, allowing the occupying forces to leave the country. The Soviets did 
not recognize any authority to UNTCOK and hindered the elections in the North, which 
were held only in “accessible” areas, namely in the South. From this moment, the few 
remaining hopes to see Korea reunited and free from foreign presence vanished. On May 
10, 1948 the elections for the formation of a National Assembly, composed of 200 
members were held and, in spite of the high percentage of boycotts, Yi Sungman won15. 
On July 17, a constitution under which elections would be held for the Assembly every 
two years, while those to elect the president every four, was adopted. On July 20, Yi was 
appointed president and on August 15 the Republic of Korea was proclaimed. The General 
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Assembly of the United Nations accepted the result of the election and declared (in the 
resolution 195) it was “the only legitimate government of Korea”16. 
The reaction of the authorities of the North was to hold their elections and on September 
9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed. Kim Il-sung took 
over as Prime Minister. North Korea and South Korea, as we usually call them, from this 
point became two separated sovereign states. 
 
 
2.2 The Emergence of inter-Korean Relations 
 
During the years from the 1953 armistice to the early '70s, inter-Korean relations were 
dominated by tension and mutual hostility not only by total closure. It might be said that 
there were no inter-Korean relations at all. The authoritarian government of Yi Sungman, 
in the South, decided to stop all contacts toward the North and launched its own slogan: 
“Victory over Communism” 17, that left no room for doubts about its administration’s 
position in the management of the relations with Pyongyang. In the consistent anti-
Communist policy of Yi, North Korea was not recognized at all and its government was 
regarded as a rebel group against the government in Seoul, the only legitimate 
representative of the entire peninsula, since it was “founded by free elections under the 
supervision of the United Nations” 18. The cornerstone of this vision was represented by 
the alliance with the United States, established by the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in 
the aftermath of the armistice, which put South Korea under the nuclear umbrella and the 
protection of the American military system, in response to the continue security threat 
posed by the North.  
With the rise to power of General Park Chung-hee, in 1961, the broad approach to inter-
Korean policy does not change significantly; the close relationship with the US is 
reinforced by the decision to send Korean troops in the Vietnam War (1965) and the 
normalization of relations with Japan. In fact, despite the great problems related to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The Article 2 of the Resoultion declares that the elections of the Government were the expression of the 
free will of the electorate “and that this is the only such Government in Korea”. The full text of the 
Resolution can be found at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/66/IMG/NR004366.pdf?OpenElement 
17 Choi, Jin-wook and Lee, Erin 2008, ‘Sixty years of South korean unification policies’, Korea and World 
affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 286. 
18 Statement made by South Korean Foreign Minister Byun Young-tae at the Geneva Conference in 1954, 
cit. in, Choi, Jin-wook and Lee, Erin 2008, p. 289. 
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historical memory of the colonial period, the new post-war Japan had become a key ally 
for the Western bloc in East Asia19. The goals that General Park places at the core of its 
policy, after coming to power, however, are mainly domestic; The new slogan becomes 
“construction first and unification later”20, which materializes in maintaining the status 
quo to focus on economic development, to count on the American military and economic 
assistance and to exploit the strong ideological opposition to silence by brutal means the 
issues of civil society. It was precisely from the South Korean civil society that, in this 
period, will arise the demand for a North-South dialogue without preconditions, towards a 
neutral reunification of the peninsula. In particular, after the revolt that led to the fall of Yi 
Sungman’s regime and before Park’s coup, a brief period of freedom creates a possibility 
to address the inter-Korean dispute more openly, without the risk of being accused and 
convicted for anti-patriotic activities. 
Pyongyang’s line towards inter-Korean relations throughout this period is the mirror 
image of that of Seoul. For Kim Il-sung’s regime the main strategy of reunification was 
war21. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was considered the only legitimate 
state on the peninsula and south of the 38° parallel a fascist dictatorship had been 
implanted, with the military support of the American imperialists, oppressing its people, 
eager to rebel and reunite with their brothers in the North22. Although the strategy of 
deterrence was working, preventing direct attacks, the official rhetoric of war and 
revolution, in the same South Korean territory, was the primary strategy. In 1961, the 
formalization of this approach was confirmed in the 4th congress of the Korean Workers 
Party. 
Given these premises is thus relevant to ask which were the reasons that led to a partial 
change of course in the management of inter-Korean policies, from both sides, although in 
different ways, at the beginning of the 70s, with the first attempts of dialogue, from a 
confrontation without compromise to a competitive coexistence. 
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19 Choi, Jin-wook and Lee, Erin 2008, pp. 287-288. 
20 Ibidem, p. 290. 
21 Koh, Byung-chul 1988, Continuity and change in North Korea’s unification policy, Korea Observer, Vol. 
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22 Bluth, Cristopher 2008, Korea, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 44. 
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2.2.1 The 1972 Joint Declaration 
 
The publication of a Joint Declaration (Joint Statement of North and South) by the 
governments of Seoul and Pyongyang on July 4, 1972 represents an incredible 
development in the relations between the two countries. Despite the lack of effectiveness 
of a non-binding declaration, signed by delegates and in which are not even mentioned the 
official names of the two countries to avoid any appearance of even implicit mutual 
recognition, compared to the previous situation the change is enormous; beyond the 
limited practical consequences that the declaration will bear, it will trace a path of possible 
cooperation that will be pursued again in the future and it will represent a milestone for 
every inter-Korean declaration in the following years. 
First of all, it is essential to analyse the content of this declaration. The stated goal is the 
will to reduce misunderstandings and mutual distrust, ease tension and accelerate the 
realization of reunification. The points that constitutes the declaration are seven, the most 
important of which is the first, in which are enlisted the three guiding principles of 
reunification: 
 
1 - Independence, from outside interferences; 
2 - Peace, as the main tool to achieve reunification; 
3 - National Unity, promoted above ideologies, ideals, systems. 
 
The remaining points listed a series of virtuous behaviours to reach the implementation of 
the three main objectives. Among them the most relevant are: to end mutual defamation 
and slander, to refrain from causing military accidents, to take positive steps to prevent the 
outbreak of armed clashes, to implement exchanges in various fields, concluding the 
negotiations opened by the Red Cross for family reunions, to install a direct line between 
Seoul and Pyongyang and eventually to create a standing committee in charge of the 
coordination of North-South relations23. 
More interesting elements might be extrapolated by analysing the negotiation process that 
led to the signing of the document. Although it is not entirely clear which party initiated 
negotiations, the key moment can be considered Park Chung-hee’s speech for the 
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Liberation Day in 197024, when South Korean president proposed “historical and real 
measures” to remove any barrier between North and South Korea, in exchange for giving 
up any hostile act and the objective to overthrow by force the government in Seoul by the 
Pyongyang regime. In addition, South Korea would have stopped to oppose to the 
participation of North Korea to the UN General Assembly, in exchange for the recognition 
of the authority of that organization in addressing the Korean issue. Finally, Park 
challenged his counterpart for a “peaceful competition in development”, to determine 
which system was best suited to ensure the highest living standards for its population25. 
The official response of Kim Il-sung arrived the following year, immediately after the 
revelation of the rapprochement between China and USA, when, in his welcome speech to 
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, for the first time he explicitly indicated the will to 
negotiate with Park Chung-hee26. 
The following step consisted of the official “humanitarian” negotiations, carried out by the 
Red Cross of the two countries, to organize the first reunion of Korean families divided by 
the war, while diplomatic contacts proceeded in secret by the head of the KCIA (the South 
Korean intelligence service), Lee Hu-rak, and the younger brother of Kim Il-sung, Kim 
Yong-ju27. 
 
Regarding the reasons that made a similar event possible in this particular moment, which, 
as seen before, was not characterized by détente between the two parties, it might be 
useful to divide the motivations between international and domestic circumstances.  
In the aftermath of the Korean War, both countries were under strong influences from 
their respective protector powers – USA for South Korea and USSR and China for North 
Korea – especially regarding foreign policy. The most important event in this sense can be 
considered the Sino-American rapprochement, began in 1971 and culminated with the 
visit of Kissinger and Nixon in Beijing (1972) 28. With the establishment of relations 
between the two great powers directly involved on the Korean peninsula, a new window 
of opportunity opened up to take steps in the direction of a North-South dialogue. 
A few years before, in 1969, the Korean-American relations had been shaken by the 
launch of the Nixon Doctrine. The main goal was the reduction of the American military !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The English translation of the speech can be found in: Major speeches by Korea’s Park Chung-hee, 
Hollym Corp., Seoul, 1971. 
25 A White paper on South-North dialogue in Korea, National Unification Board, 1988, p. 34. 
26 Koh, Byung-chul 1992, p. 469. 
27 Lee and Kim were the delegates who signed the Joint Statement. 
28 Koh, Byung-chul, 1992, p.464. 
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interventions in Asia and therefore the necessity, for countries like South Korea, to take 
more responsibility for their own security; the US no longer ensured their intervention in 
the event of a conventional attack but only in case of a nuclear threat. The deterrence 
equilibrium was still in place, for the presence of the American nuclear umbrella, but the 
American allies in East Asia had to bear a larger share for their own defense. According to 
this new strategy, in 1971 20000 American soldiers were withdrawn from the Korean 
peninsula29.  
As for the the internal situation, the reasons that led to the beginning of the inter-Korean 
dialogue are connected, in the South, to the necessity of Park Chung-hee to develop a new 
strategy towards the reunification, in order to meet the new demands of the society that, 
after years of sustained economic growth, was increasingly interested in issues relating to 
democracy, freedom and reunification30. 
In the North, the failure of the strategy of militarization and total support of the revolution 
in the South of the 60s was becoming too expensive to support and needed a reshape; in 
addition the withdrawal of American troops on the peninsula and the reduction of the anti-
communist sentiment were considered very positively. The causes for this paradigm shift 
in inter-Korean relations were thus very different and composite, but they created the 
conditions for the emergence of a window of opportunity that will lead to a new approach 
to the issue. 
 
Although, as mentioned before, the practical consequences of the declaration were scarce, 
it can be considered as a turning point, as the first example of engagement in inter-Korean 
relations. 
Firstly, it is clear the conditionality of the proposed incentives. From the speech of Park 
Chung-hee in 1970, each opening gesture was explicitly connected to a prior change of 
attitude by North Korea. The formulation of the declaration required mutual commitment 
from each country on every single point and implied the ceasing when one of the two 
shares had failed virtuous behavior the result would have been the end of the commitment 
on the other side. The incentives mainly concern security – in particular the mutual 
preservation of territorial integrity – in the list of the principles of the reunification process 
and in the subsequent points, in which is established the interruption of mutual defamation 
and threats and the will to prevent any military incident, in addition to the creation of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Choi, Jinwook and Lee, Erin 2008, p. 291. 
30 Ibidem, p. 292. 
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Coordinating Committee and the North-South direct line between the two governments. 
Points 3 and 4 instead concern humanitarian objectives and exchanges in “various areas”, 
in order to promote mutual understanding and facilitate a peaceful reunification. 
The declaration has the undeniable merit to emphasize a new method, based on the mutual 
exchange in issues not directly political, on the growth of interdependence and 
cooperation and, in turn, of integration. The old formula of “no dialogue” was replaced by 
the new of “unification through dialogue” 31. It is also clear, however, another aspect of 
the issue: this opening by Park’s regime was probably dictated more by international 
circumstances and his own political opportunism than by a genuine desire of 
reconciliation with Pyongyang. The series of conditions imposed, especially in the speech 
of 1970, could not be immediately accepted by the Pyongyang’s regime as well as the way 
they were made was not aimed at eliciting a positive response from North Korea32. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Cold War II on the Korean Peninsula 
 
Despite the developments in diplomacy and dialogue, rivalry between North and South 
remained the significant feature of inter-Korean relations between the mid 70s and the 
following decade. The astonishing South Korean economic growth had moved the 
competition also on that side, in addition to the military aspect, and the growing disparity 
in favour of Seoul made North Korea increasingly reluctant towards trade and contacts 
between the two countries33. The most important change can be found in the new 
paradigm, accepted by both sides, of long-term coexistence34, characterized by rivalry but 
also intermittent contacts and dialogues, instead of the previous total mutual closure. 
The Joint Statement began to slowly disappear by the time of its implementation; the 
reason can be found on its derivation from a temporary convergence of interests and a 
momentary favourable international context, rather than from a decrease of the differences 
between the two parts. In addition, it becomes immediately clear the different 
interpretation of the document given by the two administrations. The goal of Pyongyang 
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was primarily to use the statement as a lever to force the demobilization of American 
troops from the peninsula while, just a few months after his signature, the same Lee Hu-
rak declared openly the need for a restructuring of the South Korean state to carry on 
dialogue and simultaneously reinforce against potential threats, clarifying even more the 
political manipulation of inter-Korean relations that the regime of Park Chung-hee 
planned for internal purposes. 
A key factor in the new worsening of inter-Korean during the second half of the '70s, 
along with the aforementioned economic rivalry increasingly in favour of the South, was 
the continued military tensions that restarted again, especially after the capture of Saigon 
by the Vietnamese Communist troops. This led to new threats by Kim Il-sung about the 
supposed superiority of conventional military forces of Pyongyang and new fears for the 
leadership in Seoul about the commitment of US defense on the peninsula; these 
uncertainties were allayed by the interruption of the withdrawal of American troops and 
by a shift of industrial production towards heavy industry, electronics, and all the areas 
connected to the defense industry35.  
 
The murder of Park Chung-hee (October 26, 1979) does not cause severe disruptions in 
the management of inter-Korean relations; his place, in fact, was quickly occupied by 
another member of the army, General Chun Doo-hwan, through a military coup in 
December of that year36.  
The policy of the new regime follows that of its predecessor and, also, the resurgent global 
tensions between the two blocks. Some terrorist acts, including the attempt to assassinate 
the South Korean president in Yangoon, Burma, in 1983, alarmed the regime in Seoul and 
contributed to aggravate the situation on the peninsula. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the new approach, enshrined in the joint statement of 
1972, does not completely disappear; since the early 80s in fact the talks for family 
reunions between the Red Cross of the North and South, interrupted in the second half of 
the 70s, are resumed; the diversification of communication channels proved to be fruitful, 
leaving room for dialogue, exchanges and cooperation even at times of heightened tension 
between the two governments37. A paradigmatic example of this is the proposal by 
Pyongyang to march together at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Los !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Choi, Jin-wook and Lee, Erin 2008, pp.292-293. 
36 For futher information on Park's murder and Chun’s rise to power see: Oh, J. Kie-chang 1999, Korean 
Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 73-87. 
37 Oberdorfer, Dan 2001, The Two Koreas, pp. 144-153. 
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Angeles; this important step will not materialize because of the boycott of the event by 
North Korea, along with much of the block Communist, but will serve as a stimulus for 
bilateral dialogue. Peace and stability on the peninsula will then be a key factor for the 
award of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul38. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Reunification Policies of North Korea 
 
Also from the leadership in Pyongyang, over the years, formal proposals to seek a 
peaceful way towards the reunification of the peninsula were formulated. For North 
Korea, the basic idea of a reunification process was not to reunite a divided nation but 
rather to regain the control of the southern part of the peninsula, freeing it from the 
American colonial yoke, that replaced the Japanese in 1945. For the propaganda of the 
Korean Workers Party was therefore a continuation of the war of liberation39. The idea 
that the main strategy of reunification, for Pyongyang, was constituted by the war should 
be interpreted from this perspective. 
Despite this premise, over the years a project of peaceful reunification took shape, 
especially with the symbolic meaning of underlining the commitment of the regime and its 
leadership towards the goal of national reconciliation40. 
The first statement by the leader of North Korea Kim Il-sung in this direction dates back 
to the late ‘50s and. In 1960, the first proposal for the creation of a federal system was 
formulated, as a solution for the reunification of the peninsula41. From that point on, the 
project has been proposed on several occasions by the North Korean leadership, with 
some minor adjustments, according to the changes at the international level or in the 
context of inter-Korean relations, but keeping the bases firm. In 1973, Pyongyang 
proposed the creation of a confederation between the two countries (Confederation of 
Koryo), for the simultaneous access to the United Nations of the two countries, under one 
name, while maintaining two different systems in two separate states. However, the 
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proposal was not supported neither by South Korea nor by UN member states, thus getting 
no results42. 
The most complete formulation of a plan for the peaceful reunification of the peninsula by 
North Korea was proposed in October 10, 1980, during the 6th Plenary Session of the 
Korean Workers Party, with the idea of the creation of a confederation between the two 
countries, the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK) 43. 
The basis of the outlined plan was the mutual recognition and mutual acceptance of two 
ideologies and its existing systems; on these premises would then be created a unified 
national government that equally represented the two states. In particular, the plan 
included the establishment of a Confederal Supreme National Assembly and a Permanent 
Committee of the Confederation; the first organ was formed by an equal number of 
representatives of north and south and by an adequate number of representatives of 
overseas Koreans, the second would be a permanent executive body with the task of 
guiding the two regional governments and manage matters under federal jurisdiction, such 
as: foreign policy, defense and control of the armed forces. In this context, the regional 
governments would retain the freedom to pursue their own policies independently within 
their political systems, as long as they were following the national interest of the federal 
government and trying to decrease the differences in order to reach, in the long term, a 
uniform development of the nation44. It was essentially a structure that can be described as 
follows: one nation, one state, two systems, three governments (two regional and one 
central). 
In the project was also included a framework of ten points on which the central 
government would have to commit: independence, democracy, cooperation and exchanges 
in various fields, welfare, protection of overseas Koreans, common defense and foreign 
policy. The new unified state should have to be neutral, independent and peaceful, without 
relying on any external power; all the international treaties, signed by north and south 
before reunification which could damage the national unity, should have been abrogated, 
including military treaties; all foreign troops on the peninsula should have been withdrawn 
and the armed forces of the two countries should have been reduced up to 100-150 
thousand units, and then converge into a single national army. Obviously, the primary goal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of Pyongyang’s regime was the withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula and the 
end of the military alliance between the US and South Korea45. 
This detailed plan for reunification will be proposed consistently by the leadership in 
Pyongyang over the years, albeit with some modifications; it will be resubmitted officially 
by Kim Jong-il with the Joint Declaration of the inter-Korean summit of June 15, 2000 as 
a “low level federation”, after repeated references to a the project carried out by Kim Il-
sung in the early ‘9046. 
The basic characteristics remain firm. First of all the Confederation, which, despite being 
defined also as a soft form of federation, remained as a vague form of unitary state in 
which the central government has little autonomy and sovereignty, while the two regional 
governments can freely manage a wide range of crucial issues. Second, the issue regarding 
the method and timing to reach a final and complete unification is not addressed, because, 
depending on the situation, the formula proposed by Pyongyang is regarded as the final 
destination of the unitary state or as a transitional stage towards an unspecified form of 
complete unification47. 
Finally, one of the crucial point that emerges from the analysis of the reunification 
policies proposed by North Korea over the years, is that they are not plans for an effective 
reunification of the peninsula, but rather the real goal is to raise the level of national 
security in the North. In fact, the will to preserve the existing system in the North, 
preventing unification by absorption by the South, is always present, and even more the 
efforts to reach the withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula and the end of the 
military treaty between Washington and Seoul48. 
The practical consequences of the reunification formula developed and proposed by 
Pyongyang have been very scarce. First, its formulation was hardly feasible in practical 
terms, as for the South would mean abdicating some cornerstones of its foreign policy (the 
alliance with the United States) and domestic policy. Furthermore, beyond the project, and 
in some cases within it, the North Korean regime, while stressing the importance of 
mutual recognition as the basis for the formation of the future confederation, continued to 
rely on and encourage a radical change in the political system of South Korea. As 
previously said, its value was therefore mainly symbolic. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Nevertheless, these plans can be considered as attempts of engaging South Korea made by 
the North, beyond the actual will of realization from Pyongyang. It should also be pointed 
out that there are many similarities between this plan, developed by North Korea, and the 
formulas of reunification, which will be later proposed by Seoul. 
 
2.3 The End of the Cold War 
 
The years from 1987 to the mid-90s can be considered as the clearest window of 
opportunity that has ever presented for the resolution of the inter-Korean dispute. During 
this period, a series of tremendous changes, both at international and domestic level, 
converge and portend the end of the division and reunification on the peninsula. 
Unfortunately, the situation took a different turn and, despite the significant changes that 
materialized in this period, the crucial point of the dispute was not solved. The division of 
Korea, which directly descends from the bipolar logic of the Cold War, will survive even 
the end of what created it. 
 
 
2.3.1 The Democratization of South Korea and the end of the Socialist Bloc 
  
The first change of enormous importance that materialized in these years is the process of 
democratization in South Korea. The 1987 is indeed the year in which the different 
components of civil society and the political opposition were able to obtain from the 
authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan free direct presidential election, as well as a 
series of further measures of democratization49. Obviously, this kind of new path will have 
strong repercussions on the development of inter-Korean policies implemented by South 
Korea. First of all, at the domestic level, democratization had the power to liberate and 
bring up important forces of civil society and progressive political opposition, that have 
been requiring a different approach to the inter-Korean dispute and a clear commitment of 
the government towards reunification for a long time. As for the international dimension, 
the new government that came out from the polls had, as one of its priority objectives, the 
promotion of the international legitimacy for South Korea, in addition to the will to carve !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 For further information on the process of democratization in South Korea see: Kim, Sunhyuk 2000, The 
politics of democratization in Korea: the role of civil society, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
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out a new role for the nation, proportionate with its growing economic power and with an 
equal degree of independence. In this sense, the Seoul Olympics of 1988 were the first 
catalyst for the development of trade and economic negotiations with a large number of 
countries, including some belonging to the Communist bloc; similarly, the will to establish 
a more independent relationship with the United States and Japan, without questioning the 
security alliance, led to new tensions with the old allies50. 
The impact of the democratization process in South Korea was combined with the real 
historical change that took place in the late ‘80s and the beginning of the following 
decade: the decline and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union, which inevitably leads 
to the end of the bipolar balance of power created after the Second World War. The 
developments that led to the conclusion of the Cold War had repercussions throughout the 
international system; more specifically, the decline of Soviet Union's ability to continue to 
help the socialist regimes and insurgencies laid the basis for the resolution of a number of 
regional conflicts51. 
Obviously, the theatre that most of all was shaken by this change was precisely the one 
which most of all was central during the years of the Cold War: Europe. In a few months, 
the member countries of the Warsaw Pact regained its independence from Moscow. 
Between the end of 1989 and the first month of 1990, the division of Germany, the 
clearest demonstration of the “iron curtain” over Europe, was over and the country regined 
its national unity. In other areas, the end of the bipolar geopolitical order, in which many 
countries have been trapped for decades, gave the chance to numerous conflicts and 
regional disputes to be resolved. This is the case of Angola, Vietnam and Cambodia, 
Yemen, Nicaragua and El Salvador52. 
A development in this direction was expected also from the situation on the Korean 
peninsula. The Pyongyang regime was highly dependent on supplies at controlled prices 
from the Soviet Union and the opportunity to trade with the countries of the Socialist bloc, 
outside the rules of capitalist free market, was of great importance for the industry of 
North Korea. The sudden collapse of the system left North Korea in a situation of serious 
deep economic and security crisis53. In addition, USSR – that soon would be named again !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Russia – and China, while taking distance from Pyongyang, were approaching South 
Korea. 
 
The full restoration of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Moscow was realized in 
1990 and since that time the economic and trade cooperation grew unabated54. With 
Beijing, whose regime had not suffered the same revolutionary jolt that occurred in the 
Soviet Union, the turning point in relations required a longer period, mainly because of the 
different strategic position that the Korean Peninsula played for China, so close to a 
critical area for the industrial development of the country such as Manchuria. In any case, 
in August 1992, Seoul government obtain the normalization of diplomatic relations with 
Beijing, after over a decade of growing and extensive trade relations, which culminated in 
1990 with the opening of commercial offices in the two capitals55. 
During the Cold War, despite the insistence on the slogan of autarchy linked to the 
doctrine of Juche, North Korea was able to overcome its economic difficulties with trade 
relations with communist countries and the assistance provided by the Soviet Union and, 
to a lesser extent, by China56. The beginning of the post-Cold War era dramatically 
brought to the fore all the economic problems of the country and laid the foundation for 
the terrible crisis, which in the mid-90s, also because of two floods in 1995 and 1996 and 
a drought the following year, will become a real famine. 
The reasons that gave North Korea the chance to resist the wave triggered by the end of 
the Cold War are several. First, the distance from the main theatre of the confrontation 
between the two superpowers system, namely Europe; the peripheral position of the 
Korean peninsula ensure the regime the possibility to maintain a higher degree of closure 
and resistance to the changes put in place from the détente onward. Moreover, the 
presence of China, both in terms of material and ideological supplies, gave more leeway to 
the regime of Kim Il-sung to resist the pressure for reforms, coming from the Kremlin 
under Gorbachev leadership. What is crucial, however, is the almost complete lack of a 
policy of engagement that could pave the way for a real change when the window of 
opportunity opened. Taking into account the German reunification, the most cited case in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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comparison with Korea, the process of Ostpolitik was already in place since almost twenty 
years, when the Cold War ended, and had created a dense network of relationships and 
contacts with the entire block of Eastern Europe, that would prove to be fundamental in 
1989. In inter-Korean relations this approach is absent and when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, there was no network of interdependence that could be used to drive the 
transition toward reunification. 
The regime's response to the crisis, guided from 1994 by Kim Jong-il, son of President 
Kim Il-sung and his designated heir, after the death of the "Great Leader", was articulated 
on two fronts. First, on the domestic front, a further impetus was placed on the ideological 
indoctrination, based on the doctrine of Juche57 and the consolidation of the dictatorship 
and the cult of personality. In addition, an increasing relevant role was given to the 
military system, especially since the mid-90s with the emergence of the policy of son'gun, 
which established the primacy of the army in the distribution of state resources to defend 
the country from imperialists enemy attacks58. 
Despite this stronger hold in the control of North Korean society and population, the 
consequences of the end of the Cold War had also another dimension. On the international 
front in fact the increasingly stringent economic needs and the almost total political and 
diplomatic isolation, in which the country had fallen with the fall of the Socialist bloc, 
made clear the priority for Pyongyang’s regime to get some form of support from 
countries considered as “main enemy”, like the United States, Japan, even South Korea59, 
not to succumb to the incipient crisis. This situation created the conditions for a positive 
response by North Korean regime towards the engagement policies implemented in the 
following years by the governments in Seoul. 
 
 
2.3.2 Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik 
 
The first democratic elections in South Korea, dated December 1987, sanctioned the 
victory of General Roh Tae-woo, candidate of the Democratic Party of Justice and number !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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two of the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan. This defeat of the political-social 
movement that led to democracy was due to the inability of the two opposition leaders, 
Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, to reach an agreement on a single presidential 
candidate; the double candidature split the votes of the democratic movement giving the 
victory to Roh Tae-woo60. However, the new president proved immediately to be decided 
to maintain the democratic principles enshrined in the new constitution, approved in 
October 1987 by a popular referendum61. 
As for the inter-Korean relations and international relations the approach of Roh Tae-
woo’s presidency was labeled with the term Nordpolitik62, by analogy with the term 
Ostpolitik coined by German Prime Minister Willy Brandt in the early 70s. The basic idea 
of the approach was to pursue good neighbourhood relations with the Soviet Union (then 
Russia) and China, for a double purpose: as the prelude to an improvement in relations 
between the two Koreas and to improve the economic and diplomatic status of the 
country. The main goals of Roh’s foreign policy in fact were: national security, economic 
prosperity, peaceful reunification and the prestige of the country63. Alongside these 
initiatives, successful in a few years, still prominent was the desire to intensify links and 
exchanges with the Pyongyang regime, since the real objective of Nordpolitik was to 
improve inter-Korean relations.  
The first concrete step in this direction can be considered the “Special Declaration on 
National Pride and Unification and Prosperity” 64  of July 7, 1988, when President Roh 
advances six principles, which can be considered as the natural evolution of the Joint 
Declaration of 1972, thus highlighting the presence of a long term path based on 
engagement that, while remaining hidden, resurfaced and advanced with the right 
conditions. The six principles listed by Roh Tae-woo were: 
 
- Promotion of officials exchanges in various fields and the permission to visit the 
two countries for Koreans living abroad; 
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- Promotion of exchanges of correspondence and mutual visits for divided 
families; 
- Promotion of inter-Korean trade, to be considered as domestic trade; 
- Promotion of balanced economic development between the two countries; 
- End of confrontational diplomacy and development of the possibility of contacts 
between the two countries within international forums; 
- Support for the improvement of relations between North Korea on one side and 
the US and Japan on the other and, at the same time, the development of the 
relations of South Korea with China, the USSR and other communist countries. 
 
The statement is the most important step forward in the approach of engagement since 
1972 and is also the most important change in the foreign policy of Seoul. For the first 
time the idea that the only way to ensure the national security of South Korea was seeking 
a strategy of military, economic and diplomatic supremacy was abandoned65 and replaced 
with the idea of maintaining friendly relations with the neighbours, trying to break the 
isolation in which North Korea was falling, supporting the development of relations with 
the countries that Pyongyang considered enemies and finally, through economic and trade 
cooperation and collaboration at the humanitarian level 66 . A commitment of this 
magnitude immediately gives the idea of what was the approach of Roh Tae-woo’s 
presidency regarding the inter-Korean relations.  
The following year the dialogue between the two countries is resumed and reaches 
unprecedented levels in intensity and in the relevance of the addressed issues; again in 
1989, the Seoul government proposed a plan for a “Korean National Community”, aimed 
at improving the existing gradual approach to reunification through a first Confederation 
stage – named Korean Commonwealth – consisting of the formula “One Nation, Two 
States, Two Governments, Two Systems” 67. The proposal was not the first in this 
direction, a similar idea of a "Confederation of Republics" was put forward by the 
opposition leader and future President Kim Dae-jung68 , and it also resembled the 
confederative proposal from Pyongyang; but it was the first time in which the plan was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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proposed at the governmental level by South Korea and in a moment of profound turmoil 
on the global arena that could provide unexpected openings. Actually, the reaction of 
North Korea to the proposal was, predictably, to ignore it officially, although the final 
removal of the label of “enemy” from the vocabulary of Seoul, with reference to 
Pyongyang, benefit the dialogue between the two countries69. 
The inter-governmental talks, in fact, including in particular those between the prime 
ministers in September 1990, had not stopped and, indeed, reached within a few years to 
the signing of the most important document of Roh Tae-woo’s presidency regarding inter-
Korean relations: the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and 
Cooperation between the South and the North”, known as the South-North Basic 
Agreement, signed on February 19, 1992. On the same day, two other equally important 
documents were approved: the “Joint Statement on the denuclearization of the Peninsula” 
and the “Agreement on creating sub-commission for high-level talks between South and 
North” 70. 
The points listed in the Basic Agreement can be divided into three chapters:  
 
1. Reconciliation,  
2. Non-aggression,  
3. Exchanges and Cooperation;  
 
the spirit of the declaration and many of the principles listed reflected those of the Joint 
Declaration of 1972 and the Declaration of Roh Tae-woo of 1988. The main focus was on 
the need to pursue mutual behaviours that could avoid provocations and mutual 
interference (the idea of considering the South as a colony of the United States 
disappeared), at the same time negotiations and peaceful resolution of disputes as basic 
principles along with some measures to make dialogue permanent. Another point worthy 
of attention is the Article 5 in which it is stated that the two parties must be committed to 
transforming the armistice of 1953 in a real peace treaty and to respect it until reaching the 
final goal of reunification 71 . As easily predictable, the third chapter, concerning 
cooperation and exchanges, was the part of most rapid and easy implementation, with an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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improvement of family reunions and a volume of trade grew by the middle of the decade 
up to $ 300 million72. 
 
A different fate affected instead the “Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the 
Peninsula” 73, a short document that in just six points called for the use of nuclear 
technology only for peaceful purposes on the peninsula and the creation of mutual control 
organisms, which remained a statement and was never implemented into practice. 
Nevertheless, even if its value may have been only symbolic, this was the last agreement 
from which North Korea decided to withdrawn, at the end of the 2000s. 
 
The main points of Nordpolitik pursued by President Roh Tae-woo during his mandate 
can be fully included within the conceptual framework of constructive engagement. It 
almost exclusively encompass positive incentives, aimed at creating a minimum level of 
trust to engage the counterpart in constructive negotiations. In addition, the vision of 
South Korean government broadens to encompass the other powers who played a role on 
the peninsula – through the openings toward China and the Soviet Union/Russia, but also 
with the explicit support for the opening of a dialogue between North Korea and the 
United States and Japan74.  
All incentives, however, are strictly conditional, because they descend from bilateral 
agreements in which the fulfilment of one party becomes necessary for the positive 
response from the other. Moreover, despite the good will, what is lacking is the 
effectiveness at the time of implementation. As seen above, the emergency situation 
created by the end of the Cold War puts North Korea in the uncomfortable position of 
having to accept a form of openness to dialogue in inter-Korean relations, which 
materializes with the agreements of 1992, but then most of the requirements are ignored 
and the mechanisms to make implementation effective are not put in place. 
The political capital that the presidency of Roh Tae-woo leaves to his successor, Kim 
Young-sam, elected in late 1992, regarding inter-Korean relations is therefore positive in 
terms of setting the framework and considering that it came out from a long period of 
almost total absence of dialogue. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Park Young-ho 1997, p. 94. 
73 The full English text is available on: Cotton, James 1993, Korea under Roh Tae-woo, pp. 341-342. 
74 MacDonald, Donald S. 1992, ‘Reunification and Korean foreign policy’, The Korean Journal of National 
Unification, Vol. 1, p. 81. 
! 113!
 
2.3.3 The Wavering Presidency of Kim Young-sam 
 
The election of Kim Young-sam, December 18, 1992, establishes the return of a 
government led by a civilian in South Korea since 1960. Despite the long years in the 
opposition, his candidacy was an expression of the ruling party, the Democratic Party of 
Justice, following the controversial decision to merge his party, the Party for Democracy 
and Peace, with that of President Roh Tae-woo in 1990. 
The policy of Kim Young-sam’s government in terms of inter-Korean relations has been 
rarely judged in a positive way, and this because of the many changes in the approach 
pursued by the government, with a wide alternating between hard-line and conciliatory 
positions 75 . The frequent replacement at the head of the newborn Ministry for 
Reunification can be regarded as an important signal in this direction. 
The volatility of South Korean position in this issue, however, can not be reduced to a lack 
of leadership or decision-making capacity of the president or his cabinet; multiple factors 
contributed to these rapid and frequent changes of approach. First, a relevant role was 
certainly been played by the behaviour of North Korea, characterized, especially in these 
years of difficult transition in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, by a high degree 
of unpredictability. In addition, in the same period in which Kim Young-sam took office 
in Pyongyang the dynastic succession from Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-il was taking 
place, a crucial moment for the North Korean regime. Another factor that affected the 
inter-Korean dispute regards the international situation and, in particular, the position of 
the US government that emerged victorious from the global confrontation with the Soviet 
Union, and began to set up its new global strategy in the unipolar world. Finally, a key 
factor to understand the choices of Kim Young-sam’s government in inter-Korean 
relations is domestic policy; in fact, every change of position toward North Korea is 
accompanied by an important political deadline in the domestic arena76. 
The five-year presidential term, which begins in 1993, can be divided into four periods, 
with regard to inter-Korean relations, in which at every period of closure follows a period 
of openings and vice versa. 
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The first period begins in March 1993. After barely sixteen days of conciliatory policy, 
that highlighted the will of flexibility toward, North Korea threat to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) put the inter-Korean relations process to a 
standstill for almost two years77. The reversal of Kim Young-sam is immediate: the 
Minister for Reunification is replaced and the posture of the government begins to be 
characterized by total intolerance, with the suspension of any economic or humanitarian 
exchange at all levels; the domestic criticism, related to his first optimistic and 
conciliatory start, pushed the president to support this new hard line approach even 
more78. This posture, however, quickly turns into a boomerang when Seoul remains cut 
off from the negotiations that take place between Pyongyang and the Clinton 
administration to solve the first nuclear proliferation crisis. 
The lack of diplomatic abilities, that leaves Seoul on the sidelines during the negotiations 
in New York and Geneva, for the signing of the so-called Agreed Framework, will 
provide a new source of criticism Kim Young-sam’s government. In fact, despite South 
Korea would be the first country to be threatened by a potential nuclear threat from 
Pyongyang, the agreement will be the result of negotiations between USA and North 
Korea; the only small possibility left for South Korean President will be represented by 
the chance of a meeting with Kim Il-sung, proposed by former US President Carter after 
his visit to Pyongyang79, but this opportunity will disappear because of the death of North 
Korean leader. 
The death of Kim Il-sung, on 8 July 1994, was preceded by a long period of preparation 
for the succession and does not brakes the path that will lead to the signing of the Agreed 
Framework in Geneva, on 21 October 199480. The agreement is a paradigmatic example 
of conditional engagement but, in this case, the main parties are North Korea and the 
United States, while South Korea remains a secondary player. The heart of the document 
is represented by an exchange: while the United States committed themselves to provide 
to Pyongyang a light water reactor (LWR), through the creation of an international 
consortium, and, in the meantime, an adequate supply of fossil fuel, in exchange North 
Korea would immediately freeze the graphite reactor that was building and all facilities 
connected to its nuclear program, as well as full cooperation with the inspectors of the 
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IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in charge of overseeing the implementation 
of the Agreement81. 
To find a way out from the corner and regain consensus, Kim Young-sam’s government 
decided to change its policy again by switching to a softer approach in inter-Korean 
relations and trying to resume exchanges and relationships, despite there were still many 
doubts about the transparency of North Korea’s nuclear policy82. This change of course 
was primarily due to regain domestic support for the administration, despite the president 
was not fulfilling the principle that there would be no cooperation without a satisfactory 
resolution of the nuclear issue (condition not met by Pyongyang, according to the head of 
IAEA inspectors Hans Blix, that denounced the unreliability of the content of the reports 
provided by North Koreans). However, the new policy of engagement by Seoul goes on 
until the end of 1995, with economic cooperation (trade volume passes in a few months 
from 19 million to 28 million dollars), the search for a key role for South Korea in the 
organization in charge of implementing the Agreed Framework (Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization or KEDO) and food aid83. 
Precisely the provision of food aid will give the motivation for a new radical change of 
approach by Seoul government. After two accidents linked to the procurement of rice 
from South Korea to North Korea, increasingly in the grip of the food and economic 
crisis, South Korean public opinion, that supported the government during the opening, 
begins to change position and criticize the weakness of the reactions of Kim Young-sam 
against North provocations. Following the change of orientation of the public opinion, 
South Korean government decided to return to the hard line, suspending any food supply 
to Pyongyang and advancing the request to take the same decision also in Tokyo and 
Washington84. 
After the elections for the National Assembly in 1996 and no other election in sight before 
the presidential, in December 1997, the last of the periods in which we can divide the 
wavering attitude Kim Young-sam’s government begins. As expected, after a period of 
intransigence there is a return to a softer line towards Pyongyang, in the form of the 
proposal of the so-called Four Party Talks, formulated together with President Clinton 
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after a summit on the Korean island of Cheju in April 199685. The heart of the proposal 
was to start new talks between the two Koreas, the United States and China with the aim 
of replacing the armistice of 1953 with a more effective and permanent peace treaty. The 
hostile attitude to the proposal by Pyongyang regime, whose goal had always been to 
reach a peace treaty with the US, isolating South Korea, is slowly blunt, by incentives 
such as food aid, the start of the works for the construction of the LWR and the lifting of 
US trade sanctions86. In this case, the approach of Kim Young-sam’s government is 
coherent and consistent with the proposal and it is rewarded with the acceptance of the 
talks by the North and an official apology, presented in December 1996, for the submarine 
incident occurred a few months before87. 
 
The legacy that Kim Young-sam leaves to his successor is definitely lower compared to 
the situation he inherited from Roh Tae-woo in 1993. Nevertheless, in 1997 there are still 
important opportunities to exploit and chances for openings, both at inter-Korean and at 
international level, in order to start negotiations with ambitious and long-term goals. The 
election of Kim Dae-jung will be the missing piece to bring to the affirmation of an 
approach based on constructive engagement. 
 
 
2.4 Inter-Korean Cooperation in Practice 
 
When, in December 1997, Kim Dae-jung won the presidential election of the Republic of 
Korea, it was the first time in which a member of the opposition, and the most strenuous 
opponent of authoritarian regimes, reached the highest office in the country. 
A native of the southern state of Cholla, which will remain its main reservoir of popular 
and electoral support88, Kim Dae-jung began his political struggle in the 50s, against the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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authoritarian regime of Yi Sungman, joining the Democratic Party in 1957. When, in 
1961, Park Chung-hee enacts his coup, Kim becomes his main opponent and emerge on 
the national scene as the symbol of millions of Koreans who fought against the increasing 
harshness of the dictatorship89. In 1971, after obtaining the nomination for the presidential 
candidacy of the opposition and after getting 46% of the vote against Park Chung-hee, in a 
strongly altered electoral competition, he became the leader and the symbol of political 
dissent for democratization90. This position led him to assume the role of main antagonist 
against Park’s regime, but also to suffer harsh regime’s retaliation, with tortures and long 
periods of arrests and exiles91. Until democratization, in 1987, Kim Dae-jung was free 
from house arrest, imprisonment, exile or other forms of persecution and restriction for no 
more than two consecutive months. These long periods spent between isolation and 
adversity gave him the opportunity to deepen his political awareness, develop answers to 
the main problems that the country was facing and articulate them clearly92. Among these, 
the inter-Korean issue played certainly an important role. 
The election of Kim Dae-jung as president materializes with his third nomination in the 
post-1987 era. In the first free and democratic elections, in fact, Kim was defeated by Roh 
Tae-woo, while in 1992 he was defeated by Kim Young-sam, as a result of his alliance 
with the ruling party. To secure more chances to defeat his main opponent, Lee Hoi-
chang, Kim Dae-jung decided to reach a deal with the ultra-conservative leader Kim Jong-
pil, head of the United Liberal Democrats Party and founder of the KCIA, promising him 
the position of Prime Minister in case of victory93. 
The election campaign was dominated mainly by problems related to the economic crisis, 
exploded in 1997 after the devaluation of the Thai currency and the propagation of the 
financial collapse to all emerging Asian economies. The government of Kim Young-sam, 
still in office, after replacing the Minister of Economy, was forced to turn towards the 
International Monetary Fund and demand for a loan of 58 billion dollars, tied to a series of 
measures of liberalization, reform of the banking and credit system and new procedures to 
prevent a recurrence of a similar shock in the country94. 
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Also in the context of inter-Korean relations the ideas of the candidate Kim Dae-jung were 
very different from those of his predecessors and, in particular, from the swinging 
management of relations with the North carried on by Kim Young-sam. These ideas on 
had an origin that went back through the years. The first report of a conceptual approach 
to North Korea by the future president dates back to the 70s, when he began to draw a 
picture of what would become his theory, based on a peaceful management of the division 
and an approach to unification obtained through consecutive degrees of integration95. 
Over the years Kim Dae-jung developed his theory of reunification, looking for an 
institutional setting with also relevance on the practical side96; it was during the 80s that 
the foundation for his theory of “reunification in three stages” took form. From the second 
half of the decade, debates and discussions on the question of inter-Korean relations 
became more frequent within South Korean civil society, with the appearance of a wide 
variety of alternatives. In this context, the approach that will be brought forward by Kim 
starts to be organized, with the help of suggestions from the nascent debate97. The years 
before the election of 1997 is the moment in which the theory, now completed, begins to 
be exposed and put into practice, through the efforts of Kim Dae-jung as a member of 
South Korean National Assembly and through the newborn Foundation for Peace. In this 
regard, the future president Kim committed himself in helping former US President Carter 
to organize his visit to North Korea – in the aftermath of the first nuclear crisis – and in 
arranging the first summit between the leaders of the two Koreas, canceled due to Kim Il-
sung’s death98. 
The formula theorized by Kim Dae-jung was based on three fundamental principles: 
 
1. Independence from external forces, in the resolution of inter-Korean dispute;  
2. Peace as the guiding principle behind the negotiation of any matter;  
3. Democracy as the foundation of the unification process, based on the consent 
given by national consultations.  
 
These principles formed the basis upon which the practical framework of reunification had 
to be built. It consisted of three stages: the first was constituted by a Confederation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between the two Koreas, the second by a Federation, composed of two autonomous 
regional governments, and the last one by a Single Government that could take the form of 
a centralized or regional administration, with a some degree of autonomy, as in the cases 
of the federal system of United States or Germany99. 
In this theoretical construct, a great attention is given to the first phase of the process, the 
Confederation. At this stage, which can be realized at any time with the national 
consensus and the political will from both parties, the foundation for the ultimate goal of 
reunification can be laid down. The first step imagined by Kim Dae-jung consists in the 
mutual recognition of the two systems and the institutionalization of a mechanism to 
prevent all forms of military confrontation, based on mutual trust. Then, with the 
application of the three guiding principles and the promotion of trade in areas of common 
interest (culture, economy, society), the two parties can create the necessary bridges to 
make unification easier100.  
The transition to the Federation would have the role of reducing the heterogeneity that 
fifty years of division created between the two Korean states, through the assistance 
provided by the federal government to the regional ones. The unitary state, that would 
eventually be created, could take the form of a centralized government or a German (or 
American) style solution, with the co-existence of a central government and other regional 
autonomous administrations101. 
The theoretical development of Kim Dae-jung did not depart much from what had been 
Roh Tae-woo’s government proposal of the creation of a Korean Commonwealth, as a 
first step towards reunification102. What distinguishes this idea, however, is the presence 
of the Federative stage during a transitional period, with one single Korean nation, one 
state, with the task of managing the most important issues, and two regional governments 
with two different socio-economic systems. In addition, the same formulation of the 
proposal shows that Kim Dae-jung’s will to carry out the project by was real; in fact, a 
great emphasis is placed on its feasibility and on the possibility that it would be positively 
received by the leadership in Pyongyang. The Confederation stage is explicitly designed 
in order to not create too heavy constraints, but to promote cooperation and integration 
without the loss of any share of sovereignty103. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The exposure of Kim Dae-jung’s plan is extremely detailed and pragmatic; it almost 
exclusively concentrates on the implementation of the first stage, seen as the most 
important of the three, since it would be the basis for the success of future developments 
and could take the form of a process of peaceful reunification; in this context, multiple 
possibilities, in the field of economic cooperation and socio-cultural exchanges, are taken 
into consideration.  
All these considerations will represent the basis for the implementation of the inter-
Korean of president Kim, known by the term “Sunshine Policy”. 
 
 
2.4.1 The “Sunshine Policy”  
 
When Kim Dae-jung is elected President of the Republic of Korean he starts immediately 
in pursueìing policies aimed at reconciliation with the North, well aware of the fact that, to 
create consensus around his project among the public opinion, it is necessary to stop 
consider North Korea as the main enemy for the South. In this sense, it should be 
considered one of his first statements regarding his will to meet Kim Jong-il at any time 
and without preconditions104. 
The term “Sunshine Policy” is used for the first time by Kim Dae-jung September 30, 
1994, when, as a recently defeated former presidential candidate, delivers a speech at the 
Heritage Foundation in Washington in which, with reference to the forst nuclear crisis 
caused by North Korea's threat to withdrawal from the NPT, argues that “America must be 
patient and linked to the 'sunshine policy' which had proven to be the only effective way 
of dealing with isolated countries like North Korea” 105. The term “sunshine” was 
borrowed from a famous Aesop's fable, in which the sunlight proved to be more effective 
than strong wind in forcing a man to take off his coat; out of the metaphor, it meant 
precisely that applying the dictates of engagement, rather than those of containment, 
would be the best way to take North Korea out from isolation and form that climate of 
constant confrontation. 
In the moment Kim is elected president the “Sunshine Policy” becomes the official policy 
of the South Korean government in the management of inter-Korean relations. In a speech !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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given a few weeks after his inauguration, at the School of Oriental and African Studies of 
London University, Kim describes the “Sunshine Policy” as a policy that “tries to lead 
North Korea on a path towards peace, reforms and opening through reconciliation, 
interaction and cooperation with the South”, he also adds “as president I will realize these 
ideas step by step” 106. 
The new approach of South Korea can be considered a constructive policy that aims to 
induce gradual and volunteers changes to North Korea; going beyond the simple 
engagement, it includes other components, such as: military deterrence, international 
collaboration and internal consensus. The forst Kim Dae-jung’s foreign minister, Hong 
Soon-young, in an article published on Foreign Affairs, clarifies precisely that the purpose 
of the approach was to lay the foundation for a peaceful reunification of Korea by 
eliminating the vicious cycle of negative and hostile actions and reactions through 
peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation107. 
The foundation of the theoretical and practical construction of the “Sunshine Policy” is 
based on three fundamental principles, set out by President Kim Dae-jung in his inaugural 
speech. The first is the non-tolerance of military threats or armed provocations, the second 
is the official abandonment of the idea of unification through absorption, as well as any 
measure to undermine or threaten North Korean regime, and finally the promotion of 
exchanges and cooperation, in particular through the resumption of the Basic Agreement 
of 1992108. 
Examining in depth the doctrine of President Kim on inter-Korean relations, we can find 
out six operative principles, that provide the guidelines for the practical implementation of 
the “Sunshine policy” 109: 
 
1. The Strategic Offensive. In spite of many critics that considered this policy as a 
weak policy appeasment, actually this approach is extremely proactive, especially 
compared with the inter-Korean policies pursued by Seoul during previous 
administrations, often reactive and strongly influenced by the behaviour of 
Pyongyang. The “Sunshine policy” is dedicated to the pursuit of exchanges and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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cooperation in an active way and despite initial negative responses from the North, 
because of its long-term time horizon; 
2. Flexible Dualism. It represents a profound paradigm shift in the management of 
inter-Korean relations and the core of Kim Dae-jung’s approach. The heart of the 
concept lies in the separation between politics and economics. Previous 
governments always focused on the primacy of policy issues and the need to 
connect them to economic exchanges and cooperation; this kind of attitude led to 
the creation of barriers to the promotion of cooperation and inter-Korean 
exchanges, both because of the strict separation between politics and economics in 
decision-making in Pyongyang, but, above all, for the effect that any military 
provocation or political tension had on improving inter-Korean relations 110 . 
According to this new form of functional flexibility, economy must come first and 
then political issues will follow; similarly, political and military tensions might not 
stop the interactions and bring back at the beginning the process, eliminating the 
improvements. Easy tasks should be tackeld first and difficult tasks later, Non-
governmental assistance first and government activities later, gove first and take 
later111; 
3. Simultaneous search of Engagement and Security. To implement this kind of 
approach, without appearing too weak or undermining the defense structure, it 
becomes necessary to maintain a strong position and ensure the effectiveness of the 
policy of engagement; North Korean provocations, hence, would not have been 
tolerated and would have unleashed retaliatory action, together with the deterrent 
force of the military alliance with the United States112; 
4. International Cooperation. Although one of the main points of Kim Dae-jung’s 
doctrine on inter-Korean relations is that the issue should be resolved without 
intervention of external forces, great importance is given to the cooperation of the 
major regional players, which can facilitate a peaceful management the dispute. In 
this sense, the plan of Kim Dae-jung’s administration is the first to propose a 
negotiation that pass from four to six parts, with the inclusion of Japan and Russia, 
and that address the establishment of a system of regional security cooperation in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Northeast Asia. Kim Dae-jung’s plan included also the idea that, to facilitate a 
series of changes within North Korea, the normalization of diplomatic relations 
with United States and Japan was crucial, and also the creation of a favorable 
environment for reform and opening, through the cancellation of existing sanctions 
and the access to multilateral institutions that would lead to facilitate the inflow of 
investments (IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank) 113. 
5. Internal Consensus. Unlike all the administrations that preceded him, 
democratic or authoritarian, Kim Dae-jung decides to make transparency and 
consensus one of the strengths of its policy towards the North. Inter-Korean 
relations were usually managed secretly and were used for domestic political 
purposes; what “Sunshine Policy” is aimed at is rather the opposite attitude, based 
on internal consensus and transparency in the management of relationships and 
avoiding politicization; 
6. Pseudo-Unification. Well aware of the fact that unification de jure, by mutual 
consent and through a referendum, would require a very long period of time, the 
decision of the government of Kim Dae-jung is to aim at a medium term a pseudo-
unification, a de facto unification in which the exchange of people, goods and 
services is fully functioning, as well as the mechanisms of consolidation of mutual 
trust and arms control. This intermediate target would give the opportunity to 
achieve important goals in humanitarian and socio-economic field, and to learn to 
coexist peacefully114. 
 
The goals of the “Sunshine Policy”, at the moment in which it is formulated, are varied, 
even though all subordinated to the ultimate goal of reunification in “three-stage”. The 
first medium-term goal, as previously stated, is the de facto unification, achieved through 
exchanges, cooperation and free movement. Another important purpose is to induce the 
changes and reforms in North Korea on a voluntary and gradual basis, assisting the 
country in a time of severe economic crisis and facilitating a path inspired by the reforms 
put in place by Deng Xiaoping in China in the second half of the 70s115. The last practical 
mid-term goal of the policy is to finally dismantle the Cold War system on the Korean !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Peninsula, through the improvement of relations between the US and Japan with North 
Korea, its participation in the international community and the signing of a peace treaty to 
replace the armistice of 1953; this would lead also to create the preconditions for making 
real steps forward in the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and arms control on the peninsula116. 
The operating principles and the theoretical construction of the new approach were also 
fully in line with the conditions on the ground at the end of the 90s. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the sudden German re-unification, the idea of a unification through 
absorption emerged as the dominant discourse, also with regard to the Korean peninsula. 
In particular, the idea was linked to the theory of imminent collapse, according to which 
the Pyongyang’s regime was about to collapse any time soon. During the 90s, however, 
the realization of this prevision was fading away and the resilience of North Korean 
regime put the country in a position to overcome the crisis. At the same time, the doubts 
on the possibility for South Korea to bear the economic and social costs of a sudden 
collapse of the North and a reunification by absorption increased117. The problems that 
post-1989 Germany had to face, that would have become even greater for the different 
economic conditions on the peninsula, made the leadership and the population 
increasingly reluctant about this kind of scenario118. The economic crisis of 1997 came to 
sweep away any doubts about the real possibility of unification by absorption. 
Furthermore, the pursuit of a hard-line approach and an increasing military confrontation, 
would create problems for the stability of the country and the incoming of foreign capital, 
absolutely necessary for the recovery of South Korean economy after the crisis. Even the 
international environment seemed to favour an approach like the new “Sunshine Policy”; 
no one seemed to be favourable to the sudden collapse of North Korea and its absorption 
by the South. From China to the US, from Japan to Russia, all the powers with a role in 
the dispute seemed to support a doctrine that did not pursue the disruption of the status 
quo in a quick way, but rather a series of gradual changes. 
Finally, when Kim Dae-jung starts its mandate, a credible alternative to a policy based on 
engagement no longer exists. The approach based on containment and sanction 
mechanisms, widely used throughout the Cold War and in some moments of Kim Young-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sam’s administration, seemed unable to produce any positive results, and it was likely to 
aggravate the vicious circle of negative action and reaction and strengthen Kim Jong-il’s 
regime, offering ideological motivations for mobilization, control and intimidation of the 
North Korean population.  
 
The new approach of the “Sunshine Policy” is visible in the behaviour of Kim Dae-jung’s 
administration that, despite the difficulties of the economic crisis, immediately began to 
focus on the new course of inter-Korean relations, supported in particular by the director 
of the National Intelligence Service Lim Dong-won, considered as the “architect of the 
'Sunshine Policy'” 119. 
The first practical measures of engagement adopted concerned primarily fields that, 
according to the theoretical approach used, have to be addressed first, therefore economic-
commercial and humanitarian issues. 
Regarding the development of cooperation, the primary condition was in lowering the 
barriers that had long blocked South Korean investments in the North. The simplification 
of administrative procedures, necessary for this type of investment, was the first step. The 
government of Kim Young-sam had set a cap of $ 5 million, which discouraged the 
majority of potential investors. Within the first weeks of government, Kim Dae-jung more 
than doubled the limit, and simplified the restrictions on travel for economic and trade 
purposes between the two countries. These measures, known as the “April 30 measures” 
for the day of the announcement, led to the removal of more than half of the obstacles that 
previously existed within inter-Korean trade; in particular, the laws that prescribed prior 
approval from the government in Seoul regarding travel and stay for business in the North, 
the choice of business partners and also for granting the necessary loans for the investment 
were cancelled120. 
With this relaxation of controls on inter-Korean trade it increased significantly in the early 
years of Kim Dae-jung’s administration, as well as direct investment in the North by 
companies of South. Obviously, the situation continued to present problems related to the 
passive attitude of Pyongyang regime towards economic cooperation, especially because 
of the fear of a loss of control of the national industrial production and population. Also, 
the lack of infrastructure and of institutional mechanisms, that could guarantee !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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investments from problems like double taxation or the risk of a failure to fulfil its 
commitments by North Korean regime, was a major problems for a further development 
od economic cooperation121. Despite these complications, the volume of inter-Korean 
exchanges, after a fall in 1998 due to the economic crisis in South Korea, reached $ 334 
million in 1999 and 425 million in 2000, nearly doubling the volume of the mid-90s122. 
In 1998, it also marked the birth of the “Mount Kumgang tourism project”, that can be 
considered as a real turning point in the active economic cooperation between the two 
countries. In November of that year, in fact, Hyundai Asan, a branch of the industrial 
conglomerate Hyundai Group, signed the concession agreement with the government of 
North Korea for the first sightseeing tour at the site of Mount Kumgang, which becomes 
accessible to tourists from South Korea123. In 1999, the visits already amounted to 148 000 
and the following year reached 213 000124. The project represents an important step in the 
process of building trust between the two countries, in addition to its positive effects on 
the economic and social side. 
Regarding the humanitarian sphere the first years of “Sunshine Policy” brought significant 
improvements. The main areas of activity were: the reunion of divided families and 
humanitarian assistance. As for the first one, after many years of total lack of contact, in 
1999 reunification reach a height of almost 200, while the exchange of information and 
correspondence exceeded a thousand units. In the period 1998-1999, there was also a 
considerable increase in the activity of Non-governmental Organizations that provided 
assistance to North Korea, in particular food and basic necessities. Behind this progresses, 
the hand of the government can be easily be found, through various funding sources and 
facilities, but especially with the reversal of the policy of the “single channel”, put in place 
by Kim Young-sam. According to this perspective, the provision of aid to North Korea 
should be supplied only through the Red Cross125; this opening served to allow the vast 
panorama of NGOs to increase humanitarian assistance to the North, while maintaining a 
low profile126. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In these early stages of the new course in inter-Korean relations, the political aspects are 
kept in the background, as predicted by the theoretical approach, focusing on economic 
cooperation, humanitarian assistance and the socio-cultural exchanges. 
The official reaction of the government in Pyongyang at the beginning remains in line 
with its rhetoric of closure toward the South, although in April 1998 a letter from Kim 
Jong-il in which there is an explicit reference to a “broad national dialogue” and the 
possibility that all Koreans “North, South, and from abroad, will be visiting each other, 
maintain contacts, promote dialogue, strengthen solidarity” was made public127. These, 
albeit feeble, openings pushed President Kim Dae-jung to work toward its primary 
objective, the organization of a meeting with the North Korean leader. 
The administration of Seoul was actively involved also with the American allies to ease 
the sanctions regime and look for progresses in the normalization of diplomatic relations. 
Similarly, it was at the forefront in helping for the construction of the Light Water 
Reactor, as planned by the 1994 Agreement. Contemporarily, North Korea was continuing 
test launches for long-range missiles Taepodong, the first of which occurred on August 
31, 1998. When, the following year, South Korea, through its engagement policy, was 
able to obtain the renunciation by Pyongyang to the launch of the Taepodong-2 the 
validity of the new approach was confirmed128. 
During the early stages of the “Sunshine Policy”, and on the way to the organization of the 
first inter-Korean summit, the two parties had to face also moments of great tension, in 
which the principle of flexible dualism or flexible reciprocity had to be applied. On 
June22, 1998 a North Korean submarine was captured in the territorial waters of South 
Korea; inside were found the bodies of nine people, including sailors and officers; the 
latter had killed the first ones and then committed suicide, to avoid being captured by 
South Koreans. The reaction of President Kim was to emphasize flexibility in the 
reciprocity of its policy toward the North, so that this incident did not affect the process of 
rapprochement, recently started. A potentially much more dangerous episode occurred in 
June 1999, when a clash between the navies of the two countries led to the sinking of a 
North Korean warship and the serious damage of another one. The two ships entered 
South Korean waters passing the Northern Limit Line, the demarcation line between the 
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territorial waters of the two countries, never recognized by North Korea129. The position 
of President Kim was to hold on, defending its policy of partnership for peace and giving 
a clear example of the principle of flexibility – no tolerance of military provocations but a 
commitment towards positive long-term policies130. 
The first two years of Kim Dae-jung’s administration and of “Sunshine Policy” does not 
represent a total change of the situation but the beginning of a path of small and 
significant changes, in practical and political terms. This new course of relations will lead 
to what can be considered as the most important event in inter-Korean relations for 
decades and that will represent a watershed for the presidency of Kim; the inter-Korean 
summit in 2000. 
 
 
2.4.2 The inter-Korean Summit and its Consequences 
 
While the government of Kim Dae-jung was continuing its indirect approach toward 
North Korea, encouraging contacts through Non-governmental or private entities, rather 
than talks at the political level, to create a network of exchange and interdependence, at 
the same time it began to work for accomplishing the goal of a summit between the 
leaders of the two countries. The task was assigned to Lim Dong-won, who, initially acted 
through the intermediation of the founder of the Hyundai Group, Chung Ju-yung, and his 
son, president of Hyundai Asan, Chung Mong-hun. Between 1998 and 1999 Chung 
Mong-hun had frequent contact with the leadership in Pyongyang, during the negotiations 
for the Mount Kumgang tourist project. Later on, Lim, as the chief of South Korean 
intelligence service (NIS), established a liaison office in Panmunjom where he could keep 
in constant contact with his interlocutors in Pyongyang131. 
The negotiations for the organization of the summit in 2000 took place mainly in Beijing 
and occupied the first months of the year. Among his tasks, Lim had also to convince 
American allies of the importance of the summit. In the meantime, in Washington, a 
consensus for the approach of the administration of Kim Dae-jung was growing, in 
particular after the inspections in March 1999 at the site of Kumchangri, suspected of 
hosting plants for the production of nuclear fuel, that failed to show evidence in that sense. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In addition, in October, the so-called “Perry Review” 132, a document drawn up by the 
head of the White House policy on North Korea, William Perry, was published. The 
document states that the most effective approach to reduce the threat of nuclear 
proliferation from Pyongyang was linked to engagement. These new events decreased the 
pressure on South Korea by its main ally. 
A crucial moment in this context is represented President Kim Dae-jung’s speech at the 
Freie Universität in Berlin (March 9, 2000) 133. On that occasion, he made explicit 
reference to the need to shift from economic cooperation between private sectors to a 
collaboration at governmental level, supporting the will of South Korea to help the North 
in the creation of the necessary infrastructure and also in the modernization of the 
agricultural production; he also stressed the need for an inter-Korean dialogue at 
government level. A few weeks later the official announcement of the summit, scheduled 
for mid-June of that year, was released. 
On June 13, the president of South Korea Kim Dae-jung went to Pyongyang by plane with 
a direct flight from Seoul, the first since the autumn of 1950, and returned three days later 
by land, crossing the border at Panmunjom, as a symbol of the possibility of opening 
between the two countries134. 
The primary goal of the meeting was to accelerate the process of normalization and 
institution-building in inter-Korean relations, particularly on three different areas. First of 
all, the official shift from confrontation to reconciliation, then the normalization of 
relations between the two governments and, finally, the beginning of the process of 
dismantling of the Cold War structures from the peninsula135. The atmosphere around the 
summit can be considered somewhat surreal, given the great cordiality with which the 
South Korean delegation was welcomed, and in particular the familiarity between the 
leaders of two countries officially still at war136. All the traces of decades of hostility and 
mutual suspicion seemed disappeared during those days, while peace seemed closer than 
ever137. Surely, the flaunted welcome for Kim Dae-jung in Pyongyang was purposely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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created by the leadership of North Korea like a huge spot, in which Kim Jong-il could 
show to the entire world how strong was his grip on the country, but at the same time 
mitigate the totally negative image that the whole world had of him, showing a new 
“face”: warm, friendly, charismatic and rational138. At the same time, South Korean 
President Kim Dae-jung was able to exploit the theatricality created around the summit for 
their own political gain, increasing the prestige at home around him, further grew as a 
result of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2000.  
In the weeks immediately following the summit, a series of surveys conducted by the 
Ministry of Unification showed that over 90% of respondents had a favourable opinion of 
the meeting and its consequences on the improvement of inter-Korean relations; similar 
percentages were recorded in favour of a visit by Kim Jong-il to the South, while over 
70% of respondents declared to be in favour of the “Sunshine Policy” and President Kim 
Dae-jung139. 
The most important result of the summit, beyond the symbolic of image aspects, is 
definitely the Joint Declaration, signed by the two leaders on June 15, 2000, in the wake 
of the 1972 Joint Declaration and the Basic Agreement of 1992140. In this case, however, 
the signatures on the document by the two leaders were simultaneous. The text of the 
declaration is made up of five points, preceded by a preamble, in which is enshrined in the 
importance of the historic meeting between the two leaders and the willingness to promote 
mutual understanding, improve relations and peaceful reunification. At the end of the 
document, there is the formal invitation by Kim Dae-jung for Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul. 
The five-point resumed the claims that had already been declared in the previous joint 
papers: the importance of achieving unification independently from external influences 
and through the joint efforts of the two countries as one Nation; the recognition of the 
similarities in the proposed unification formulas, considered as a viable basis for the 
future; the resolution of the humanitarian issues, primarily the family reunions, and in this 
context, it is also identified a date, August 15, 2000 – the anniversary of the liberation of 
the peninsula from the Japanese colonial rule – as the first opportunity for the meeting 
between divided families. The last two points refer to the importance of the strengthening !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of exchanges in various fields (cultural, social, sports, environmental, health) as a tool for 
strengthening mutual trust, of a balanced development through economic cooperation and 
of the creation of a permanent dialogue between the authorities of the two countries to 
achieve the implementation of the Agreement. 
One of the most important passages in the declaration were represented by the repeated 
use of the word “Nation”, both in the case of the efforts for the reunification and for joint 
cooperation and development. There are also references to concrete steps to achieve the 
listed goals, both for the humanitarian problem as for the implementation of the entire 
agreement. Finally, it is crucial to note that the summit was organized without the 
intermediation of third parties, as mediators, but only through contacts between the two 
Koreas, a radical change for the North who had long refused to have direct official 
contacts with the government in Seoul141. 
The summit and the joint statement gave great impetus to the development of talks 
between the two countries in the immediately following months, while also providing a 
strong institutional basis for dialogue and negotiations142. 
The first addressed issue, one of the most important in President Kim’s opinion, was the 
reunification of families divided by the Korean War. In this sense, the first meetings 
between the Red Cross of the two countries took place just two weeks after the summit, at 
the Mount Kumgang, between 27 and 30 June, 2000, to define the details of the already 
scheduled meeting and also to establish a suitable place for the repatriation of prisoners of 
war still in the South. The contacts materialized on August 15 with the visits to Seoul and 
Pyongyang of two groups of separated families, repeated again in the same terms on 
December 2 of that year, and with the repatriation, on September 2, of a group of 63 
prisoners of war who had expressed a desire to return to the North143. 
The second step for dialogue is represented by the ministerial-level talks held on a regular 
basis throughout 2000, in order to implement the joint statement. The first took place 
between 29 and 31 July, in Seoul; the final document, in addition to confirming the 
commitment of both parties to the points set out in the Declaration, also sanctioned a 
series of practical interventions to be carried out to improve relations between the two 
countries, in particular: the importance of the reopening of the liaison office between 
North and South in Panmunjom and the recovery of the railway line from Seoul to Sinuiju, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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on the border between North Korea and China. The following inter-ministerial meetings 
took place on the same line of the first, with documents that reiterated the principles 
enshrined in the June 15 Declaration and some proposals to move forward on a practical 
level, such as the organization of further meetings between separated families, mutual 
exchanges for tourism, the construction of a road link between Munsan and Kaesong, the 
implementation of projects to contain the floods caused by the Imjin River, located on the 
border between the two countries, and various exchanges at cultural and academic level144. 
One of the most productive inter-ministerial meeting was certainly the fourth, held 
between 12 and 16 December in Pyongyang. Despite an initial climate of tension between 
the two delegations, due to statements made before the meeting by some members of the 
two governments, the final document presented a series of practical measures to deepen 
the cooperation between the two countries (cooperation in fishing industry, meetings 
between the two organizations of Taekwondo), among which the establishment of a “Joint 
Committee for the promotion of inter-Korean economic cooperation” with the duty of 
starting the discussion for the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex145, which 
will be built in the following years and represent one of the clearest examples of 
constructive engagement and economic cooperation between the two Koreas. 
In addition to the inter-ministerial meeting, as a direct result of the Joint Declaration of 
June 15, both sides planned a series of meetings to find a common ground on matters of 
common interest and the practical measures to be pursued to achieve them. The first was 
held in Seoul between 11 and 14 September, with the visit of the Secretary of the Korea 
Workers Party, Kim Young-sun, in which it was decided the date for a further meeting 
between the defence ministers of the two countries and one, at the technical level, to 
establish a set of procedures to simplify economic cooperation between the two countries. 
Both meetings took place in South Korea on 25 and 26 September, the first on the island 
of Cheju and the second in Seoul146. 
The purpose of the meeting of defence ministers was to provide military guarantees to the 
implementation of the June 15 Declaration, easing the tension and removing the threat of 
war from the peninsula. These guidelines are fully accepted in the final document of the 
meeting, together with a commitment to make possible the construction and the use of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rail and road infrastructure linking between North and South, passing through the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) 147. 
The meeting on the economic cooperation focused instead on the need for institutional 
mechanisms that would guarantee the investments and would prevent double taxation; 
both points however would be delegated, for the implementation, to subsequent meetings, 
while, in the final document, was included a major agreement between the two countries 
on food and economic aid148. 
The first months following the summit of 2000, and the multitude of meetings that 
followed, show the willingness of both governments to continue to pursue the 
rapprochement towards a peaceful reunification. The approach of the “Sunshine Policy” is 
at this moment at its highest point; within South Korean population, the approval for 
President Kim Dae-jung and his management of inter-Korean relations is at historic highs, 
and the hostility toward Kim Jong-il and North Korea to the minimum149. 
 
Even the international environment is favourable to a development in this sense; in 
particular the US administration led by Clinton supported the policy of Kim Dae-jung and 
joined the opening toward Pyongyang. In October 2000, in fact, the number two of the 
regime, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, went to Washington to deliver a personal letter to 
President Clinton from Kim Jong-il, and shortly afterward US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright visits Pyongyang, reporting a very positive impression on the 
commitments made by the regime in the nuclear field. In the last months of 2000, the last 
also for Clinton’s administration, important steps forward in the relations between US and 
North Korea are made. Pyongyang is removed from the list of “rogue state”, both sides 
agree to pursue friendly relations and achieve a final peace treaty, North Korea renounces 
terrorism and the launch of long-range missile, while the US commit itself in helping the 
country to access to financial aid from international organizations150. The major steps 
forward moved by Clinton’s administration, particularly in the last months of the 
presidency, toward a normalization of relations with North Korea were very important, 
also regarding the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Unfortunately, they did not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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materialize in a visit of the American president to Pyongyang or in a permanent agreement 
between the two countries151. 
 
 
2.4.3 The Last Years of Kim Dae-jung’s Presidency 
 
While in the months immediately after the summit it seemed that the principles of the 
Joint Declaration of June 15 and the approach of the “Sunshine policy” had a strong 
support both at international and domestic point of view, it was soon clear that the 
situation was not as positive as it might seem at first glance. In the second half of 2001, in 
fact, the situation was dangerously close to a standstill152. 
Criticisms against Kim Dae-jung’s administration were multiplying, particularly with 
reference to the “Sunshine policy”, and the popularity of the president and his policy 
decreased within the country. The causes of this deterioration of the situation can be traced 
to three main reasons. 
First of all, there was an escalation of the internal political opposition, led by the Grand 
National Party, the majority party in the National Assembly, with the support of the so-
called “big three”, the three major newspapers in South Korea: Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo 
and JoongAng Ilbo, all characterized by a conservative line and strongly hostile to the 
administration of Kim Dae-jung153. This internal opposition focused on a few points of the 
Joint Declaration, in particular on the first two articles of the document, accusing the 
president of being gone too far and too fast in the Declaration, without providing a prior 
plan of military guarantees against the threat represented by North Korea. The idea that 
was brought forward by the opposition was that the summit was only a counterproductive 
show organized to allow Kim Dae-jung to win the Nobel Prize and that nothing concrete 
could be achieved with the “Sunshine Policy” 154. Also, the use that was made of the Fund 
for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation was increasingly questioned, with a specific 
accusation to grant to the North Korean regime too much, in terms of economic and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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humanitarian assistance, without receiving anything tangible. In this context, in the final 
months of 2001, the opposition started to strongly oppose the tourism project of Hyundai 
Asan on Mount Kumgang, considered as a mere source of hard currency for the regime in 
Pyongyang, since the company “Mt. Kumgang Tourist Hyundai Co.” was on the brink of 
bankruptcy and was kept alive through capital injections from the government and through 
the subsidies that the same paid to students and members of divided families to join the 
tour; it was estimated that, within three years, the company had accumulated debts of 417 
million dollars, compared with 700 million invested in the project155. Since the beginning 
of 2002, corruption charges, related in particular to the organization of the summit in 
2000, multiplied and will explode, the following year, in the scandal known as “Cash for 
Summit”. 
A further source of problems for Kim Dae-jung and his policy stemmed from the attitude 
taken by the leadership in Pyongyang, which continued on many occasions to maintain a 
high level of tension, mainly to stabilize its internal front and to get vantage over the 
South at the diplomatic level156. In this sense should be interpreted the intrusion of a North 
Korean ship in the territorial waters of South Korea in June 2001 and, even more, the 
clash of the naval clash in the Western Sea, in June 2002, in which South Korean ship is 
sunk and six sailors of the South and thirteen from the North are killed157. In these 
situations, the principle of flexible reciprocity, already used in the past, barely works, 
precisely because of the deterioration of the internal position of President Kim Dae-jung; 
after nearly four years of policy of constructive engagement, characterized by aid, trade 
and economic cooperation, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the leadership in 
the management of inter-Korean relations after provocations of this kind. 
 
Probably the biggest obstacle that arises in the development of the “Sunshine Policy” is 
represented by the election of George W. Bush at the White House in 2000. The new 
administration took office in January 2001 and decided to totally reverse the approach 
brought forward by Clinton, so close to the policy of Kim Dae-jung. The new American 
government decides to interrupt the dialogue with North Korea indefinitely, considering 
the country as a serious threat to international security, a “rogue state” with which US !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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could not negotiate, unless it took significant and verifiable concessions regarding the 
nuclear programme158. Even the attempt carried out by President Kim Dae-jung, during 
his visit to Washington on March 7, 2001 – the first Asian leader to visit the White House 
after the inauguration of Bush’s administration – to persuade the new administration to 
continue the path interrupted by the previous did not lead to any result159. 
The situation worsened further after September 11 and especially after the “State of the 
Union speech” of the American president in January 2002, in which North Korea is 
included, along with Iraq and Iran, in the so-called “Axis of Evil”. The charges against 
Pyongyang were its supposed will to build long-range missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction, to destabilize world peace160. This hostility shown by the United States only 
heightens the tension on the peninsula and, in particular, the aggressive and provocative 
behaviour of North Korea, and further undermined the already precarious situation of the 
“Sunshine Policy”.  
The culmination of this deterioration will occur between late 2002 and early 2003, when 
North Korea decided to reactivate its nuclear facility at Yongbyon and subsequently 
withdrew from the NPT, accusing the United States of failing to meet the terms of the 
1994 Agreed Framework (the construction of the Light Water Reactor and the oil 
supplies) 161. 
In this context, with South Korean presidential election coming in December 2002, the 
“Sunshine Policy” needed a reformulation, not so much as a theoretical approach, but 
rather in its implementation, because, despite the drop in popularity within the South 
Korean public opinion, there still was a strong base of support for this new course of inter-
Korean relations, as shown by a survey, published by the JoongAng Ilbo in 2002, 
according to which 60% of the population was in favour of the “Sunshine Policy” and 
54% stated that the policy had to be carried out in the future, even if with some changes. 
 
2.4.4 Lights and Shades on the “Sunshine Policy” 
 
The new course of inter-Korean relations launched by President Kim Dae-jung has been a 
real turning point in the dispute between the two Koreas; representing a clear increase in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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quality compared to the previous policies, it thus has given rise to a heated debate about 
what are the results and what prices has been paid to obtain them. 
It definitely is a long-term policy with long-term goals, which, to be properly evaluated, 
should be considered a step in a broader process. As mentioned, the approach developed 
by the administration of Kim Dae-jung builds on the path of engagement that can be 
traced back to the Joint Declaration of 1972. Subsequently Roh Tae-woo’s policy and, to a 
lesser extent, Kim Young-sam’s have kept alive a variable level of engagement in their 
management of relations with North Korea, until the election of Kim Dae-jung who 
proposed a structured and consistent policy in the wake of earlier attempts. 
In this historical perspective, “Sunshine Policy” cannot be considered as the culmination 
of the path but as a step, even if a fundamental one, that must surpassed toward the final 
goal of unification. As clarified by the Kim Dae-jung in his writings, the main goal of the 
“Sunshine Policy” should have been the stage which he calls “Confederation”, where 
basically there are no transfers of sovereignty for the two countries but a structured 
cooperation in various fields and the replacement of the regime of confrontationc with that 
of reconciliation, eliminating the threat of a looming military escalation on the peninsula. 
In this perspective, the policy of Kim Dae-jung was quite successful, being able to 
improve inter-Korean relations, promote peace and cooperation on the peninsula and 
lowere the levels of tension162. 
 
The heated debate aroused within the socio-political South Korean environment, around 
this new approach, gave birth to numerous criticisms of the “Sunshine Policy”. These 
criticisms focused on different aspects of the policy: from the expected and achieved 
goals, to the international dimension and the management of President Kim himself.  
The criticism that has been moved most frequently to Kim Dae-jung’s management of 
inter-Korean relations was its character of being “weak toward the North” and, above all, 
to be a policy that has brought scarce results compared to the efforts made by South Korea 
for the duration of his administration. In particular, the principle that is continuously 
questioned is that of flexible reciprocity. The idea that engagement and cooperation should 
continue, despite the political and military provocations carried out by North Korean 
regime was considered by many critics as a sign of weakness163. Previous administrations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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had always used a concept of reciprocity, but based on the short term and on the strict 
connection between economic assistance and immediate practical results, in terms of 
improved relations. The innovation introduced by the “Sunshine Policy” is connected to 
its time horizon of the long run164. The exposition of the concept by Kim Dae-jung, that 
can be considered as vague and changeable, has helped to create this kind of criticism165. 
Directly connected to this issue there is also the one related to the waste of resources by 
South Korean government. According to the critics, in fact, the practical results achieved 
by the “Sunshine Policy” are not comparable to what would be expected from the millions 
of dollars invested on the new policy by the government. North Korea took advantage of 
this moment, getting aid in a much more simple way than in the past, without carrying out 
any real change, but only a few and temporary attitude changes.  
Analyzing data, the resources spent by the state for South Korean cooperation with the 
North, between 1998 and the early months of 2002, amounted to approximately $ 330 
million, or 0.02% of GDP166, in addition to the $ 70 million invested by the Korea 
National Tourism Organization (KNTO) in its joint venture with Hyundai Mt. Kumgang 
Tourism Co., on the brink of bankruptcy in 2001167. Going beyond, it can be assumed that 
the economic gains South Korea achieved with the “Sunshine Policy”, in purely financial 
terms, have been well above the costs of cooperation. The significant reduction of tension 
on the peninsula attracted and encouraged foreign direct investment as well as improved 
rapidly the rating of the country: in 2002, foreign exchange reserves had soared to 106 
billion dollars, from 3.7 billion in 1997168. 
Another frequent criticism against the “Sunshine Policy” is linked to the issue of national 
security. In particular the administration of Kim Dae-jung has been accused of having 
weakened the defense system and national security against the threat from the North169. 
The “Sunshine Policy” definitely established a major change in this respect. After the 
Korean War, in fact, the North had always been regarded as the main enemy and suddenly 
it turned into a cooperation partners, thus creating doubts and concerns within South !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Korean public opinion. What worried most the detractors, however, was the decision of 
Kim Dae-jung to be more tolerant of provocations, including military provocations, by 
Pyongyang; the behaviour of the president, as noted earlier, responds to the logic of the 
long-term run, consisting in the fact that, if the cooperation process is interrupted for any 
heightening of tensions, it is impossible to have significant progress170. Beyond all 
considerations, some facts might help to characterize the period of the “Sunshine Policy” 
from the military and national security point of view. First, the reaction of South Korean 
administration to the naval incursions into southern territorial waters by North Korean 
military boats, in 1999 and 2002, shows Kim Dae-jung’s government firmness in military 
response against provocations; but, at the same time, they did not have major impacts on 
cooperative relations. In addition, the state budget for defense remained at previous levels 
even during Kim Dae-jung’s administration, with a very limited declining trend. Military 
spending in 2000 amounted to 12.8 billion dollars, for example, the twelfth in the 
world171. 
Many criticisms have also focused on the concern that the development of the “Sunshine 
Policy” would weaken the alliance with the United States, considered fundamental for 
national security, particularly after the election of George W. Bush and the deterioration of 
relations with the administration of Kim Dae-jung172. Actually, this kind of judgments 
does not take into account the fact that the strategic alliance between US and South Korea 
goes beyond misunderstandings that may arise between the two administrations, precisely 
for its inherent strategic character related to the global balance of power. It is true that, 
with US elections of November 2000, relations between Seoul and Washington have 
deteriorated, as a result of the new approach taken by Bush administration in the 
management of relations with North Korea173. This deterioration, however, can hardly be 
attributed to the policy of Kim Dae-jung; it remained firm and consistent throughout the 
duration of his term but, while with Clinton presidency there was harmony of purpose, 
after Bush's decision to overthrow completely that approach, the distance between the two 
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countries began to widen. This means that the tension cannot have been caused by the 
“Sunshine Policy”, but rather by the change of administration in the White House174. 
 
The third category of criticism against the “Sunshine Policy” is linked to the management 
of inter-Korean relations carried forward by President Kim Dae-jung. First of all, he is 
accused of having pursued an extremely progressive policy, without seeking a bi-partisan 
consensus, in an important issue such as that of relations with North Korea. In fact, after 
the almost generalized consensus of the first period, since the second half of 2000 two 
heterogeneous opposing sides arise, and they started to include very different categories: 
on the one hand the supporters of Kim Dae-jung, nationalists (supporters of a single 
Korean Nation), supporters of unification, anti-Americanists, progressives, on the other 
opponents of Kim Dae-jung, anti-North Korea, opponents of unification and of a united 
Korean Nation, supporters of US and conservatives175. Most likely, this strong opposition 
was already present within the existing South Korean political fabric and a breakthrough 
approach like the “Sunshine Policy” has only contributed to get it back on the surface176. 
A further series of critical focused on the question of the violation of human rights by 
North Korea. The administration of Kim Dae-jung was in fact accused of closing their 
eyes to the problem of the systematic violation of the most basic human rights by the 
regime in Pyongyang, with the intention to continue cooperation and exchanges177. In this 
sense, the commitment of South Korean government has focused on other aspects of the 
human rights issue; first of all the reunification of divided families in the two countries, 
about which it obtained important results (nearly 200 people involved in the reunification 
of 1999 in China, 400 people in 2000, 200 in 2001 and 400 in 2002). In addition, the 
“Sunshine Policy” focused on humanitarian aid, particularly food supplies, to cope with 
the crisis in North Korea (more than 100 million dollars in 2000 and 130 million in 2001 
and 2002) 178. The management of these funds, particularly the control by Pyongyang 
regime, has often been the subject of strong criticism, because a wide margin of discretion 
was left to North Korean authorities with the risk that they were mainly used for the 
livelihood of the military rather than for the population. As for the defense of human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rights, Kim Dae-jung chose not to create a linkage between it and North-South 
cooperation – and to not directly intervene in the issue of defectors – because he 
considered that the efforts for fast changes would produce the opposite effect of the 
closure of the regime and, in this sense, he preferred a flexible approach that would give 
the opportunity to collect long-term results, although at the cost of neglecting the issue in 
the short term. 
The last set of criticisms of the “Sunshine Policy” is linked to the excessive centralization 
of decisions in his hands, reducing the National Assembly role, which, over time, has led 
to a lack of transparency in the management of inter-Korean relations and of the funds that 
have been directed towards North Korea179. Along the same line, a further criticism was 
linked to the excessive personalization of the policy by the President, and its use for 
domestic purposes180. The most citaed example is that of the inter-Korean summit in 2000, 
whose announcement was gave a few days before the general elections held in South 
Korea in April of that year. As for the excessive personalization of the “Sunshine Policy” 
and its use for purposes of domestic politics it is partly present in the administration of 
Kim Dae-jung, a president who, more than any other in the past, has been identified with 
his ideas on the management of inter-Korean relations. The practice materialization of 
such criticism came with the outbreak of the serious scandal, called cash for summit in 
2003181. 
Despite handling the dispute with North Korea always required a certain degree of secrecy 
and decisiveness on the part of the government – and engagement policies are no 
exception – President Kim was contested for an excess in this sense, with important 
decisions left to a group of individuals, without providing without the approval of the 
legislative bodies182. In addition to this remarkable unilateralism, the rapidity with which 
Kim Dae-jung seeked to expand relations with North Korea was questioned. Finally, the 
criticism focused on the mistake of the administration of Kim Dae-jung to bet everything !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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on the “Sunshine Policy”, without simultaneously develop alternative approaches in case it 
did not work183.  
 
As we noted above, the “Sunshine Policy” has been subjected to a wide and varied amount 
of criticism, especially in the last years of President Kim Dae-jung. It certainly 
represented a crucial turning point in the history of inter-Korean relations; such an 
approach of engagement had never been put in place in the history of the division of the 
peninsula so thoroughly and consistently. As mentioned earlier, however, this was not 
considered by its creator as a point of arrival but rather as a crucial intermediate step in a 
process that needed a long-term time horizon to be fully realized and hence the will of 
successive governments to pursue the same approach. 
 
 
2.4.5 The Policy of Peace and Prosperity 
 
On February 25, 2003, the new administration of President Roh Moo-hyun was 
inaugurated, after he came out as the winner of presidential elections on December 19, 
2002 with a very low margin, 2.3%, against his main opponent Lee Hoi-chang. Roh's 
candidacy was an expression of the Millennium Democratic Party of Kim Dae-jung and 
the future president was already part of the previous administration, having been 
appointed in 2000 as Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, its highest government 
experience before the presidential election. 
The “participatory government”, the term which the new president chose to indicate and 
characterize its administration, had an ambitious agenda and was characterized by new 
and current issues, related to the expectations of the popular movement that had turned in 
favour of the candidate Roh and that led him to victory, in spite of all the predictions 
against him184. Domestically, the main goals were the fight against corruption, the 
expansion of the welfare system, a balanced national economic development, that would 
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help the underdeveloped areas, and various reforms in fields like: education, taxation, 
labor and media185. 
Regarding the issue of inter-Korean relations, the new head of state was expected to 
continue on the path of engagement, traced by his predecessor. During the election 
campaign, despite the difficult situation that had arisen at the end of 2002 because of the 
admissions about North Korean nuclear programme, Roh always adhered to the idea that a 
“Sunshine Policy” was still needed and had to go ahead and move even further on186. In 
this context, immediately after the election, Roh sets the foundations for what will be his 
“Policy of Peace and Prosperity”. 
 
In his inaugural speech, on 25 February 2003, Roh Moo-hyun presented his approach to 
inter-Korean relations, embodied by four principles: 
 
1. South Korean government would try to resolve all outstanding issues 
through dialogue; 
2. Priority will be given to the creation of mutual trust and support of 
reciprocity; 
3. Active cooperation at the international level will be pursued, with the 
premise that the two Koreas must remain the main actors in inter-Korean 
relations; 
4. Increasing of transparency, expanding citizen participation and ensure 
bipartisan support187. 
 
The new president made clear that his intentions was not to replace the policy of his 
predecessor, but simply build on the results achieved to that point and improve the way in 
which the policy was implemented.  
The development of this policy can be divided into three stages. The first consisted of the 
organization of regular talks between the leaders and the heads of the defense of the two 
countries, to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat; the second aimed at expanding 
cooperation and exchange programs, including those in military issues, to create a climate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of mutual trust. Finally, Roh wanted to replace the armistice of 1953 with a real peace 
treaty that would lay the foundation for the establishment of a new structure in Northeast 
Asia, based on peace and cooperation188. While the “Sunshine Policy” focused on the 
policy to be followed towards DPRK, the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” goes beyond 
the Korean Peninsula and put an emphasis on the entire region of Northeast Asia. Among 
the goals of Roh’s policy, there was indeed also the will to make the Korean peninsula a 
business hub for Asia and beyond189; this operation would have been possible only by 
creating a peaceful and secure environment in the region of Northeast Asia. 
Another distinctive feature of the approach of the new administration towards inter-
Korean relations is represented dby the equal emphasis that is placed on the security 
aspects and on those related to economy, embodied by the two terms of “peace” and 
“prosperity” 190. The theoretical framework of the new government is therefore exactly the 
same outlined by the administration of Kim Dae-jung; the goal that arises is to deepen 
these policies and, in particular, focus on the issues of security and economic 
development, fundamental precondition for any attempt to reform the system. 
Under the government of Roh it is increasingly clear that the goal of national 
reconciliation through economic cooperation with Pyongyang becomes the top priority. 
Through the progress of inter-Korean relations co-prosperity could be promoted and peace 
strengthened; and these relations are are increasingly identified by the new administration 
with economic relations. Despite the growing tensions caused by the Second Nuclear 
Crisis that erupted a few months before the election of Roh Moo-hyun, the new 
government decided to immediately promote economic cooperation and cultural 
exchanges through various channels, including the continuation of ministerial talks 
between the two countries, started after the summit in 2000. The leverage that the 
government intended to use the most is that of economic and humanitarian aid and 
cooperation projects; in the first three years in office the total amount spent in this field 
exceeded that of the period 1995-2002. The basic idea through economic interactions the 
tension on the peninsula can be reduced and the relations between North Korea and other 
regional powers, involved in the difficult resolution of the nuclear crisis, improved. The 
projects on which South Korean government focused were basically three: the creation of 
two road and rail connections between North and South Korea, the further development of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the tourist area of Mount Kumgang and the construction of the industrial complex of 
Kaesong in North Korea191. 
The first project was, in part, already initiated by the administration of Kim Dae-jung with 
the agreement to reconnect the line between Seoul and Shinuiju (Kyongui Line) and, by 
the end of 2003, the border crossing between Dorasan and Kaesong was completed, along 
with a parallel road connection, followed a year later by a similar operation on the east 
coast (Bukbu Donghae Line). In this way, the government gave the opportunity to the 
tourists to visit Mount Kumgang by land and to ensure to South Korean workers in 
Kaesong an easy access to the industrial complex192. 
The revitalization of the tourism project of Hyundai Asan on Mount Kumgang was 
strongly connected to this first project. In September 2003, the North accepted the 
proposal to promote overland tours and also to establish a Special Tourist Zone of 19.8 
million square meters, to provide a more secure environment for the tourists; with these 
new improvements the project showed signs of recovery and soon became financially 
profitable. Its biggest limit remained, however, to be mostly a symbolic experience, given 
the scarcity of real effects on the population193. 
The most important cooperation project of the whole Roh Moo-hyun’s administration – 
and probably of the whole history of inter-Korean relations – is the contrsuction of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), which had become a showcase for the “Policy of 
Peace and Prosperity” and an example of cooperation to route North Korea on the road 
toward economic reform. Both in terms of visibility and importance the project 
overshadowed all other joint programs between North and South. Located about sixty 
kilometers north of Seoul, the complex covers an area of 66 km2 and is an administrative 
area with a special economic status, physically and legally separated from the rest of 
North Korea. The heart of the project, which according to the plans had to be fully 
developed in three successive stages for a total of 160 000 jobs created194, was to allow 
both parties to benefit from it, in a sort of win-win strategy. South Korean industries could 
save money thanks to the lower costs of wages and rents, and, at the same time, help 
North Korea as a source of hard currency; combining the investments and technology of 
the South with the cheap workforce and land in the North became a convenient and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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affordable joint venture. At the same time, South Korea played a role to induce 
Pyongyang to take some, albeit timid, economic reform, without bearing the financial 
risks of the investment. Obviously the project, since its inception, has always suffered for 
the ups and downs in the relations between the two Koreas, failing to reach the potential 
for which it was designed195. 
Thanks to these advances on the economic front, in 2006, South Korea became the second 
largest trading partner for the North, just after China, with a strong positive growth trend. 
Also the amount of aid had grown significantly, reaching the remarkable figure of nearly $ 
300 million in 2004 and 2005. At the same time, cultural exchanges between the two 
countries were encouraged, in particular touristic, and the process of reunification of 
divided familied continued, involving, by the end of 2005, more than 10 000 people196. 
Another important result obtained by South Korean government during Roh Moo-hyun’s 
administration was the summit of 2007 between the leaders of the two countries. From 2 
to 4 October of that year, President Roh Moo-hyun traveled to Pyongyang, crossing the 
border by land of the 38th parallel, to meet Kim Jong-il. The announcement of the meeting, 
just a few weeks before the chosen date, created great sensation, because it was totally 
unexpected. In the weeks before, there were no relevant progress in the ongoing 
negotiations on the nuclear issue, that would justify the summit, although at the beginning 
of the year the relations between Pyongyang and Washington were definitely improving. 
In addition, in the months before the meeting there seemed to be no interest for such a 
meeting in Roh’s government, unlike before the summit of 2000. All these factors, 
combined with the proximity to the presidential elections of December 2007, had 
prompted many opponents to accuse the president of using the summit to promote the 
candidate of his own party197. 
Apart from the accusations of political opportunism, the summit, although not as 
fundamental as that of 2000, obtained significant results in building even closer ties 
between the two countries. The final declaration was very concrete and specific on the 
addressed issues; in particular, after only two days of talks, the leaders reached agreements 
on 40 points, divided into five areas related to peaceful reconciliation and economic 
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cooperation between the two countries198. Unfortunately, the results of the presidential 
elections of December 2007 in South Korea, frustrated many of the elements on which an 
agreement was found during the summit. 
Despite Roh Moo-hyun’s government strategy was to encourage inter-Korean 
reconciliation and cooperation through the increasing of exchanges of people and goods 
between North and South and to improve bilateral relations and promote the peaceful 
coexistence, there were clear limits to the promotion of these goals through economic 
cooperation and cultural exchanges199. The most pressing problem during the five years of 
the mandate of Roh was represented by the need to reach a meaningful agreement on 
security, that would includ a final settlement of the relationship between the two countries, 
as a basis for the establishment of a peaceful structure in Northeast Asia and, most 
important, the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program in Pyongyang, in addition to a 
system of control and reduction of conventional weapons200. 
The second nuclear crisis weighed on Roh Moo-hyun going and undermined the progress 
that had been made on socio-economic issues, putting him in the difficult position of 
having to disentangle between its idea of managing inter-Korean relations and the 
structure consisting in the alliance with Washington, whose main interest was the 
elimination of the risk of nuclear proliferation represented by North Korea. 
 
 
2.4.6 Managing the Second Nuclear Crisis 
 
As in the case of its predecessor, also the mandate of Roh Moo-hyun began under bad 
auspices of a major crisis; while for Kim Dae-jung had been a financial and economic 
crisis, in the case of the new administration the crisis was related to national security: the 
threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea. This situation imposes to deal with the 
problem within the context of the alliance with the United States, and in coordination with 
Japan. For South Korea, the resolution of the crisis was essential to determine whether its 
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“Policy of Peace and Prosperity” would be able to lead to real progress in inter-Korean 
relations201. 
The second nuclear crisis in North Korea breaks out only two months before the 
presidential election of 2002. In his inaugural speech, the new president made reference to 
the intolerability of the development of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula but, at 
the same time, the need to solve the situation through dialogue and with a proactive role 
on the part of South Korea202. 
This position was clearly reiterated on several occasions and represented a source of 
friction between Seoul and Washington, because of the closure towards dialogue of 
Bush’s administration; anyway, Roh repeatedly rejected any kind of solution that would 
include military actions and strongly opposed US position of “all options on the table”, 
alluding precisely to the possibility of using military force as negotiating leverage203. 
Anyway, after the start of the war in Iraq and the explicit opposition of China and South 
Korea to any kind of military action that option was eliminated. To replace it the strategy 
used was the so-called dell “hostile abandonment” which was based on isolation, 
containment and a process of regime change with the first good occasion. The idea was 
that the removal of the leadership in Pyongyang and its replacement with a new 
government would be the safest option to resolve the nuclear dispute, so the US and its 
allies would have to work together to isolate, contain and change the regime204. 
Obviously, this kind of approach, based again on the idea that the collapse of Pyongyang 
regime was imminent, was absolutely contrary to Roh Moo-hyun’s policy of engagement, 
that was not only in sharp contrast to the catastrophic consequences that a sudden collapse 
of North Korea would have on the South, but it also considered such an event quite 
unlikely. Also, in his opinion all the pressure on North Korea might be counterproductive, 
since it increased dramatically the sense of insecurity and concern of the regime, reduced 
the chance for a negotiated solution and gave to the regime an excuse to tighten even more 
its control over the population205. 
For President Roh the crucial element in the solution of the second nuclear crisis was 
represented by trust, or rather, by the lack of trust between the parties; the only way to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 Koh, Byung-chul 2003, p. 8. 
202 Secretariat of the National Security Council – Republic of Korea, President’s remarks on the North 
Korean nuclear issue, January 2005, p. 3. 
203 Allen, Richard 2003, ‘Seoul’s choice: the U.S. or the North’, New York Times, January16. 
204 Rowen, Henri S. 2003, ‘Kim Jong-il must go’, Policy Review, No. 121, p. 15. 
205 Moon, Chung-in 2008, ‘Diplomacy of defiance and facilitation: the six party talks abd the Roh Moo-hyun 
governement’, Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 76-77. 
! 149!
restore it was then recognize and engage in dialogue North Korea. These positions, so far 
away from what was the idea of Washington to resolve the crisis, began to weaken the 
relationship with the United States and led to a fierce internal opposition from the 
conservative front206. 
A further difference between Seoul and US was represented by the way in which dialogue 
and negotiation had to be shaped. The two options were: the will of Pyongyang to have 
bilateral contacts with the United States and American idea of multilateral talks extended 
to all those countries that had an interest, more or less direct, to the resolution of the 
nuclear issue. The idea of North Korean leadership had always been to talk face to face 
with the Americans, to include in the negotiations other issues like the signing of the 
peace treaty; the main reason was the strong belief by Pyongyang regime that the only real 
and pressing threat to its own survival came from Washington207. 
Bush’s administration was instead convinced that previous attempts of bilateral dialogue 
were to be regarded as true failures; the agreement reached by Clinton’s administration in 
1994 represented in this respect a form of appeasment that rewarded North Korea for his 
wrong and dangerous behaviour208.  
The option that they US put on the table the beginning was a 5 + 5 dialogue, which 
included the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, Russia, China, 
France, Great Britain) and a quintet composed by: North Korea, South Korea, Japan, 
Australia and the European Union. A formulation of this kind could not be accepted by 
Pyongyang; it was ambiguously suspended between a negotiation between ten parts and a 
pressure group of nine against one209. The position of Roh Moo-hyun was to support the 
option of bilateral negotiations between US and North Korea, for his fear that a prolonged 
stalemate on the situation would have aggravated the tension on the peninsula and his 
awareness of the difficulty of reaching some tangible result through a multilateral 
approach. Finally, he knew that the root of the nuclear threat by North Korea was tied to 
the fear of the American threat against Pyongyang, to the survival of the regime and, even 
more, to the desire to force the US to sit at a negotiating table and address all the 
unresolved issues (peace treaty, American troops in the South, humanitarian aid, access to 
international credit institutions). An effort to improve the relations between the two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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countries through direct contacts, would help to improve the overall climate and the path 
of national reconciliation between North and South210. 
The reached solution, through the mediation of China, was that of the Six Party Talks 
(involving the two Koreas, the US, China, Japan and Russia) 211, already proposed during 
Kim Dae-jung administration. The first three rounds of this new negotiating formula (27 
to 29 August 2003, 25 to 28 February 2004 and 23 to 26 June 2004), did not bring any 
tangible results, with constant setbacks and stalemates; neither United States nor North 
Korea had the will to find a compromise on crucial aspects.  
In particular, the discrepancies were concentrated on the timing of the commitments, with 
Pyongyang that wanted a system based on the simultaneity between the American security 
guarantees and its renounce to nuclear ambitions, while Washington was for a sequential 
approach in which the first step was the dismantling of nuclear infrastructure and, later, 
the dialogue and the guarantees. Moreover, the same meaning of denuclearization was a 
contested subject212. Americans do not receded from the complete, verifiable, irreversible 
dismantlement of all nuclear program, both based on uranium and plutonium, and of the 
Light Water Reactor under construction as a result of the 1994 Agreement, this because 
according to Bush, there could not be a peaceful nuclear program in North Korea. 
Obviously, these conditions were unacceptable for Pyongyang, considered this scenario as 
a ploy by Washington to disarm the country without paying any cost213. 
In this situation, the role of South Korea risked to be squeezed – along with that of Russia 
and Japan – by a sort of Three-Party Talks, between North Korea and United States with 
the mediation of China. South Korea was risking again – just like had already happened 
with the resolution of the first nuclear crisis – to be put aside and not being able to play a 
real and decisive role in resolving the issue. The proposals put forward by Roh Moo-
hyun’s government, to try to bridge the gap on the timing and modality of 
denuclearization did not get tangible results. Regarding the first problem, the position of 
Seoul was very close to that of Pyongyang, because harsh preconditions to dialogue 
prevented the very possibility of engaging North Korea in negotiations; while for the 
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second Roh shared the American approach, but excluding the nuclear program for 
peaceful purposes214. 
The re-election of Bush in late 2004 further worsened the situation, putting at risk the 
efforts that Seoul government was pursuing in inter-Korean cooperation and that it 
succeed to keep separate from the nuclear dossier. 
The period 2005-2006 was characterized by alternating moments of relaxation and very 
serious crisis. The fourth round of the Six Party Talks (July 26 to August 7 and 13 to 19 
September 2005), mainly thanks to the role of South Korea as a facilitator of dialogue, 
succeeded in achieving a tangible result with the Joint Statement of September 19, in 
which North Korea agreed to the total abandonment of its nuclear program and the return 
within the structures of the IAEA and the NPT, in addition to the commitment to respect 
and implement the declaration of denuclearization of the peninsula of 1992. In exchange 
all the parties agreed to re-discuss the issue of the Light Water Reactor, while the US gave 
guarantees to respect the sovereignty of the country, to abandon any hostile intent – in 
particular by refraining from any kind of military attack – mand possibly start a process of 
normalization of relations. In addition, all parties committed themselves to participate in 
the reconstruction of North Korean economy and to cooperate in trade, economic and 
energy, as well as to reach a definitive agreement to establish a peaceful regime on the 
Korean Peninsula215. The agreement, perhaps the main diplomatic milestone achieved by 
the Roh Moo-hyun’s administration, represented the triumph of an innovative diplomacy 
where everyone appeared to be a winner216: North Korea for the security guarantees and 
economic and energetic assistance, the US for the renunciation of Pyongyang to its 
nuclear program, China for the diplomatic success, South Korea for the reassurances about 
the nuclear threat, on the one hand, and for a more favourable international environment 
toward engagement on the other217. 
Unfortunately, the declaraton will never be implemented because of the immediate, new 
escalation of tension. By the end of 2005, in fact the US government decided to freeze a 
sum of $ 25 million, deposited in the bank Banco Delta Asia in Macao, because it was 
traced back to operations of money laundering and counterfeiting by North Korean !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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regime. Despite protests and threats of boycotting future meetings of the Six Party Talks 
by Pyongyang, the US decision did not change, and went even further with the open 
critics to the regime for human rights violations and accuses of being involved in drugs 
trafficking and having links with international criminal organizations218. 
The reaction of DPRK to these statements, considered as slander, materialized in June 
2006 when, as part of a defensive military exercise, seven missiles of short, medium and 
long range were launched; the intent is clearly to attract the attention of the government in 
Washington and try to ease the increasing pressure t on the country. The reaction of 
Bush’s administration is, however, even more intransigent and during the summer of that 
year the tension reached very high levels, up to burst with the underground nuclear test 
carried out by Pyongyang in October 9, 2006. 
The explosion of the first nuclear device, although with very limited power, by North 
Korea is a real turning point. The harsh sanctions taken a few days later by the United 
Nations Security Council, through the 1718 Resolution – which prohibited the transfer of 
money to and from North Korea, as well as the sale of any good to the country linked to 
the production of weapons or nuclear technology, luxury goods and even a travel ban for 
anyone linked to the nuclear program219 – were one of the causes that led to a dead end for 
the Six Party Talks. Roh Moo-hyun’s policy was under increasing criticism at home, 
especially by conservatives who accused his engagement policy of having completely 
failed, in particular regarding security issues, the second pivotal point of his “Policy of 
Peace and Prosperity” along with economic cooperation220. 
In 2007, the last year of the Roh’s presidency, a new round of the Six Party Talks takes 
place. After the risk of a complete break down caused by the first nuclear test, in fact, 
during the third session of the fifth round of consultations (8-13 febbario 2007), thanks 
again to the mediation of South Korea, the parties reache a new agreement. Pyongyang 
agrees to put the seals to its nuclear plant in Yongbyon and allow IAEA inspections, in 
return for the starting of bilateral talks with the United States, to resolve pending issues, 
and of the path toward full diplomatic recognition, and an appropriate energy supply, 
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estimated at one million tons of fuel. A new agreement, which reaffirmed the 
commitments made in February, was signed on October 3, 2007221. 
From these dynamics that followed the first nuclear, we can draw some conclusions. First, 
the use by Pyongyang of the threat of nuclear proliferation as a weapon to force United 
States to negotiate; an example in this sense is represented by the agreements of 2007 
when, a few months after the experiment, North Korea decided to give up its nuclear 
infrastructure because it succeeded in obtaining bilateral talks, the possibility of 
normalization of relations and essential energy supplies. From this perspective, the nuclear 
issue is not intimately linked to inter-Korean relations, but rather to the relations between 
Pyongyang and Washington, and the will of the first to get the attention of the second. It is 
also true that a deterioration of these relations has always had serious negative effects on 
the proactive policies pursued by Seoul, aimed at increasing cooperation and exchanges 
with the its northern neighbour222. 
As for the role played by Roh Moo-hyun’s government during the nuclear crisis and the 
Six Party Talks, it cannot be considered prominent. The very structure of the negotiations 
prevented Seoul from playing a primary role, as the two main actors were the US and 
North Korea, with China to act as a key mediator. The role of “supporting actor” will cost 
to the government harsh domestic criticism of weakness. Nevertheless, the role of 
“facilitator of dialogue” played by South Korea on several occasions (Declaration of 19 
September 2005, the resumption of talks in February 2007) has been crucial and guided 
the process of the Six Party Talks, influencing the political behaviour of United States223. 
Even in these cases, however, there have been criticisms from conservatives on the 
domestic front, related a possible weakening of the strategic alliance with United States. 
 
 
2.4.7 Ten Years of Inter-Korean Cooperation 
 
When Roh Moo-hyun finished his mandate it marked the end of a cycle of ten years in 
which the management of inter-Korean relations has been characterized by an approach of 
constructive engagement. Both progressive presidencies put forward the goal of a peaceful 
and gradually implemented reconciliation, through of cooperative relations in various !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fields, particularly in those areas that could create a strong interdependence between the 
two countries. This is the case of economic and trade relations, food aid, energy, 
humanitarian field, especially regarding the reunification of divided families224. 
A goal achieved during this decade (1997-2007) is certainly represented by the reduction 
of tension on the peninsula. For the duration of Kim Dae-jung’s mandate, there were no 
major military confrontation that could escalate into an open conflict out of control, and 
the few incidents that were limited in their consequences and did not stop the cooperation. 
The presidency of Roh Moo-hyun has been affected throughout its duration by the second 
nuclear crisis, but the situation has never represented a real threat to the security of South 
Korea; as mentioned earlier, in fact, the challenge launched by Pyongyang regime in the 
nuclear field was headed to Washington and not to Seoul and was linked to the need to 
bring to the negotiating table a very conservative American administration. The main 
diplomatic work of Roh Moo-hyun’s government had to deal with Bush’s administration 
and its doctrine of preventive war, that threatened to become itself a threat to the security 
of South Korea. 
Regarding economic cooperation the decade saw the achievement of positive results, 
hardly imaginable in the prvious years; the volume of trade increased decisively, as well 
as South Korean investments in the North, especially after the creation of the industrial 
park in Kaesong.. After the end of the Cold War North Korea desperately needed a source 
of economic and humanitarian aid, to replace the lack of supplies ensured by beaing part 
of the Soviet bloc; the cooperation policies of the two progressive governments partially 
removed North Korea from the orbit of influence of China.  
One of the characteristics that contributed to the realization of these results has been the 
continuity in the policies towards inter-Korean relations. The South Korean political 
system, emerged in 1987, did not allow the re-election of a president, affecting the long-
term policies. The continuity given by the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-
hyun to the engagement approach has instead allowed to achieve tangible results in the 
medium term, like in the case of the Kaesong Industrial Complex or of the tourism project 
to Mount Kumgang. 
Despite the multiple goals achieved the “Sunshine Policy” and the “Policy of Peace and 
Prosperity” had different shades in their implementation. A common negative factor of 
both can be found in the lack of attention paid to the control of the management of aid by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the authorities of North Korea, which decided in an absolutely autonomous way how to 
allocate supplies economic aid inside the country. A more stringent and binding control 
mechanism, which would have probably been accepted by Pyongyang because of its 
situation of extreme necessity, would have allowed a more accurate use of the assistance. 
Another weakness can be found in the excessive flexibility of the concept of reciprocity. 
Notwithstanding that a totally conditional engagement would have not led to an increase 
in mutual trust and to the creation of a network of interdependence between the two 
countries, a greater will to constrain the behaviour of Pyongyang in a more direct and 
immediate way would be have benfit both the development of relations between the two 
countries and the domestic consensus in the South. 
Finally, a common feature of both governments, although more pronounced during the 
five years of Kim Dae-jung, is related to the lack of transparency in the management of 
inter-Korean relations, often left to more or less hidden negotiations, with a questionable 
use of the funds; in both cases the criticism in this regard helped to create a distance 
between public opinion and the government's approach. 
The international environment also played a decisive role. If the early years of “Sunshine 
Policy” found an American democratic administration that, in principle, supported the 
approach of constructive engagement, with the elections of 2000 the situation changed 
dramatically. The government of Bush was characterized for the hostility to this kind of 
policy and the propensity towards the imminent collapse theories related or regime-change 
approaches. This situation exacerbated the tension on the peninsula and also between 
Seoul and Washington; in particular the South Korean government had to find a continuos 
balance between the fulfillment of its obligations towtds the alliance with the United 
States and the need for cooperation and dialogue with North Korea. 
Despite having identified the cooperation in the economic field as the primary way 
towards national reconciliation, the government of Roh limited to carry on some projects 
already designed in the previous administration, without being able to make the further 
necessary step to go beyond the first phase of the “Sunshine Policy”. For sure, the adverse 
international environment and the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis played a crucial 
role in making this kind of evolution impractical. The fact is, however, that South Korean 
elections of December 2007 closed a cycle of innovative management of inter-Korean 
relations that led to major improvements but not to that radical change that the innovation 
of the approach anticipated. 
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Third Chapter 
Analysis of Inter-Korean Political Cooperation 
 
The in-depth analysis of the theoretical approach to the concept of cooperation among 
states, made in the first chapter, gives us the tools for a thorough study of cooperative 
relationships, that developed on the Korean peninsula after its division into two separate 
state entities. The contribution of the second chapter is rather to provide the historical 
bases for making this study possible. Indeed, it has been exposed in a discursive way the 
development of inter-Korean relations, beginning with the essential condition for their 
existence: the division of the peninsula. Subsequently, the attention has been focused on 
some precise critical junctures that coincide with the opening of windows of opportunity 
for the materialisation of inter-Korean cooperation. 
In fact, as it became clear from the historical reconstruction previously made, relations 
between the two Koreas find their bases in a situation of hostility and conflict, which 
characterized, at different levels, its whole history. The division of the peninsula has been 
caused by two key events: the loss of independence, as a result of the colonial occupation 
by Japan, and the establishment of a global bipolar equilibrium, characterized by an 
irreducible strategic rivalry between the two superpowers, USA and Soviet Union. This 
situation of hostility and rivalry has reverberated in a decisive manner on the process of 
national reconstruction, that followed the liberation from the colonial rule, propitiated by 
the defeat of Tokyo in World War II. Although the Korean population demonstrated 
unequivocally the desire for independence and national unity, the intervention of the 
superpowers, which at that time were beginning to move permanently away from each 
other and to outline the respective spheres of influence, brought out two opposing groups 
who sought to legitimize itself as the only representatives of the entire Korean nation. The 
crucial support provided by the Soviets for the affirmation of Kim Il-sung in the north, as 
well as the support of Americans to the uncompromising anticommunism of Yi Sungman 
in the south, led to the final break of any possibility of re-formation of national unity. 
This irreducible strategic rivalry, which is and will be a crucial element in the 
development of inter-Korean relations, will materialize in an open armed conflict, with the 
Korean War (1950-1953). But this was not the only case. As seen in the previous chapter, 
over the years that followed, in fact, the opportunities for open confrontation and military 
clashes were not lacking. We can therefore conclude that “conflict” – including real 
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military conflicts – is the first significant feature in the development of inter-Korean 
relations. 
With these premises, in some ways still valid nowadays if we consider that the two Koreas 
are still formally in a state of war and that the military skirmishes take place still today, it 
is therefore difficult to imagine an environment favourable for the development of 
cooperative relations; even more if, as outlined in the first chapter, we imagine the 
beginning of a stable and long-term cooperative project, with an end goal of high profile. 
In fact, despite the conflicting assumptions set out above, the case of inter-Korean 
relations is unique in this sense. The goal of the reunification of the peninsula formed, 
from the very birth of two separate states, a primary objective for both governments1. The 
use of military means to achieve it – as in the case of the Korean War – has never 
questioned the importance of the goal of reunification. This common objective has been a 
strong push for the leadership of the two countries toward cooperation. Through this 
perspective, we can identify three significant historical ruptures, after the end of the war, 
in the development of cooperative relations between the two Koreas. 
Following the changes that occurred on the international scene in the ‘70s it became clear, 
especially for Pyongyang, which pursued with greater continuity military efforts toward 
reunification, that the war was no longer a viable way to regain national unity. And it is 
precisely at this time that we assisted, in fact, to the opening of the first form of dialogue 
and cooperation between the two countries. With the Sino-American rapprochement of 
1971-1972 – and to a lesser extent, with the process of detente between USA and Soviet 
Union – the conditions on the ground for the two Koreas changed significantly, because of 
the strong influence on their foreign policy of the respective superpower. The most direct 
consequence of these changed conditions has been the signing of the Joint Declaration of 
1972. This moment represented a milestone in inter-Korean relations and, above all, for 
inter-Korean cooperation. In addition to the practical results and the symbolic value of 
reconciliation, it will translate into practice the awareness that cooperation between the 
two Koreas was a viable alternative. At the moment of the signature only 19 years have 
passed since the end of the War and the signing of the armistice; an armistice that South 
Korean President Yi Sungman refused to sign. From this point on, even if with a widely 
variable speed and intensity, dialogue and cooperation between the two countries will 
never totally stop. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Also the second critical juncture in the development of inter-Korean cooperation came 
from a change in the international system, but, if in the previous case it was a change at 
the regional level, in this case it was a systemic global revolution. The end of the Cold 
War, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, opened up unexpected and 
extremely large possibilities for the resolution of many disputes and regional conflicts. 
Obviously the Korean peninsula was no exception. But unlike other cases of nations 
divided by the balance of power of the Cold War, on the peninsula there the final 
resolution of the conflict did not take place, as predicted by several observers, although 
the changes of 1989-1990 opened new ways for inter-Korean cooperation. In fact, the 
system of power and self-sufficiency instituted in North Korea since the end of the Korean 
War had strengthened the regime, guaranteeing a degree of resilience such as to overcome 
even a change as destabilizing as the end of the Cold War; the same change that cost 
instead the survival of many regimes that were in conditions similar to those of North 
Korea. 
The third historical fundamental rupture involving inter-Korean relations has rather 
different characteristics than the previous two. In fact, in this case it is an operation 
completely internal to inter-Korean relations. The creation and implementation of the 
“Sunshine Policy” by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, corresponded to no change 
in the structural nature of the international system, but rather to the will of a particular 
political leadership to establish a new regime of relations on the peninsula. Obviously, it 
can not be ignored the fact that some features of the international system contributed to its 
success – for example the preconditions created by the end of the Cold War and the 
famine in North Korea, or the support provided by Clinton’s administration to President 
Kim – nonetheless it is also true that, compared to the two cases mentioned above, it was a 
new proactive political approach pursued on the peninsula and followed by other 
international actors. What is even more significant is the fact that, among the three 
historical moments taken into account, it was precisely the latter that brought more 
concrete results in terms of cooperation, establishment of mutual trust and reduction of 
tensions on the peninsula. 
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3.1 The Political Cooperation Between North and South Korea 
 
Within a tendency, which traces its origins from the very division of the peninsula and the 
will of both regimes to be the sole legitimate state entity on the peninsula, constituted 
mainly of hostility, confrontation and containment, some room for cooperative interaction 
was created. As seen in the first chapter, the main tool that made this switch from hostility 
to cooperation possible is that of engagement, whether conditional or unconditional or 
constructive. 
The attempts toward cooperative interaction on the Korean peninsula covers a wide 
variety of tools, goals and issues. They move, in fact, from political-diplomatic 
agreements of limited scope and short duration, to structured and long-term economic 
cooperation, through the improvement of trade, cultural contacts, military confidence 
building measures. This multiplicity had different effects but, in general, they were always 
positive for inter-Korean relations, and often also for the entire security system of 
Northeast Asia. 
Obviously, not all the cooperative interactions are equal; not all have the same value in 
terms of results, tools deployed and strategic depth. However, in a situation of very tight 
containment and great hostility and conflict as of the Korean peninsula after 1953 was, 
every step in this direction has been a source of inspiration for the improvement of 
subsequent cooperative interactions. 
To analyse systematically the different aspects that make up the set of inter-Korean 
cooperation, we can structure a division of the various cooperative interactions in three 
broad groups. 
 
First, we can identify all the cooperative interactions that have taken place in the political-
diplomatic field. The first contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang, after the armistice, 
although channelled through the Red Cross, were precisely aimed at creating a dialogue at 
the political level between the two countries. Within this group we can put all the political 
and diplomatic agreements between the two Koreas, starting with the Joint Statement of 
1972, then moving to the fundamental agreements signed in 1991, the Basic Agreement 
and the Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Peninsula, until the Joint Declaration 
of June15, 2000, signed during the historic visit to Pyongyang by President Kim Dae-jung. 
In addition to these events of essential importance for the study of inter-Korean relations, 
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then there is a big part of political-diplomatic cooperation between the two countries that 
took place after the opening of 1972. In particular, all these forms of continuous dialogue 
at a lower level have often played the function of facilitating the achievement of high level 
results, such as those previously listed.  
Giving an extensive reading to political cooperation, we can then encompass within that 
group also forms of cooperation in the military field, that have taken place over the years 
on the peninsula. In this case, we are dealing especially with Confidence Building 
Measures that have been put in place, in particular during the periods of engagement to 
favour a reduction of tension, to avoid a misuse of the huge military machine on the 
border from 1953 onwards, that could cause, even indirectly, clashes that could quickly 
escalate to a degeneration of the situation. The dialogue between officials of the respective 
ministries of defence has always been one of the most active and continuous development 
of inter-Korean relations – for example, it is in charge of essential tasks required for other 
forms of cooperation, such as the management of border crossing at Paju, necessary for 
the operation of the Kaesong industrial park – and must be included in this group. Finally, 
one last area that can be considered within political cooperation is the issue of North 
Korean nuclear program. As we previously pointed out, this problem is not properly a part 
of inter-Korean relations, mainly for two reasons: firstly, because the main recipient – and 
objective – of this program is not South Korea and secondly because, precisely for the 
previous feature, the issues can not be handled within the framework of bilateral relations 
Seoul-Pyongyang. However, South Korea has a strong strategic interest in the issue and 
intervened, alongside the United States, to give its contribution in the management of the 
dispute. During the First Nuclear Crisis, as outlined in the second chapter, the role of Kim 
Young-sam’s government was totally absent in the negotiation, the agreement essentially 
concerned USA and North Korea. However, in the immediate aftermath, South Korea 
secured a major role in the consortium responsible for the construction of the light water 
reactor included in the Framework Agreement, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO). Of the total funds allocated for the organization the South Korean 
share reached almost a billion and a half dollars, surpassing all the other countries put 
together2. Moreover, after the Second Nuclear Crisis, the role played by the government of 
Roh Moo-hyun in the Six Party Talks was of great value. In fact, despite the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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preponderance of USA, North Korea and China – as the main mediator – the role of the 
government in Seoul as a facilitator of dialogue was certainly valuable. For these reasons, 
a comprehensive analysis of the political and diplomatic cooperation between the two 
Koreas must take into consideration the aspect of the nuclear issue. 
 
A second set in which we can divide inter-Korean cooperation is that of economic 
cooperation. The appearance of trade and economic interactions becomes relevant on the 
Korean peninsula especially from the ‘90s. Although, in fact, the Joint Statement of 1972 
and the Basic Agreement of 1991 foresaw explicit references to the promotion of 
economic exchange, the collapse of Soviet Union and the deep economic and food crisis, 
that invested North Korea in the mid ‘90s, gave the final impetus to the development of 
fundamental economic cooperation. The decade of progressive presidency in South Korea, 
in fact, put at the centre of inter-Korean relations the development of economic 
interactions on the peninsula. The inter-Korean policy of President Roh Moo-hyun will 
have a direct reference to this sphere in its name, in which, alongside peace, prosperity – 
on both sides of the 38th parallel – is placed as a priority goal of relations between North 
and South. A key role in this context is certainly played by the radical changes in the 
socio-economic sphere that involved the two countries from the late ‘60s onwards. If, in 
fact, from the end of the Korean War until the mid-70s, North Korea could count on a 
higher level of GNP per capita than in the South – from 1960 to 1973, for example, the 
national domestic product per capita of North Korea has always been higher than that of 
the South, reaching a maximum where the ratio was almost double, in 1964 in the North it 
was $ 194 while in the South of 1073 – with the rise to power in Seoul of Park Chung-hee 
and the great emphasis placed on the need to develop the country's economy, soon the 
situation was reversed. In the second half of the ‘70s South Korea surpassed the North in 
many economic indicators and the same trend was consolidating with increasing strength 
in the following decade. In this sense, South Korea could count on the deep integration in 
the economic system that was headed by the United States and, above all, on the 
privileged access of its goods to the US market. In contrast, North Korea suffered for the 
increasing economic decline of the Soviet Union – its main partner and main provider of 
assistance. This trend was then taken to extreme consequences with the collapse of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Soviet Union and the profound economic and food crisis that hit North Korea in the ‘90s. 
Starting from this context of economic and commercial superiority of Seoul on 
Pyongyang, the “Sunshine Policy” and the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” focused on 
economic cooperation as a key for the development of both countries, but also as a 
possible channel for relations with the North4. Until that moment, in fact, economy was 
left in the background compared to the contacts of political and military character; also, 
very often a worsening of the situation from that point of view substantially affected also 
possible cooperative interactions in the economic field. 
Within this division we will first analyse the economic aspects, albeit marginal, in the 
Joint Statement of 1972 and the Basic Agreement of 1991; we will also take into 
consideration the contacts in this area in the first period of inter-Korean cooperation, by 
the early ‘70s until the launch of the “Sunshine Policy”. Next, we will focus on the 
economic and commercial aspects inside the inter-Korean policies of President Kim Dae-
jung and, even more, on that of Roh Moo-hyun, the moment when economy became the 
main component of inter-Korean relations. In this regard, the analysis of the joint 
industrial park of Kaesong will play a fundamental role, since it can be considered as the 
main and most important example of inter-Korean economic cooperation, with strong and 
deep repercussion also on the political field and on the overall climate of the relations 
between North and South. The economic aspects of inter-Korean cooperation will later be 
the main focus of the fourth chapter. 
 
A final set in which we can divide inter-Korean cooperation includes all the cooperative 
interactions that can be defined as “second level cooperation”. This group refers to all 
those relationships that do not encompass political, military or economic aspects. In 
particular, within it we can consider all the projects dealing with humanitarian 
cooperation, but also the scientific and cultural exchanges, as well as those of related to 
sport. In this case, the humanitarian issue certainly has a very important role. Since the 
early ‘70s, in fact, the two countries have worked together in the pursuit of objectives of 
humanitarian nature, in particular, the reunification of families separated by the division of 
the peninsula and the Korean War. This issue is a matter of great impact for the population 
of the peninsula and represented the more continuous form of cooperation between the 
two countries. Also from this perspective, the period from 1997 to 2007 can be considered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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as the one with the most positive results, thanks to the climate of cooperation and mutual 
trust established with the presidencies of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. However, the 
contacts in this area have been preserved even in times of tension and conflict, often 
ensuring the maintenance of an open channel of dialogue between the two countries, 
although in a context of secondary relevance. The economic and food crises of the ‘90s, 
that strongly affected North Korea, added a further dimension to the humanitarian level. 
South Korea has, in fact, started to cooperate with the North by sending huge and 
important supplies of aid and assistance, especially in the food and agricultural sectors. 
This aspect plays a role that goes beyond that of mere humanitarian assistance. As seen in 
the first chapter, in the analysis of the approaches of engagement, in fact, the existence of 
a strong asymmetry of power and resources between the two sides can create the 
conditions for the emergence od a dependency (or a strongly unbalanced 
interdependence), which can then be used as a leverage in a process of cooperation or 
negotiation. The situation between the two Koreas at that time falls exactly within this 
framework. 
Even cultural, scientific and sport exchanges and cooperation plays an important role in 
inter-Korean relations. Although it may be regarded as of secondary importance, however, 
in many cases they played a very important role. First, these are topics that involve issues 
of non-prime importance in the hierarchy of interests of the states, and thus helped 
maintain open lines of dialogue in times when political and diplomatic relations were 
stalled. Moreover, this kind of cooperation can help to change the mutual perception in the 
eyes of the population. The existence of a network of regular contacts between the cultural 
and scientific communities of the two countries, as well as the organization of shared 
events – as in the case of the joint march at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games 
in Sydney in 2000, Athens in 2004 and Turin in 2006 – can act to bridge the gap created 
by decades of division. 
 
In this chapter, we will focus the attention on the political dimension of inter-Korean 
cooperation. We will start from analysing the beginning of cooperation between the two 
Koreas, with the process that led to the signing of the Joint Declaration of July 4, 1972. 
Then, we will move on to focus on the second period of cooperation on the peninsula 
when, after the end of the Cold War, new possibilities for dialogue and negotiation 
between the two countries opened up. The Nordpolitik of South Korean President Roh 
Tae-woo, in fact, led to different results of great practical importance; in terms of political 
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and diplomatic cooperation, the highest point can be considered the signing of the Basic 
Agreement in 1991. Finally, we will focus on the period of progressive governments, 
regarded as the apex of cooperation between the two Koreas. In this context, the event 
upon which we will put more emphasis will be the inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, a 
real watershed in the relations on the peninsula. Besides it, however, we will also take into 
consideration more examples of political cooperation that developed in the period of the 
“Sunshine Policy” and the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”, along with the role that 
Seoul will within the framework of six-party talks. 
 
Within the development of inter-Korean cooperation we then identified three fundamental 
historical ruptures, which made possible an acceleration of cooperation, or even the actual 
birth of new interactions of this kind. Moreover, the division into three set of inter-Korean 
cooperative initiatives – and dialogue – makes possible their systematization and an easier 
analysis, with regard to the initial conditions, the development and the results obtained. 
In this chapter we will then analyse these interactions, following the subdivision 
previously presented. These events will be addressed using the theoretical framework 
created in the first chapter. Therefore, of each of these groups we will investigate the 
underlying causes – both from the domestic, inter-Korean and international points of view 
– we will retrace the development, through the analysis of the presence of a possible 
approach of engagement, and, above all, we will be analyse the results in terms of creating 
mutual trust, supporting a process of long-term and stable cooperation, aimed at creating a 
process of national reconciliation, reducing tensions and conflict on the peninsula. 
 
As we previously seen, political cooperation represents one of the main and most 
important field of interaction between North and South Korea. In our analysis, we will 
consider the term “political” in a very broad sense, including also diplomatic and military 
cooperation, as well as the political role played by South Korean governments in 
addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. In a situation like the division of the Korean 
peninsula, certainly every aspect of the interaction has strong political consequences and 
implications. If we consider economic cooperation, for example, it strongly depends on 
the decision taken by the two governments in regulating the interchanges between the two 
countries. Even in the cases in which there are private actors that intervene and put 
forward the interaction – such as in the case of the Kaesong Industrial Complex or the 
Tourism Project on the Mount Kumgang – the role of the political sphere is decisive. 
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Similarly, a successful cooperative interaction in non-political fields – economic, cultural, 
scientific, humanitarian, and so on – has positive consequences on the overall record of 
inter-Korean relations and, very often, contributes to the improvement of political 
relations between the two parties. 
In this chapter, we will focus the attention only on the political cooperation, as we 
previously defined it. The political impact of inter-Korean cooperation in every aspect will 
be drawn at the end of the chapter. 
The first example of inter-Korean political cooperation that we will take into account can 
be considered as the first example ever of inter-Korean cooperation and dialogue: the 1972 
Joint Statement. 
 
 
3.2 An Analysis of the 1972 Joint Statement 
 
As we previously saw in the historical reconstruction of the second chapter, there are 
many reasons why the inter-Korean Joint Declaration of 1972 is a key point in the 
development of relations on the peninsula. Despite the contacts between the two regime 
had not stopped completely after the end of hostilities in 1953, this is the first case in 
which the two Korean states decide to open a dialogue and set a path of engagement with 
the possibility to get to the birth of a cooperation project. As we will see later, one of the 
major achievements of the declaration – and of previous negotiation process – has been to 
move from a state of almost total conflict to that of a competitive coexistence. 
This term can be defined as a stalemate in which the two actors accept the existence of the 
other party, albeit in a state of competition, that is not only of military and legitimacy 
nature, but also involves the economic and social aspects of the political systems of the 
two countries. 
The so-called Miracle on the Han River – the extraordinary economic development of 
South Korea under the authoritarian regime of Park Chung-hee – in fact, began also the 
economic competition between the two systems, which will lead to the success of the 
South, thanks to the incredible achievements in economic and industrial growth. 
In addition to this basic paradigm shift in inter-Korean relations, the Declaration showed 
how, just two decades after the end of the war and despite the open conflict still present, a 
form of dialogue and cooperation was possible. Within this process, a crucial role has 
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been played by the international environment, which provided the necessary inputs to the 
materialization of the declaration. 
At this point, we can submit this first experiment of political cooperation between the two 
Koreas to the analysis of the theoretical framework previously created. First of all, we can 
ask whether the instruments used in the negotiation process that led to the signing of the 
declaration can be considered as approaches of engagement. An affirmative answer seems 
obvious. Since the negotiation process was aimed at the signing of a joint declaration 
which would lay some key shared features to manage inter-Korean relations in the future, 
it could not be based on a negative pressure – consisting of threats, use of coercive 
economic or military instruments or subversive interventions. The incentives that are 
envisaged by both parties, however, are strongly influenced the behaviour of the other part 
and concern primarily the security aspects. Humanitarian and economic issues are left in 
the background and treated residual. This first attempt of dialogue foregrounds the needs 
related to security guarantees, but it also adds elements related to the paradigm of 
constructive engagement. In fact, even if in a secondary way humanitarian needs and 
exchanges in various fields, to encourage the creation of a climate of minimum mutual 
trust and interdependence, are mentioned. Similarly, the citation of the Red Cross provides 
an official role to a third party organizations, other than the two governments; the 
declaration does not exclude a possible future expansion of this role, also to other actors, 
in advancing the unspecified interchanges foreseen in the third section of the document. 
This example of cooperation reaches the valuable outcome of emphasizing a new method 
in the management of inter-Korean relations, based on mutual exchange in areas other 
than political, on the growth of interdependence and cooperation and, in the end, of 
possible integration5. 
 
For what concerns the cooperative strategies used in the process we can divide them into 
three different groups: structural conditions, variable conditions and constructed 
conditions. 
As we pointed out in the first chapter, the structural conditions deal with the system in 
which the cooperative process takes place. Regarding the number of actors involved in the 
interactions, obviously in the first level we have to put North and South Korea. Inter-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Koh, Byung-chul 1992, ‘The inter-Korean agreements of 1972 and 1992: a comparative assessment’, 
Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 463-482. !
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Korean relations, by definition, are held and managed between these two countries. This 
characteristic can be considered as a facilitator of the cooperation; in fact, if the number of 
actors is low – and two is the lowest possible number for an interaction to take place – the 
mechanisms of control and the eventual sanctioning for defection is much easier. In 
addition, the structure of the payoffs and the balance of gains can be as favourable as 
possible for the two actors; also the problem of the collection of reliable information and 
the communication between the parties is highly simplified, since there are only two 
actors involved. 
Despite this bilateral character of inter-Korean relations, there are also other actors that 
play a role on this issue. In particular, if we refer to the Cold War period, the foreign and 
inter-Korean policies of North and South Korea were highly influenced by the respective 
superpowers. In the first years of the ‘70s, the split between China and USSR and the 
rapprochement between Beijing and Washington started the period of the so-called 
tripolarity on the Asian region; a period in which there were three different powers that 
pursued different strategies on the area and inevitably affected every open issue in the 
region. Inter-Korean relations were no exception6. For this reason, even if the primary 
actors were two, there was also another group of secondary actors – USA, China, and 
Soviet Union – that had a role in the process of negotiation of the Joint Declaration. 
This further characteristic leads us to the second structural condition of the cooperative 
strategies: the balance of power. In the case of the 1972 Joint Declaration, the balance of 
power in the region and the changes in the international system can be considered as the 
main cause for the emergence of cooperation. In fact, the efforts put in place by the south 
and positively received by Pyongyang can be considered as a reaction to bigger changes in 
the relations between USA, China and Soviet Union.  
At that moment the balance of power between the two primary actors was in a state of fair 
equilibrium, since there was no asymmetry in military or economic terms. North Korea 
was still growing, enjoying good relations with both China and USSR, and South Korea 
was in the middle of its industrial explosion; all the main economic indicators told of a 
competition between equals, for example the GNP per capita in 1972 was exactly the same 
in North and South ($ 316)7. What was changing was the regional – and global – 
equilibrium. Although within a bipolar balance of power (in the world) or tripolar (in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Yahuda, Michael 2011, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Routledge, New York, p. 62. 
7  Source: National Unification Board, A comparative study of the overall North and South Korean 
economies since the 45 years of division; cited in: Young, Namkoong 1995, ‘A Comparative Study on North 
and South Korean economic capabilities’.!
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region) there was not a real hegemon, the changes in the relations between these powers 
were the main cause of the rapprochement between North and South of 1972, and, 
therefore, the start of inter-Korean dialogue. 
The most prominent change was the advent of the détente between the United States and 
Soviet Union, which paved the way for a curtailment of American military obligations in 
East Asia, in accordance with the so-called ‘Nixon Doctrine’. For South Korea, the 
application of this doctrine meant the withdrawal in 1971 of one third of the American 
troops stationed on the peninsula since the end of the Korean War8. This erosion of 
confidence toward the United States was accelerated when, in July 1971, Nixon 
announced his plan to visit China. Seoul’s government, not informed in advance, was 
shocked, since China fought against South Koreans and Americans during the war. Seoul 
was further perplexed by pressure from Washington to open a dialogue with Pyongyang 
and to seek joint admission to the United Nations; this request undermined the conviction 
that South Korean government was the only legitimate one on the peninsula, so this shift 
in American policy was very alarming. Most likely this decision was connected to the idea 
that to solve the issue on the Korean peninsula the first step should have been to ease the 
military confrontation and recognise North Korea – as well as making diplomatic 
overtures toward USSR, China and East European countries – in line with the step taken 
in Germany9. 
Given this changing political environment and the new US attitude toward East Asia, 
Seoul needed to revise its foreign policy, and, in particular, its North Korea policy. The 
same changes affected Pyongyang, that, in addition, saw the possibility of achieving one 
of its major goals in foreign policy: the withdrawal of American troops from the 
peninsula. During its visit in China, president Nixon and the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai 
made references in their statement to the situation on the Korean peninsula and called for 
an arrangement through direct inter-Korean dialogue10. The following path toward the 
signing of the Joint Declaration can be considered as a consequence of this pressure from 
the international environment on the two Korea’s regimes. Therefore, going back to the 
framework of analysis of cooperation, we can state that the regional balance of power was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Gordon, Bernard K. 1973, ‘U.S. Policy toward Korea’, in Kim, Young C. ed., Major Powers and Korea, 
Research Insitute on Korea Affairs, Silver Spring, p. 49. 
9 Abramowitz, Morton 1971, ‘Moving the Glacier: the Two Koreas and the Powers’, in Adelphi Papers, No. 
80, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
10 Hwang, Byong-moo 1991, ‘The Evolution of ROK-PRC relations: retrospects and prospects’, The 
Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 24-48. 
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one of the main causes of this first attempt toward inter-Korean cooperation. This change 
in the South Korean attitude toward North Korea, and more broadly toward the whole bloc 
of socialist countries, will lay the foundations for the subsequent launch of the so-called 
Nordpolitik by president Roh Tae-woo from 1988. In fact, from 1973 onward South Korea 
started to build contacts and relations, especially regarding cultural and scientific aspects, 
also with Soviet Union11. 
 
Moving to the variable conditions of the strategies of cooperation, we can underline some 
efforts that have been put in place with the Declaration toward an improving of the 
situation for the achievement cooperative interactions. For what concerns the distribution 
of gains, the two states started from a condition of substantial equality, since, as we 
already noted, there were no significant differences in the economic and military resources 
of North and South. In this sense, the Declaration was extremely equitable and fair; in 
fact, it was essentially a statement of shared principles on which setting the future course 
of inter-Korean relations. There were no specific measures to be implemented by the two 
states, except those concerning the creation – in some cases failed – of permanent dialogue 
channels, mainly to avoid military escalation along the border. Despite the interpretation 
given to the three fundamental principles (independence, peace, national unity) could 
diverge, especially with regard to the will of the DPRK to connect independence in inter-
Korean relations to the withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula, they were accepted 
by both parties without major differences. The same North Korean idea of a withdrawal of 
American troops was in fact soon set aside because unrealizable. 
For what concerns the creation of institutions to make cooperation more stable and 
durable, the Declaration contemplated several steps forward, at least on the paper. In fact, 
the article 3, 4 and 5 made explicit reference to the creation of a new set of measures for 
an ongoing dialogue, that in some passages resembled some form of institutions to 
manage the relations on the peninsula. Article 3 called for a positive resolution of the 
process of North-South Red Cross meetings, mainly to address the issue of separated 
families, article 4 foresaw the establishment of a direct phone contact between Seoul and 
Pyongyang, in order to prevent accidental military clashes, and article 5 the creation of a 
North-South Coordinating Commission, co-chaired by the two delegates who signed the 
Declaration – namely Lee Hu-rak for the South and Kim Young-ju for the North – in order !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Kwak, Thai-hwan 1980, ‘Recent Soviet Policy toward the Two Korea: Trends and Prospects’, Korea and 
World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 202-203. 
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to implement the points of the Declaration, resole pending issues and promote 
reunification of the peninsula.  
While the first two examples cannot be considered as a real effort for the creation of 
common institutions, they, however, had a positive impact on the management of inter-
Korean relations; they were actually put into practice and achieved concrete results. In 
particular the process of reunification of divided families continued almost uninterrupted 
until 1985, when the first meeting took place, involving 30 families in the South and 35 in 
the North. 
 
Tab 1: Number of Dialogue by year and subject (1971-1985) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Chronology of Inter-Korean Dialogue – Statistics 
 
The North-South Coordinating Commission started working on October, 12, 1972, with a 
meeting between the two chairmen in Panmunjom, and continued throughout that year. In 
the following years, several more meetings took place from 1973 to 1975 and again three 
times in 1979. But the pace of the meetings slowed down with the passing of years and 
also the relevance of the delegates involved; in fact, they involved usually vice co-
chairmen or secretaries and they didn’t reach any relevant agreement between the two 
Koreas. Despite the lack of practical results, the creation and the work of the Coordinating 
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Commission have been important because they testified the possibilities for inter-Korean 
dialogue, even in a situation of tensions and confrontation12. 
The third dimension of the variable conditions is probably the most important. In fact, as 
we noted in the previous chapter, the issue of future time interactions is crucial for the 
stability of a long-run cooperation, aimed at solving a strategic rivalry. From this 
perspective, the 1972 Declaration marked a decisive rupture with the previous 
management of inter-Korean relations and opened a way in which the two Koreas could 
not avoid to interact again in the future. Hence, the fact that the counterparts started to 
take into consideration a higher possibility for future relations enhanced the cooperative 
behaviour of both sides. The same fact that forms of continuative dialogue where put in 
place – and implemented – attested this new predisposition of the two regimes.  
 
Regarding the last aspects of the conditions for cooperation, the constructed conditions, 
the rapprochement that tools place in 1971-1972 had a strong impact. Previously, the two 
Koreas regarded each other as enemies. The Korean War had crystallized the process of 
division of 1945-1948 and had reinforced the idea that there was only one legitimate state 
represented on the Korean peninsula. The only real strategy of reunification was 
constituted by the war. The beginning of this process of competitive coexistence had 
meant that, although there had been no step towards a real mutual recognition, there had 
been a sort of de facto recognition of the division. The two Koreas started to find different 
ways to interact with each other, in order to avoid escalation of conflicts and provocations. 
The principles enshrined in the preamble of the Declaration contributed to the recovery of 
a shared sense of national unity on the peninsula. The independence from external 
interferences, the renunciation to the use of force and, above all, the promotion of national 
unity, beyond ideological or political differences, meant that both sides started to take into 
consideration the unity of the Korean culture and nationhood as a fundamental feature of 
inter-Korean relations. As we pointed out in the first chapter the peculiarity of the Korean 
case is precisely the fact that, despite the two states interact with each other as the two 
sovereign states they are, however they share a plurality of common meanings – such as a 
common history, a common culture, a common language, and so on and so forth – that can 
be positively used as a tool for improving cooperation and mutual trust. From this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Choi, Jinwook and Lee, Erin 2008, ‘Sixty years of South Korean Unification policies, time for a paradigm 
shift’,  Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 32 n. 3. !
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perspective, we can better understand the emphasis that from this moment onward will be 
put on the various plan for a reunification of the peninsula based on the common national 
identity13. 
 
The strong dependence of the 1972 rapprochement on the changing international 
conditions and on the pressures from the external superpowers had also the effect of 
undermine its practical possibilities from the very beginning. In fact, it was more a tactical 
move of adaptation by the two regimes, rather then a real step forward toward national 
reconciliation. Soon after the release of the Declaration, even if some forms of dialogue 
continued, the relations on the peninsula traced back to a situation of high tensions and 
sporadic conflicts. Nonetheless, the contribution to the creation of a minimum level of 
mutual trust between the parties is undeniable and it will have a strong influence on every 
important political agreement that will be signed in the future, in which a reference to the 
1972 Joint Declaration will never lack. 
 
 
3.3 The Basic Agreement and the Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Peninsula 
 
After a hiatus that lasted for almost all the ‘80s, with some sporadic exceptions, the inter-
Korean dialogue regain strength after the democratization of South Korea and the election 
of Roh Tae-woo as President. The new process of rapprochement and inter-Korean 
cooperation turned out to be much more profound and lasting than the previous one. As 
we saw in the second chapter, the changes in the international system in the late ‘80s and 
early ‘90s will create the window of opportunity for the development of this process. At 
the same time, however, also the extremely proactive attitude of South Korean 
government – along with the flexibility shown by the North Korean leadership – played a 
major role to make these developments possible. Among the main reasons of this new 
attitude, it must certainly be considered also the process of democratization of South 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Koh, Byung-chul 1990, ‘A comparative study of unification plans: the Korean National Community 
versus the Koryo Confederation’, Korea Observer, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 437-455. !
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Korea, which had “liberated” a new boost from the civil society toward the 
implementation of new constructive approaches in the relations with North Korea14. 
Despite the poor results obtained in the implementation of the Joint Declaration of 1972 
and the return of the so-called Cold War II also on the peninsula also had frozen the 
process of rapprochement and cooperation between the two Koreas, the new impetus of 
the late ‘80s did not emerge in a totally disconnected way, as a result of shock, both 
endogenous (the process of democratization in South Korea) or exogenous (the end of the 
Cold War). In fact, since some years, the authorities of the two countries had begun again 
some form of dialogue, albeit mostly at a low-level and on issues of secondary relevance. 
After the interruption of the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee, in 
1975, the only remained occasions of inter-Korean dialogue were represented by the 
working-level meetings of the respective Red Cross, with the aim to discuss the issue of 
separated families. Some rare exceptions were a series of meetings between the 
associations of table tennis of the two countries, in 1979, or a round of preparatory 
meetings for a possible summit between the two Prime in 1980, soon abandoned. 
After this interruption that lasted almost a decade, things started to change in the mid-‘80s. 
One of the aspects that contributed most to this new flowering of inter-Korean dialogue 
was sport. In 1981, in fact, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had entrusted the 
organization of the 1988 Olympic Games to the city of Seoul. This situation had created 
new opportunities for reconciliation between the two countries, under this new aspect. In 
1984, talks were held for the organization of a single Olympic team to participate at the 
Olympics in Los Angeles; the efforts then failed due to the boycott of that edition by the 
countries of the socialist bloc. In 1985, in Lausanne, the two Koreas, with the mediation of 
the IOC, started new talks for the organization of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The idea was 
to include North Korea in the organization of some of the preliminary events and to 
explore the possibilities for a single Korean national team. Even if, as we will see in the 
last part of this chapter, the talks did not succeed in its main aim of sport cooperation, the 
dialogue lasted until 1988 – with 2 more meetings in 1986 and 1 in 1987 – and helped to 
rebuild a positive climate for the restart of inter-Korean dialogue. Along with the 
discussions on sport, also the meetings between the delegates of the Red Cross were 
resumed in 1985; along with them, new preliminary talks in economic issue were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Kim Sun-hyuk, The politics of democratization in Korea: the role of civil society, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, Pittsburgh, 2000. !
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established (in 1984 and 1985) and also preliminary contacts in view of possible inter-
parliamentary meetings (in 1985 and 1988)15. 
This rediscovered positive and constructive climate has been essential for the beginning of 
the South-North High Level Talks that will began in 1989 and will lead then to the 
realization of the most important results in terms of inter-Korean political cooperation of 
the ‘90s. 
 
On February 19, 1992 South and North Korea put into effect the “Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and 
the North” (known as the Basic Agreement), during the 6th round of South-North High 
Level Talks. Two other significant documents also took effect on that day: the Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the Agreement on the 
Formation of Sub-committees of the South-North high level talks. 
The South-North High Level Talks were first suggested by South Korean Prime Minister, 
Kang Young-hoon, on December 28, 1988; in a message to his North Korean counterpart, 
Yon Hyong-muk, Kang proposed to held this kind of high level political discussion on the 
peninsula. On January 16, 1989, Yon agreed. After this prior consent, the two sides started 
a series of eight preliminary meetings aimed at adopting a shared agenda; the final 
decision was summed up in the elimination of the state of political and military 
confrontation and the promotion of multifaceted exchanges and cooperation between 
North and South. The first round of meetings between the two Prime Ministers was held in 
Seoul on September 4, 1990, and thereafter five more rounds took place, until the final 
implementation of the agreement of February 1992. The production of the text of the 
Basic Agreement and the Declaration on the Denuclearization was not plain and easy; in 
fact, more than 30 meetings were held to discuss the various issues – 25 contacts between 
the delegates, besides the 6 high level talks16. 
In a sense the adoption of the Basic Agreement meant that the two sides neared and accord 
on a considerable part of the method of approach to inter-Korean relations. Both of them 
shared the conception that unification would be regarded as a process and, therefore, and 
interim stage was needed before reaching the final goal. The purpose of this stage was to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Yu, In-taek 1988, ‘South Korea’s unification policy after the Seoul Olympics’, Korea Observer, Vol. 19, 
No. 4, pp. 351-378. 
16 Park, Sang-seek 1993, ‘Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korean relations’, in Cotton, James, ed. Korea 
under Roh Tae-woo: democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean relations, Allen and Unwin Pty 
Ltd., St. Leonards, pp. 233-238. 
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eliminate some conditions that were detrimental for the process of reunification. The 
agreement thus constituted the legal enactment to lay the groundwork for the actual 
institution of a mechanism of peaceful coexistence, in a process toward unification. Unlike 
the situation prior to the 1972 Joint Statement, that lay the ground for the development of 
the competitive coexistence, this time the purpose was to reach a higher degree of 
improvement in the relations between North and South, achieving a state of peaceful 
coexistence that was recognized as a fundamental pre-requisite on the path toward 
reconciliation. Accordingly, the Basic Agreement is not a pledge of unification itself, but 
rather a time-limit agreement applicable to the first stage of reconciliation and 
cooperation, that should be surpassed by the process of unification itself. 
The Basic Agreement consists of three chapters: South-North reconciliation, non-
aggression and elimination of military confrontation, exchanges and cooperation. It aimed 
at regulating the legal nature of inter-Korean relations and it recognize that these relations 
were not ordinary relations between states, but a special interim relationship stemming 
from the process towards unification. The two sides encountered many difficulties in the 
long process of adoption of the agreement. The South, for example, while strongly urging 
the North to abandon its revolutionary policy against the South, emphasized the need for a 
clause that “the two sides shall not attempt any actions of sabotage and subversion against 
each other”. The North, however, initially opposed the point because they claimed to not 
have any intent, ability or policy to foment a revolution or sabotage in the South. Another 
article that caused frictions until the last moments was Article 5, a very important point in 
which the two sides committed themselves in transforming the state of armistice in a solid 
state of peace and in abiding the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 until that moment. 
North Korea opposed it because its logic was to find a final peace treaty with the USA; the 
final acceptance of the article can be considered as a shift in its approach and as a sign of 
flexibility from Pyongyang. Similarly, it also marked the fading of the traditional ‘One 
Korea Policy’ of the North, that considered the South as a colony of the United States. 
North Korea rejected also the idea of creating permanent liaison offices in Seoul and 
Pyongyang, the compromise was to establish them in Panmunjom (Article 7)17. 
In the second section, South Korea asked for a separate article on measures to promote 
military confidence building, but the North rejected the idea. The final solution was found !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Lim, Dong-won 1993, ‘Inter-Korean relations oriented toward Reconciliation and Cooperation’, in 
Cotton, James, ed. Korea under Roh Tae-woo: democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean 
relations, Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd., St. Leonards, pp. 269-273. 
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with a plan to create a Joint Military Commission to handle the question. However, Seoul 
succeeded in introducing a list of five tools for the implementation of military confidence 
building and arms reduction in Article 12 – mutual notification and control of major 
movements of military units and major military exercises, peaceful utilization of the De-
Militarized Zone (DMZ), exchange of military personnel and information, phased 
reduction in armaments, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and 
offensive capabilities, verification18. 
In the third section of exchanges and cooperation, the issue of separated families was 
addressed again. The main differences were related to Article 16, in which the two sides 
agreed to promote cooperation and exchanges in several different areas, including 
journalism and media, newspapers, radio, television; North Korea was negative toward the 
use of the formula ‘mutual openings’ that was replaced by the more neutral ‘…shall carry 
out exchanges and cooperation…’. The South pushed forward also for the creation of a 
Joint Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission and other sectorial joint 
commissions addressing specific issues. Moreover, the simultaneous adoption of the 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the peninsula became a tool for keeping the North 
from developing nuclear weapons to threaten peace or refusing to undergo nuclear 
inspections. As we will see later, this plan of the South Korean government did not 
succeed19. 
The process of negotiation between the two sides clearly showed that both parties were 
prepared to modify their positions to better adapt to the need of the counterpart – one of 
the fundamental feature of cooperation: policy coordination – and reach a positive 
outcome. In particular, the flexibility demonstrated by North Korea was unusual and 
marked a clear rupture with its previous behaviour toward South Korea. The 25 articles 
are extremely comprehensive but in some crucial points they tend to be general. For 
example, among the 6 articles related to non-aggression, none could be taken specifically 
by the North to require South Korea to abandon the alliance with US; similarly the social 
and economic measures of opening and cooperation are incorporated in a single 
declaration of grand principles. The concrete measures to be realised are many but defined 
in a very general language and in the most difficult area, military confidence building, the 
actual steps have been left to the Joint Military Commission. Both side commit themselves !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ibidem, p. 274. 
19 Cotton, James 1992, ‘The two Koreas and rapprochement: foundation for progress?’, in Cotton, James, ed. 
Korea under Roh Tae-woo: democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean relations, Allen and Unwin 
Pty Ltd., St. Leonards, pp. 291-292.!
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to exchanges in various fields, like freedom for their residents to visit the other side or the 
resumption of every kind of communications, transportation connections and economic 
intercourse, but again no specific steps were taken toward an actual implementation of the 
plan.  
 
Using the same framework of analysis we applied to the 1972 Joint Declaration, we can 
evaluate the contribution of the Basic Agreement to the improvement of inter-Korean 
relations. First of all, we can fully include it into the paradigm of engagement, because the 
only tools used to achieve the cooperation are incentives. The only negative pressure, in 
this case, came from outside, from the international situation; as we will see later, the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc constituted a major source of pressure on the 
behaviour of North Korea. In addition, different leverages in different areas are used to 
create interdependence: ranging from military and political, to trade and humanitarian 
issues; it is also clear the will to implement a long-term strategy, exemplified also by the 
insistence on the creation of permanent organisms for high-level dialogue. The kind of 
engagement put in place here is strictly conditional; in fact, in every article there is always 
a perfect match between the behaviour of one side and the response of other, there’s no 
room for unconditional incentives that could create a favourable context for a further 
development of dialogue. 
 
Regarding the different strategies toward cooperation, we can start from the structural 
conditions. The Basic Agreement has a lot of characteristics in common with the 1972 
Joint Statement, for what concerns the balance of power and the international 
environment. In fact, just like twenty years before, also in this case the primary actors of 
the interaction are two, but the secondary actors played a crucial and decisive role for the 
signing of the Agreement. The international environment witnessed an epochal systemic 
change in 1989-1990. The bipolar order that came out from the Second World War and, at 
different levels, affected the whole global scenario suddenly disappeared, allowing room 
for the solution of several regional and local conflicts and standoffs. The Korean peninsula 
was no exception and, even if the end of the Cold War did not bring about the final 
solution of the issue, it created new possibilities for the relations between North and South 
Korea. The international environment, thus, was moving in a favourable direction for an 
outcome like the Basic Agreement. With the collapse of the Socialist bloc and the 
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disintegration of the Soviet Union, also the East-West polarization collapsed and new 
spaces for reconciliation and cooperation appeared. 
North Korea’s military alliance system, based on Soviet Union, was weakened and its 
diplomatic dilemma deepened, obliging Pyongyang to accept simultaneous entry with the 
South into the United Nations (on September, 17, 1991), an entry which the North had 
firmly resisted earlier, but had to accept when China decided not to block Seoul’s 
application to the UN. Pyongyang’s regime lost its external patronage; while revolutionary 
ties still figured in the relations between Kim Il-sung and Deng Xiaoping, China’s interest 
in North Korea was waning. Beijing cannot provide the aid necessary to keep the model in 
operation and it was developing a fruitful economic relationship with South Korea – 
diplomatic relations were formally established on August, 24, 1992.  
If China’s new attitude toward the peninsula forced readjustments in North Korea’s 
foreign policy, the collapse of USSR had an impact upon the very foundations of North 
Korea’s world strategy that can be defined as “cataclysmic”20 . Already Moscow’s 
recognition of South Korea (September, 30, 1990) and Gorbachev’s visit (April 1991) 
portended the end of the economic, political and military alliance that had existed since 
1948. Until 1990 almost 60% of North Korean’s trade was conducted with Soviet Union, 
that also continued to provide significant aid, to whom Pyongyang owned a sizeable debt 
and that was the primary source of all high technology armaments and of the strategic 
nuclear umbrella. It’s not a coincidence that, although it was still in place decades before, 
the North Korean nuclear programme started to become a national priority in the 
beginning of the ‘90s. The ending of the USSR’s history and the repudiation of socialism 
forced Pyongyang toward a new approach to political and economic fundamentals21. As a 
result of the fact that Soviet supplies of oil have dried up, the country started to face a 
sever energy shortage; at the same time, perennial shortages of food and consumer 
commodities have grown worse and without an infusion of capital and technological 
assistance the economic crisis was almost unavoidable. North Korea’s need for capital and 
trade diversification was at the base of the attempt, initiated in 1990, to advance contacts 
with Japan and also, through diplomats in Beijing, to hold exploratory contacts with 
United States, further pursued later on in New York. The creation of a new and more 
favourable international environment toward Pyongyang was one of the goals of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Bazhanov, Eugene and Bazhanov, Natasha 1991, ‘Soviet Views on North Korea: the Domestic scene and 
Foreign policy’, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, pp. 1123-1138. 
21 Lee, Dong-bok 1991, ‘The Soviet events and inter-Korean relations’, Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 15, 
pp. 626-639. 
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Nordpolitik, and was strongly backed by South Korean government. This new situation of 
extreme isolation, strategic danger and economic difficulties pushed North Korea toward a 
conciliatory stance regarding the management of inter-Korean relations, and greatly 
contributed to its more flexible behaviour in the negotiations for the Basic Agreement. 
The containment policy of the United States towards Soviet Union was coming to an end 
too; and accordingly, also the strategic relevance of the US forces in Korea was changing. 
These changes in the international situation served to facilitate new changes in the Cold 
War system of the Korean peninsula. 
The changes in the international balance of power, thus, was one of the main drivers of 
change also for inter-Korean relations between the end of the ‘80s and the beginning of 
the ‘90s. But this it was not the only reason. In fact, unlike what happened in 1972 with 
the process of the Joint Declaration, this time the two primary actors played a different 
role with a more proactive stance and a broader perspective on the future of inter-Korean 
relations. The Nordpolitik launched by President Roh Tae-woo with his July 7 Declaration 
was a very proactive approach toward the changing regional and global scenario. It 
encompassed an amelioration of relations with USSR-Russia, China and Eastern Europe 
countries, to better fit the new growing role of South Korea, in economic and diplomatic 
terms, and from this point of view it can be considered as a real success. In addition, South 
Korean government took the initiative toward the North right from the beginning, with a 
series of unilateral declarations (the Special Declaration of July 7, 1988 and the Korean 
National Community Plan in 1989), a huge increase in contacts at political and 
humanitarian level between the parties and the organization of the South-North High 
Level Talks, that paved the way for the signing of the Basic Agreement. Obviously, in 
addition to the international changes, the process of liberalization and democratization in 
the South contributed greatly to cultivating new unification possibilities and new inter-
Korean capabilities22.  
But also North Korea played a more active role in this improvement of its relations with 
the South. For the first time, in fact, the Pyongyang’s response to the proposal coming 
from Seoul was affirmative. That means the North showed for the first time a degree of 
flexibility in the negotiations, unseen in the past. Probably, it had not many options other 
that to accept Seoul’s proposal in its new ‘strategy for survival’. The isolation was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Cho, Yang-hoon, ‘Unification in the 1990’s: historiographical prospects’, Korea Observer, Vol. 27, No. 1, 
1996, pp. 85-114. !
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looming and a rupture in the High Level Talks, with no agreement, would have meant a 
suspension of the inter-Korean dialogue and a deadlock in inter-Korean relations. If this 
kind of scenario would actually happened, North Korea would have to face a deeper 
isolation in the international community and, probably, greater pressure from outside for 
its nuclear programme. 
 
As for the variable conditions of cooperation, also in this case the similarities with the 
1972 Joint Declaration are several. In fact, the distribution of gains was again very 
equitable and fair. As we previously noted, each part negotiated with a flexible attitude 
and with a clear will of reaching an agreement. North Korea, for example, was successful 
in introducing, in the first part of the document, articles that would ensure that a 
unification by absorption was not an option (Articles 1, 2, 4,); the case of German 
unification was still very clear in the eye of North Korean leadership and, even if there 
were several signals indicating that a process of that kind was not a viable option on the 
peninsula, Pyongyang’s regime was determined to be reassured on that side. South Korea, 
for its part, obtained a relevant opening toward the possibility of direct negotiations 
between the two Koreas for a peace treaty (Article 5), several and detailed new 
possibilities for the establishment of military confidence building measures (Article 12, 
13, 14), and, above all, an extraordinary opening by the North Korean regime in 
exchanges and cooperation, involving a number of different fields (form economics, to 
culture, telecommunications, transportation), in the third part of the document (from 
Article 15 to Article 21). 
If the distribution of gains can be considered as very equitable and, hence, very supportive 
for the success of cooperation, the same can be argued with regard to the creation of 
mechanisms of institutionalization of cooperation. In 1972, the creation of the North-
South Coordinating Commission was one of the direct outcomes of the cooperation and 
the sole example of institutionalization of cooperation – in addition to the 
“encouragement” of the contacts between the Red Cross; it helped in keeping a form of 
direct dialogue between the two parties, but it didn’t reach any agreement and it lost 
importance with the passing of time, until its disappearance in 1975. In this case things 
took a different way. As we noted at the beginning of the paragraph, the process of inter-
Korean dialogue had a new impetus after the election of Roh Tae-woo; in 1990 a sort of 
institutionalization was already present on the ground – with the launch of the High Level 
Talks between Prime Ministers – so the signing of the Basic Agreement and the 
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Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula can be considered as a product of a 
pre-existent process of institutionalized cooperation. At the same time, form these 
agreements came out a new wave of institutionalized cooperation projects. Article 7 of the 
Basic Agreement planned to open a South-North Liaison Office in Panmunjom to ensure 
continued and closed contacts between the two parts; Article 8 foresaw the establishment 
of a South-North Political Committee to ensure the implementation and the observance of 
the agreement; Articles 14 and 23 dealt with the creation of South-North Sub-Committees 
to manage, respectively, military issues and exchanges and cooperation measures; Article 
22 planned to create South-North Joint Commissions for each sector of cooperation 
identified by the agreement, starting with a Joint Commission on Economic Exchanges 
and Cooperation. Also, the Declaration on Denuclearization foresaw the establishment of 
a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, as an implementing mechanism of the 
Declaration, in particular to manage the organization of the inspections that both side 
agreed to undertake. Finally, the third agreement that was signed in December 1991 and 
came into force on February 19, 1992, was precisely designed for institutionalizing the 
already existent talks. In fact, the Agreement on the Formation of Sub-Committees of the 
South-North High Level Talks, had the specific role to further deepen these kind of 
contacts and expand it, through the formation of Sub-Committees to a large number of 
pending issue that involved inter-Korean relations. 
All of these institutionalization efforts can be considered as a sort of continuation and 
substantial expansion of the framework of the High Level Talks. The difference with the 
1972 Declaration is remarkable, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms. In 1992, all 
these dialogue frameworks accounted for 75 inter-Korean meetings, at various level, plus 
5 meetings between the Red Cross of the states for the management of the separated 
families issues. 
As for the third variable condition for successful cooperation, the time-variable, the 
process of the Basic Agreement was designed precisely to make it more relevant in the 
process of inter-Korean interaction. As we noted in the first chapter, there are several 
tactics that can be followed to enlarge the so-called shadow of the future; one of these is 
certainly to divide the main issue in several smaller issues, thereby making necessary a 
higher number of interactions and so making the weight of future time cooperation more 
important. 
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Tab 2: Number of Dialogue by year and subject (1988-1994) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Chronology of Inter-Korean Dialogue – Statistics 
 
To enlarge the relevance of time, the basic way to follow is to make future cooperation 
more likely; from this perspective, the process of the Basic Agreement can be perfectly 
inserted in this path. The creation of a high number of Committees and Sub-Committees, 
each one with a different task, had divided the framework of the High Level Talks in 
numerous interactions of lower level, thus multiplying the importance of future 
interactions. At the same time, multiplying the number of opportunities for dialogue, 
meetings and personal contacts, could have contributed to the creation of a minimum level 
of trust between the parties, through the process of incremental learning. 
 
The process that had its climax with the signing of the agreements of December 1992, had 
an important impact also on the constructed conditions toward cooperation. First of all, 
the Basic Agreement, in its first articles, revived and deepened the principles of the 1972 
Joint Declaration, in terms of peace, avoiding military conflicts and confrontation, mutual 
respect of each political system or ideology. What is more, it tried to overcome the 
situation of competitive coexistence toward a condition of peaceful coexistence, seen as a 
necessary prerequisite for a process of national reconciliation. The systemic changes of the 
events of 1989, modified the fundamental conditions of the division of the peninsula and, 
even if a fast reunification by absorption was not a viable option, the first years of the ‘90s 
were characterized by an effort toward the reduction of military tension and the 
establishment of a peaceful and cooperative coexistence between the two states. The goal 
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was to start a long-lasting process of national reconciliation. With this perspective, it 
became very important to focus the attention to the shared meanings between the two 
Korean states and their common belonging to the Korean national community. In this 
sense, the Special Declaration, issued on July 7, 1988 by South Korean President Roh, 
and, even more, the plan for the “Korean National Community”, presented by Seoul 
government in 1989, had the clear goal to emphasize the common features of North and 
South, recall the phased plan of reunification, presented a few years earlier by Kim il-
sung, and act to rebuild a common Korean identity, trying to recover the shared 
characteristics that decades of division had eliminated, or replaced with a new South 
Korean or North Korean national identity. This process of (re)-construction of the 
conditions for a long-term cooperation, were much deeper than what had happened in 
1972 with the Joint Declaration. Indeed, in this case, the conditions of the international 
system had changed permanently, and this created larger room for operating – especially 
for South Korean government – and a broader strategic perspective; especially compared 
with the beginning of the ‘70s, when the process of rapprochement seemed to be more a 
tactical adjustment to the changed conditions on the ground23. 
 
As had happened in the '70s, the new process of rapprochement of the early ‘90s was 
forced to suffer a setback. In this case, however, the reasons were different. In the 
previous period, in fact, a return to an era of tension between the two opposing blocs had 
also reported tension on the peninsula, showing that the process of rapprochement was 
more a response to changing conditions than the result of an actual reconciliation project. 
In this case, instead, the changes in the international system appeared to be definitive. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rapid disintegration of the bloc that was built around 
it, left no room for a possible reconstruction. The failure of the coup in Moscow, in 1991, 
put an end to the attempts to return to the Soviet system. Similarly, the very rapid 
transitions, which involved most of the countries of the socialist bloc, represented the 
same epitaph at the international level. 
Despite the changes that had favoured the development of inter-Korean cooperative 
process between the ‘80s and ‘90s were considered stable and had given birth to a new 
global balance of power, why this process was interrupted again, just like in 1972? The 
main causes were the changes in the government in South Korea and the new attitude of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23!Koh, Byung-chul 1990, ‘A comparative study of unification plans’.!
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North Korea. Regarding the first, the South Korean presidential election of 1992 had 
ensured the victory for Kim Young-sam, member of the political coalition in charge; 
President Kim, however, as we saw in the second chapter, did not have the same vision in 
terms of inter-Korean relations than his predecessor Roh Tae-woo, and characterized his 
presidency as a period of wavering and inconstant relations with North Korea. This 
attitude affected largely the process of inter-Korean cooperation. Although it did not erase 
the positive results achieved, the freezing in the implementation of the Agreements put the 
relations between the two states in a sort of stalemate for the following five years, with a 
sharp decline in the frequency of inter-Korean meetings and especially in the importance 
of the issues involved. 
In addition, North Korean attitude in the talks changed toward a lower level of flexibility, 
and the strong increase of its nuclear programme, that will led to the development of the 
first nuclear crisis, affected even more the all inter-Korean process. In fact, even if the 
North Korean nuclear issue cannot be considered as an inherent part of inter-Korean 
relations, its main events had – and still have – strong repercussion on the process of 
cooperation between North and South. 
 
 
3.4 The 2000 Summit, the June 15 Joint Declaration and the 
Political Cooperation of the “Sunshine Policy” 
 
The positive developments of the first years of the ‘90s will be the foundations for the new 
period of inter-Korea cooperation that will take place from 1998 onward, after the election 
of President Kim Dae-jung. As we saw in the previous part, the period of the so-called 
“Sunshine Policy” can be considered as the highest point for inter-Korean cooperation. 
The new course that President Kim gave to the relations with the North was clear from the 
very beginning and started to ease the tensions on the peninsula already in 1998-1999. At 
the same time, it gave great impulse to exchanges and cooperation. In particular, for the 
first time economic cooperation was pushed to the forefront and South Korean 
government started to create new legislative measures to make it easier and more 
productive. 
The main success for President Kim, in terms of inter-Korean cooperation, was definitely 
the organization of the summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, in June 2000. The 
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idea of a Summit between the two Koreas, at the highest level, had already been taken into 
account in the past. In 1994, a round of preliminary meetings with this goal were held, but 
they had not reached any positive result in this sense. 
President Kim Dae-jung started working on the possibility of the Summit from the 
beginning of his mandate, delegating the matter to one of his closest collaborators – and 
stronger supporter of the “Sunshine Policy” – Lim Dong-won. With its famous speech on 
March 9, 2000, in Berlin, Kim Dae-jung made clear which was his plan of engagement 
toward North Korea and that he was willing to work for reaching the goal of a Summit 
between the leaders of the two Koreas24. 
 
For the first time in 55 years of Korea’s division, the South-North summit was held in 
Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000, after finalization of a secret agreement by special 
envoys reached on April 8, 2000. The summit, although postponed one day at the request 
of Pyongyang for “technical” reasons, was carried out according to schedule through five 
rounds of deputy minister-level preparatory meetings.  
What made the event especially notable was the unexpected presence of North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il, who came to the airport to greet President Kim Dae-jung, and his 
warm and “charming” behaviour during the whole Summit. Moreover, Kim Jong-il got 
into the same limousine with President Kim and they were driven to the Baekhwawon 
State Guest House. Expressing goodwill and brotherhood, Kim Jong-il strode confidently 
by the welcoming crowds of North Koreans. The same image of a relaxed, self-assured 
leader was seen again at the airport when President Kim left for Seoul.  
The three-day summit consisted of the two formal talks: the first one was a “reception 
meeting” by the North and the second was a face-to-face meeting between the two leaders 
and a meeting with North Korean legislative leader Kim Young-nam, as well as several 
area-specific discussions among the relevant officials.  
 
After a three-hour long talk on the second day (June 14), the two leaders signed the 
landmark five-point Joint Declaration. The Joint Communiqué comprehensively covers 
the contents of the July 4 Joint Declaration of 1972, as well as the 1992 Basic Agreement, 
which was signed by the prime ministers and took effect in 1992. The Joint Declaration !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24  Kim, Dae-jung 2000, ‘Lessons on German reunification and the Korean peninsula’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March, 9. !
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differs from these agreements in that it was agreed to and signed personally by the leaders 
of the two Koreas. The Declaration consists of a Preamble – in which the two leaders 
recognize the historical relevance of the Summit and the legitimate wish of the Korean 
population of a peaceful reunification of the Korean nation – and 5 articles, that, under 
several points of view, recall the two previous inter-Korean documents25. 
 
1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification 
independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of 
the country. 
The word “independently,” which was also mentioned in the July 4 Joint Declaration of 
1972, has been a bone of contention between the two sides, because for North Korea, it 
means “eliminating the foreign influence,” including the withdrawal of the U.S. forces 
stationed in the South. When North Korean legislative leader Kim Young-nam raised the 
issue, citing the principles of “independence” and three-way cooperation between the 
Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan, President Kim replied that three-way 
cooperation is a “win-win” policy that is advantageous to both the South and the North. 
Furthermore, when asked, whether the National Security Law hindered cooperation and 
exchange between the two Koreas, President Kim responded that a discussion for a 
revision was under way based on the draft submitted to the National Assembly. In 
addition, when Kim Jong-il took issue with South Korean National Security Law, 
President Kim, citing North Korea's laws and the Workers' Party platform, advised the 
North Korean leader that the two parties should not interfere in each other's domestic 
affairs.  
In that light, the term “independently” is ambiguous because both sides have a different 
interpretation that serves their own interests. Nonetheless, the two sides seemed to be 
more interested in concentrating their efforts on the promotion of understanding, rather 
than in adhering to those interpretations. In the political climate surrounding the Summit, 
the two Koreas were already independently conducting diplomacy and independent inter-
Korean economic cooperation was badly needed for the recovery of the North Korean 
economy.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Kim, Tae-seo 2000, ‘An unprecedent shift: the Summit and the Joint Declaration’, East Asian Review, 
Vol. 12, No. 2. !
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With respect to the meaning of the term “independently,” President Kim explained that 
whereas Pyongyang had interpreted it as “elimination of foreign intervention” in the past, 
after the Summit it viewed it as “resolving the inter-Korean issues independently while 
maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring countries.” He made it clear that while 
the issues concerning the Korean Peninsula should be resolved by the two Koreas 
themselves, both Pyongyang and Seoul must acknowledge the importance of maintaining 
cooperation with the international community.  
 
2. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in 
the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of 
federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.  
Kim Dae-jung’s formula advocated the maintenance of “one people, two states, two 
systems, and two governments” while forging close cooperation in order to “manage the 
divided states peacefully and to work toward integration efficiently.” The institutional 
mechanism would consist of negotiating bodies, including those between the chief 
executives, between cabinet members and between legislatures. This formula is based on 
the concept that once the two sides build mutual political trust, they can form a 
confederation and set up institutional mechanisms to promote cooperation that will as a 
natural consequence, bring about peace and reconciliation.  
In contrast, North Korea's federation presupposes “one people, one state, two systems and 
two governments.” Under this system, the central state government would control 
diplomacy and military affairs while the two regional governments of the South and the 
North would have autonomy. The “loose form of federation,” as proposed by Kim Il-sung 
in his new year's address in 1991, would be set in place as part of the interim phase prior 
to finally establishing the above-mentioned federation. It would give the regional 
governments a mandate over diplomacy and military affairs, while the central state 
government would be a nominal, symbolic entity. Therefore, based on the 
acknowledgement that the South-North confederation and loose form of confederation 
have common factors, both aiming at achieving peaceful co-existence, the two sides 
appeared to have reached a consensus on pursuing reunification along these lines.  
Two of the five articles of the Joint Declaration deal with the means for reunification, an 
indication of its importance to both parties. The two leaders devoted much time to 
discussing this issue and were very cautious in their approach in reaching a consensus. As 
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a result, they adopted the expression “loose form of” so that the two sides would converge 
on the idea of establishing a confederation.  
After returning to Seoul from his three-day trip, President Kim advised that “this issue 
should be discussed in detail by government representatives, scholars, and experts from 
the two sides” (return speech on June 15). He also added, “Even though discussions on 
means for reunification may take a while, they should be carried out so that both parties 
feel secure” (cabinet meeting on June 16).  
The South-North Confederation is, in essence, a confederate state based on mutual trust 
built by reconciliation and cooperation. It is a system designed for stable and effective 
management of the reunification process and for the reunion of the long-separated citizens 
of the South and the North.  
 
3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues: first, 
exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 
15 National Liberation Day and second, the question of unconverted Communists serving 
prison sentences in the South.  
Only once in the previous period was a group of separated family members allowed to 
meet. As we saw earlier, In 1985, a group of 50 separated family members (one hundred 
including the members of a performing arts troupe) visited Seoul and Pyongyang upon 
agreement between the two governments. The governments planned subsequent visits, but 
they never materialized. In November 1989, North Korea rejected the plan by taking issue 
with the contents of the performance. In March 1993, Pyongyang refused resumption of 
talks between Red Cross officials, a move proposed by Seoul upon the repatriation of Li 
In-mo, a long-time communist prisoner. Furthermore, at the South-North talks in Beijing 
in April 1998, North Korea wanted only to discuss Seoul's provision of fertilizer rather 
that of the issue of reunion of separated families that was on the agenda.  
The Joint Declaration specified the timing of the exchange of family members as August 
15, making it appear to be an isolated event. However, President Kim insisted that this 
would be not the case, saying “Red Cross officials will meet this month.” Accordingly, a 
serious of institutional measures were enacted, including locating dispersed family 
members, exchanging letters, and establishing meeting places. The inclusion of the 
expression humanitarian issues, including the repatriation of communist prisoners leaved 
room for discussion of other issues, such as the repatriation of South Korean fishermen 
detained in North Korea.  
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4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting 
balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by 
stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, health, environmental 
and all other fields.  
In his proposal dubbed the Berlin Declaration on March 10, 2000, President Kim stated, 
“North Korea's infrastructure, including electricity, railroads, and ports, will be 
improved.” Moreover, at the June 10th cabinet meeting held after the summit, he ordered 
the ministries to undertake the flood-prevention project on the Imjin River and to 
construct railroads (reconstruction of the Kyongwon Railroad Line linking Seoul to 
Wonsan, North Korea's east coast city), as well as to begin a dialogue between 
government authorities.  
At the farewell luncheon held on June 15, Kim Jong-il also made a proposal to reconstruct 
the Kyongi Railroad Line, which had linked Seoul to Shinuiju, a North Korean city in the 
Northwestern region, suggesting that it would have been accomplished by mobilizing the 
South and North Korean militaries. The most urgent economic cooperation project 
requested directly of President Kim by Kim Jong-il himself was the support for building 
electrical power facilities. In a speech upon returning to Seoul, President Kim stated, “the 
South and the North clearly agreed that they will cooperate in all sectors, including culture 
and sports.” Furthermore, at the farewell luncheon, in response to Minister Park Ji-won's 
request for an invitation to a delegation of South Korean media leaders, Kim Jong-il 
answered that “either, personally or in my capacity as North Korea's National Defense 
Commission Chairman, I will invite Minister Park and the delegation representing of 
South Korean newspaper and broadcasting companies.” All these developments pointed 
toward a gradual, but substantial, advancement in South-North cooperation and exchange 
in various sectors.  
 
5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in 
the near future to expedite the above agreements.  
This indicates that, based on an agreement reached between the two leaders, a dialogue 
between government officials will be held, particularly focusing on the third and fourth 
points of the Communiqué. For example, the same year, in response to a June 17 North 
Korea Red Cross Society proposal for a meeting, the Korean National Red Cross 
suggested it be held on June 23, 2000. In addition, the South Korean government held a 
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National Security Council meeting to finalize plans for the High Level Government Talks 
between two Korea on July 6, 200026.  
 
The five-point Joint Declaration consists of fundamental issues, such as Article 1 and 2, 
pending issues and their implementation, Article 3, 4, and 5, as well as the historical 
significance of the first South-North summit and Kim Jong-il's acceptance of the invitation 
to visit Seoul extended by President Kim. There are several points of great interest that 
can drawn from an in-depth analysis of this document. 
First, the idea of “elimination of foreign intervention” based on its “Three Principles of 
National Reunification” is something North Korea hoped to manifest through the wording 
independently. This may become a source of contention; however, Seoul's position 
favouring reunification by the two Koreas themselves, with the support of the 
international community, was likely to prevail.  
The two leaders had a frank discussion on the nuclear and missile issues, as well as on the 
U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. Moreover, Pyongyang acknowledged the need for 
each side to carry out diplomatic efforts in the midst of the political dynamics surrounding 
the Korean Peninsula.  
Second, acknowledging that Seoul's confederation and Pyongyang's loose form of 
federation for reunification were based on a common perception, it became desirable for 
both sides to achieve reunification on a gradual basis, taking into account each others 
position and interest. Reunification is of paramount importance, relevant to national 
security and thus, requires careful thought in reaching a national consensus. Therefore, the 
two sides decided to continue the discussion, and the progress, and various joint 
committees could be launched.  
Third, some pending issues and their implementation were somewhat abstract compared to 
those specified in the 1992 Basic Agreement. Considering North Korea's relationship with 
the outside world, the overall consensus is that the two sides will pursue the matter 
carefully. Moreover, continued progress and expansion in cooperation in various sectors 
could be achieved through the establishment of institutional mechanisms and 
organizations27.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Chang, Noh-soon 2000, ‘After the Korean Summit: the challenging consequences of the detente’, East 
Asian Review, Vol. 12, No. 3. 
27  Moon, Chung-in 2001, ‘Similarities and dissimilarities: the inter-Korean summit and unification 
formulae’, East Asian Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 59-80. !
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Fourth, in view of the historical significance of the first South-North Summit and the 
prospect of a possible – but never materialized – Kim Jong-il's official visit to Seoul, the 
Joint Declaration was a vital tool for facilitating inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, 
and ultimately, reunification. However, that depended largely on the implementation of 
the agreed provisions, the surrounding political climate, and the possibility of a second 
Summit28.  
In general, North Korea was focused on maintaining a cause and on acquiring both 
economic gains and a means by which to resolve its current diplomatic and security 
difficulties. Meanwhile, the South was interested in establishing a framework to achieve 
peaceful coexistence and to that end, Seoul made efforts to create diplomatic conditions 
conducive to carrying out an engagement policy toward the North. The Joint Declaration 
goes went serving the interests of either party; it was aimed at achieving coexistence and 
co-prosperity through compromise and cooperation.  
 
To be sure, the landmark five-point Joint Declaration signed by the two leaders is one of 
the greatest achievements of the Summit. However, it has shed light on other elements that 
are of great importance as well.  
First, the Summit served as a natural, albeit carefully orchestrated, opportunity for Kim 
Jong-il to improve his image, implying that he was likely expand his diplomatic scope in 
the international community.  
While Pyongyang had previously insisted on the inclusion of its “Three Principles of 
National Reunification” in the summit agenda, at the actual meetings, the North Korean 
delegation was for more interested in participating in frank and substantive discussions 
than in following the agenda. Clearly, a face-to-face meeting with the North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-il enabled meaningful substantial communication with tangible results.  
In contrast to low-key treatment of the July 4 South-North Joint Declaration (1972) and 
the 1992 Basic Agreement, this time, North Korean press coverage paralleled media 
coverage by South Korean and the international media. Such unprecedented attention 
demonstrated that Kim Jong-il expected a great deal from the Summit, or at least wished 
to take advantage of the publicity.  
Additionally, the “independent” achievement of reunification through common elements 
in the unification formulas of both sides, as well as cooperation in various sectors !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Ibidem. 
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mentioned in the Joint Declaration, were based on Pyongyang’s understanding that the 
South had no intention to “absorb” the North, but rather wanted to preserve both 
governments. Based on this belief, Pyongyang agreed to hold inter-Korean dialogues, and 
to shift its policies favourably toward USA and Japan.  
By the end of the summit, there was guarded hope for the future of the Korean peninsula, 
under the constant shadow of war from. Both sides confirmed that neither had any 
intention to invade the territory of the other and vowed to refrain from further threats. 
After returning to Seoul, President Kim explained that “the two sides came to a mutual 
understanding on deterring war and establishing peace.” He also added that “if we have 
the will, there will be no war. We have reached a common understanding regarding many 
issues.” Another note, at the farewell luncheon on June 15, Kim Jong-il proposed, “If the 
troops of the North and South continue to face each other as before, they will remain 
enemies. In order to remedy that, we should mobilize them for the reconstruction of the 
Kyongi Railroad Line.” In addition, Cho Myong-rok, first vice-chairman of the National 
Defense Commission and chief of the General Political Bureau of the People's Army, 
offered some significant remarks in a speech at a luncheon attended by the two leaders, 
“In good faith, the two leaders have made a historic decision before the Korean people. 
We will faithfully carry out the North-South Declaration.” Kim Jong-il also ordered that a 
meeting of the National Defence Commission be convened to stop the slanderous 
propaganda against the South, including in border areas near the 38th parallel. He further 
vowed to cancel the June 25 ceremony conducted annually in commemoration of the 
Korean War29.  
The above-mentioned characteristics of the Joint Declaration imply that lengthy and 
careful discussions between relevant government authorities preceded their inclusion. 
Details were prepared and examined thoroughly by the two sides prior to the summit, and 
it appears that the two leaders reviewed and finalized it at the face-to-face meeting.  
 
At the summit, President Kim is said to have made public South Korea's comprehensive 
and detailed stance on the pending issues that the United States and Japan asked Seoul to 
communicate to Pyongyang (June 15, presidential spokesman Park Jun-young). He spoke 
to Kim Jong-il extensively about the nuclear and missile issues, urging that the Joint 
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Agreed Framework !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29!Kim, Tae-seo 2000, ‘An unprecedent shift: the Summit and the Joint Declaration’.!
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of 1994 must be faithfully observed. He also strongly called for successful conducting of 
the ongoing missile talks between Washington and Pyongyang, maintaining that the 
missile threat undermined peace on the Korean peninsula. In addition, he advised that the 
North Korean economy and the stability of its regime would benefit if Pyongyang were to 
establish friendly relations with the USA and Japan, in the same way that Seoul has 
established ties with China and Russia, while at the same time cooperating with 
Washington and Tokyo. He also explained that just as NATO had remained after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union to sustain stability and balance in Europe, American forces 
stationed in Korea would be necessary to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula as well as 
to preserve the balance of power in Northeast Asia. He continued that “the topics covered 
included the nuclear and missile issues, U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, and South 
Korean National Security Law. A summary of the discussion was documented and given 
to Chairman Kim Jong-il.” According to Kim Jong-il's request, President Kim delivered 
Kim’s message to Clinton immediately after returning to Seoul. While delivering Japanese 
Prime Minister Mori's message about “Japan's strong commitment to establishing 
diplomatic ties with the North,” President Kim emphasized the importance of improving 
ties with the USA and Japan, as well as the critical importance of halting nuclear and 
missile development for the peace of Northeast Asia. From the perspective of the 
international environment also, both Kim Jong-il's unofficial visit to China 10 days before 
the Summit – the first ever since his official ascendance to power – and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin's scheduled visit to North Korea, for the first time in Korea's history, were 
expected to have a positive effect on the issues surrounding the Korean peninsula30.  
 
The first priority was economic assistance for North Korea, after which Pyongyang may 
express the wish for reconciliation hoping for further easing of economic sanctions from 
Washington. The issue may also cause confusion and raise doubts among the South 
Korean public about their long-held perceptions of the North. Such drastic changes in 
diplomacy and increased exchanges with Seoul had some negative implications. Since the 
Agreed Framework, Seoul, rather than Washington, has been branded North Korea's major 
enemy. Thus, Pyongyang’s face at the summit could cause confusion internally, and even 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Lee, Jung-min 2000, ‘A geopolitical shift: Korean peninsula after the Summit’, East Asian Review, Vol. 
12, No. 4, pp. 53-70. !
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Kim Jong-il could not be certain about how the North Korean military and the power elite 
would have reacted.  
Although Seoul would have to bear some economic burden, its status was secured and 
recognized by the North as such. This was confirmed by the plan to hold dialogues 
between government authorities as well as to forge government-level economic 
cooperation. Clearly, it would contribute to the establishment of a framework for peaceful 
coexistence and co-prosperity. The most important task, however, was to reach a national 
consensus on the Joint Declaration based on full support from South Korean public 
opinion so that the efforts to secure peace would have been effective.  
Some flexibility was shown also regarding the domestic issues of the two states that were 
of relevant interest for the counterpart. In response to President Kim's argument that “the 
abrogation of Seoul's National Security Law should be considered in line with revision of 
the Workers' Party platform,” Kim Jong-il is said to have remarked, “we will take the 
initiative and convene the 7th Party Congress to revise the party platform”31.  
Moreover, it must not be overlooked that despite the publicity blitz regarding the inter-
Korean Summit, Pyongyang emphasized “the need to lay a solid economic foundation and 
to increase its ability to survive since the inflow of foreign capital and aid could 
eventually lead to the enslavement of our country by imperialists”32.  
All of the above-mentioned factors, including North Korea's seemingly contradictory 
claims, the friendly attitude shown by Kim Jong-il at the Summit, expanded cooperation 
and exchange between the two Koreas and their relations with surrounding powers, had a 
dramatic effect on the development of inter-Korean cooperation. 
 
The inter-Korean summit was meant to accelerate the process of normalization and 
institution-building in inter-Korean relations in three important ways: first, a shift from 
confrontation to reconciliation; second, the normalization of government-to-government 
relations; and third, the beginning of a process to end the Cold War on the Korean 
peninsula. The two Korean leaders agreed that “the two Koreas must avoid war and end 
confrontation while promoting reconciliation and cooperation” between the two Koreas. 
The June 15 Joint Declaration was, in fact, based on such a consensus. The initial 
expectation of the summit talks was to bring an end to the Cold War on the Korean !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 !Moon, Chung-in 2001, ‘Similarities and dissimilarities: the inter-Korean summit and unification 
formulae’.!
32 Editorial, Rodong Shinmun, April 22, 2000. 
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peninsula by accelerating the normalization process between North Korea and the 
international community. In the months following the Summit and the release of the 
Declaration, the dialogue and cooperation between North and South saw a major increase 
in various fields.  
 
Tab 3: Number of Dialogue by year and subject (1999-2003) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Chronology of Inter-Korean Dialogue – Statistics 
 
The South and North Korean Red Cross delegations met on June 27, 2000, in the Mt. 
Kumgang Hotel to work out the details of the agreement reached in the joint declaration 
on resolving humanitarian issues. The talks led to the two sides agreeing to exchange 
visits by separated families and to establishing a meeting place for repatriation of 
unconverted long-term prisoners in the South. The South Korean government hailed this 
agreement as a success because it was the first concrete project produced in the wake of 
the June 15 Declaration, and also the first in 15 years. The last prearranged visit by a 
group of 50 members of separated families from the two Koreas had occurred back in 
1985.  
On August 15, 2000, two 100-member groups of South and North Korean separated 
families each visited Seoul and Pyongyang and met with their families and relatives 
according to a pre-arranged schedule. On September 2, South Korea also repatriated all of 
the 63 unconverted long-term prisoners who had wished to return to the North. From 
November 30 to December 2, the second exchange of mutual visits, consisting of 100 
member groups of separated families from each side, also took place33.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Next, the two Koreas agreed to hold ministerial talks regularly in order to implement the 
agreements stated in the Joint Declaration. This process involved two tiers of dialogue and 
negotiation between the two sides: ministerial talks to discuss issues related to 
reconciliation and cooperation, and a series of working-level discussions on particular 
issues, such as a joint committee for economic cooperation. In the six month period from 
July to December 2000, four rounds of ministerial talks and several working-level 
meetings were held to implement the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration.  
The first South-North Ministerial talks were held in Seoul, July 29- 31, 2000. The two 
sides agreed to conduct their meetings according to a three-fold principle, “as a way of 
faithfully implementing the agreement of the June 2000 Korean Summit”. First, they 
agreed to “discuss and resolve the ways to implement the Joint Declaration signed by the 
two leaders in such a way as to respect the agreement and pursue common interest”. 
Second, they agreed to “depart from the past habits of distrust and disputes to resolve easy 
issues first in the spirit of mutual confidence and cooperation”. Third, they agreed to “give 
importance to actions so that they can produce realistic outcomes before the nation, and 
shall aim at achieving peace and unification”. These principles provided the benchmark 
and guidelines for conducting the business of subsequent inter-Korean ministerial talks 
between the government officials of the two sides34.  
The first South-North ministerial level talks, held on July 30 in Seoul, adopted a six-point 
statement of agreement to be released to the press at the end of the meeting. These 
included: 
 
1. to resume the operations of the South-North Liaison Office at Panmunjom;  
2. to hold events in the South, North and overseas respectively in support of the 
South-North Joint Declaration;  
3. to drum up national determination at large to put it into practice on August 15 
(National Liberation Day);  
4. to rehabilitate the Seoul-Shinuiju Railway and discuss the issues thereof at an early 
date;  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 ‘Overview of Inter-Korean Relations in 2000’, Korean Unification Bulletin, No. 26 (December 2000), 
Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, p. 3.  !
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5. to cooperate and take appropriate measures to ensure that members of Chongryun 
(the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) can form tour groups to 
visit their hometowns;  
6. to hold the next round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang on August 
29-31, 200035.  
 
The second South-North Ministerial Level Talks were held in Pyongyang on August 29-
September 1, 2000. The joint press communiqué issued at the end contained a seven-point 
agreement that included: 
 
1. to hold two more rounds of reunions of separated families and relatives within the 
year and to arrange for a new round of inter-Korean Red Cross talks;  
2. to work toward easing military tension and ensuring peace and to hold, for such 
purposes, talks between South and North Korean military authorities at an early 
date;  
3. to establish a legal framework for economic cooperation, such as guarantee of 
investment and avoidance of double taxation and, for that purpose, to hold 
working-level contacts sometime in September; 
4.  to hold working-level contacts to discuss a schedule for connecting the railway 
between Seoul and Shinuiju and opening the road linking Munsan with Kaesong; 
5.  to meet to promote joint flood prevention project on the Imjin River at an early 
date";  
6. to exchange about 100 tourists from each side to visit Mt. Halla in the South and 
Mt. Paektu in the North between mid-September and early October (such 
exchange visits of tourists did not take place during 2000);  
7. to hold a third round of ministerial-level talks in Mt. Halla on September 27-30, 
200036. 
 
In addition to the two rounds of North-South ministerial-level talks held in Seoul and 
Pyongyang, respectively, several working-level meetings were also held between the two 
Koreas in an attempt to further clarify the agenda and to deepen the process of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 ‘The 1st South-North Ministerial Talks’, Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, July 31, 
2000.  
36 ‘The Result and Significance of the Second Round of Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks’, Korean Unification 
Bulletin, No. 22 (August 2000), Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, pp. 1-2.  
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consultation and negotiation on the matters of mutual interest before holding the 
subsequent round of inter-Korean ministerial talks. The first important and notable 
working-level talk was a three-day visit to Seoul by the Korean Workers Party Secretary 
Kim Yong-sun on September 11-14. He came to Seoul in the capacity of a special envoy 
of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to discuss views on a wide range of issues addressed 
between the two Koreas. He also met with President Kim Dae-jung at the Blue House 
before returning to Pyongyang via the truce village of Panmunjom.  
A seven-point press statement was issued at the end of Kim Yong-sun’s Seoul visit. The 
statement expressed Kim Jong-il’s will to visit Seoul in the near future; both sides 
welcomed the on-going discussion over holding the talks between the South’s Minister of 
Defence and the North’s Minister of People’s Armed Forces and agreed to start the 
process of address checks for separated families and to allow those who have confirmed 
addresses to exchange letters. In addition, they decided to hold a round of Red Cross talks 
in Mt. Kumgang on September 20 to discuss the issues related to exchanging two 
additional groups of separated families within the year as well as to establish and manage 
a permanent meeting centre37.  
Four additional points of agreement on substantive matters, mostly related to the 
development of inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation, were also reached 
during Secretary Kim’s Seoul visit. Both sides agreed, for instance, to settle the issue of 
investment guaranty and avoidance of double taxation by holding a working-level meeting 
in Seoul on September 25 to develop an institutional mechanism, to have a ceremony to 
connect the Kyongi Rail Line and a road as soon as possible, to send to the South an 
economic mission of North Korea composed of about 15 people in the month of October, 
and to start a joint survey for a flood prevention project in the Imjin River area and 
develop detailed plans for the project before the end of the year.  
At the ceremony for the restoration of the Seoul-Shinuiju railroad and the inter-Korean 
road, held at the Imjingak, south of the DMZ, on September 18, 2000, President Kim Dae-
jung took the occasion to hail the project as a milestone in ending the Cold War on the 
peninsula. He said that “(Whereas) the severed railroad has been a symbol of the division 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and Cold War... today's groundbreaking for the restoration of the railroad will begin a new 
age of reconciliation, cooperation and partnership”38.  
Subsequent to Kim Yong-sun’s Seoul visit, a historic meeting was held between the 
defence ministers from the two Koreas on Jeju Island, in the South, on September 25-26. 
The purpose of the talks was to provide military assurance for the implementation of the 
June 15 Joint Declaration. The meeting issued a five-point statement of agreement broadly 
to ease military tensions and remove the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula. The 
statement declared that both sides “would do their utmost to implement the joint 
declaration made by the heads of the South and the North” and “actively cooperate with 
each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation 
between civilians”. The most interesting point made was that both sides “hold the same 
view that to reduce military tension on the Korean Peninsula and remove the threat of war 
by establishing a durable and stable peace is a matter of vital importance and agreed that 
they shall work together towards this end”39. 
The two defence ministers also stated that both sides shall allow the entry of personnel, 
vehicles and materials into their respective sections of the Demilitarized Zone, with 
respect to the construction of a railway and a road that connects the South and the North, 
and to review issues related to the safety of construction workers and that the working-
level officials from both sides should have meet the following October to discuss the 
details related to this; another key point that was addressed in the meeting was about the 
problem of opening the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the 
areas around the railroad and the road that connected the South and the North on the basis 
of the armistice treaty and, finally, the decision to hold the second round of the talks in a 
location in the North in mid-November40. 
 
Subsequently, a follow-up working-level meeting on economic cooperation was held in 
Seoul on September 25-26. This meeting addressed substantive “issues related to an 
institutional mechanism for investment guarantee and avoidance of double taxation”. 
Participants agreed that “they needed written agreements on procedures for settling 
business disputes and clearing accounts and need to discuss this through” by establishing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 ‘The groundbreaking ceremony for the rail and road link of Kyongui Line’, Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation, Seoul, 2000.  39!‘Source Material on Inter-Korean Relations’, Korea and World Affairs: A Quarterly Review, Vol. 24, No. 
3 (Fall 2000), pp. 453-481.  40!Kihl, Young-whan 2001, ‘Overcoming the Cold War legacy in Korea?’.!
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the working-level contacts in the following inter-Korean ministerial talks. Apart from the 
procedural points, the meeting produced an important seven-point inter-Korean agreement 
on food aid: the South agreed to provide the North “in the form of a loan of 300,000 tons 
of foreign rice and 200,000 tons of foreign corn as soon as possible” and “the terms for 
repayment of the loan shall be 30 years, including 10 years of a grace period and the 
annual interest rate to be 1.0%”.  
The agreement went on to state that the extension of the loan and its repayment under this 
agreement should have been made according to a loan agreement signed between the 
Import and Export Bank of the South and the Foreign Trade Bank of the North and that 
the North should provide all the facilities needed for the smooth implementation of the 
food loan and assure transparency in distribution. The South Korean government also 
offered an additional 100,000 tons of foreign corn that would be provided to the North 
free of charge through the United Nations World Food Program (WFP). The total cost of 
the food loan and donation to the WFP amounted to approximately $100 million. 
The third inter-Korean ministerial talks were held on the Jeju Island on September 27-30. 
This meeting led to a six-point statement of agreements. A 22-member North Korean 
delegation, led by a senior cabinet councilor, Jon Kum-jin, flew to the southern island of 
Jeju on September 27 via Beijing and Seoul. South Korean Unification Minister Park Jae-
kyu led the South Korean delegation. Each delegation had five regular members, along 
with four other delegates from each side. The six-point statement of agreement was broad, 
starting from the promise “to implement all the agreements already made in various forms 
of talks and continue to discuss a wide range of issues in depth” and “to cooperate with 
each other and to encourage the Red Cross societies of both sides to immediately take 
necessary measures for a prompt settlement of issues related to separated families" and to 
praise “the successful completion of the first round of the working-level contact to provide 
institutional mechanisms for economic cooperation”41.  
The only substantively notable agreement at this session had to do with establishing a 
Committee for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation to discuss and 
implement various issues to expand exchange and cooperation in the economic area. At 
this meeting the South proposed to expand exchanges and cooperation in various areas – 
including academic, cultural and athletic – and to hold regular soccer matches 
alternatively in Seoul and Pyongyang. The South also proposed exchange of visits by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 ‘The Third Round of Ministerial Talks’, Korean Unification Bulletin, No. 24 (October 2000), Ministry of 
Unification, Seoul. 
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college professors, students and cultural leaders, while the North promised to give a 
positive review of the projects for exchange and cooperation, including these proposals. 
Finally, the two parts agreed to hold the fourth round of the inter-Korean ministerial talks 
on November 28-December 1.  
The fourth round of inter-Korean ministerial talks was held on December 12-16 in 
Pyongyang. At this meeting the two sides traded criticisms on issues that had posed 
obstacles to the steady improvement in inter-Korean relations. These included the North's 
denunciation of the Pyongyang regime as the “potential enemy number one” in a South 
Korean defence white paper, and the South's complaint against the North's criticism of the 
South Korean Red Cross president for what he said during an interview with a monthly 
magazine in Seoul. Nevertheless, both sides agreed that the projects undertaken during the 
preceding six months to implement the June 15 Joint Declaration were to be considered as 
the main goal. At the end, an eight-point joint press release was issued that reflected the 
spirit of inter-ministerial and working-level discussions42. 
The statement included an agreement to promote a balanced development and co-
prosperity of the Korean national economy, by establishing and operating a Joint 
Committee for Promoting Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation. This joint committee will 
consist of a vice-ministerial level head of the delegation and five to seven members from 
each side. Items to be discussed by the joint committee were to include such practical 
issues in prospective economic cooperation, as: the supply of electricity, connection of 
railroads and highways, construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and promotion 
of the Imjin River flood prevent projects.  
They also agreed to cooperate in the fishing industry. The North offered a part of its 
fishing ground on the East Sea to the South. People representing their respective fishery 
authorities would meet in the Mt. Kumgang area to discuss the matter. They agreed to 
advise their respective Taekwondo organizations to meet with each other to discuss the 
exchange of exhibition teams between the two Koreas, and to promote address check and 
exchange of letters between the members of separated families.. They agreed to exchange 
the third group of one hundred separated families at the end of February 2001. The North 
should also send its Mt. Halla tourist delegation in March and its economic mission during 
the first half of 2001. The most important point of agreement at this meeting was that they 
will have each of four agreements signed by the heads of delegations, related to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 ‘The Forth Round of Ministerial Talks’, Korean Unification Bulletin, No. 26 (December 2000), Ministry 
of Unification, Seoul.!
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investment protection, avoidance of double taxation, account settlement and business 
dispute arbitration. The two parts agreed also to go through the necessary procedure for 
effectuating these agreements and notifying each other of the result and to hold the fifth 
round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in March 200143. 
 
The process that brought to the inter-Korean Summit and the June 15 Joint Declaration 
marked a clear change with the previous inter-Korean political cooperation processes. 
Although several passages of the declaration take into accounts points already discussed in 
the previous documents, the path that led to the signing was of a total different nature, 
compared to the past. 
First of all, while the 1972 Joint Declaration and the Basic Agreement came directly from 
major changes in the international environment, the June 15 Declaration was a product of 
a process entirely within inter-Korean relations – even though the international context 
was, at that time, favourable for a development of this kind. The Sino-American 
rapprochement at the beginning of the ‘70s worked as the main impulse for the beginning 
of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. The end of the Cold War gave new space for 
regional conflicts and rivalries to evolve and be solved; under these favourable conditions, 
the proactive stance of President Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik – together with the flexibility 
shown by North Korean leader Kim Il-sung – make the signing of the Basic Agreement 
possible. 
At the end of the ‘90s the situation was different. The upheavals of the end of the Cold 
War were already become new structural conditions of the international system and the 
unipolar balance of power, based on the predominance of the United States, was already 
under way for several years. Also, in the East Asia region there had been no major 
changes since the beginning of the decade. Thus, the international environment, even if it 
must be taken into consideration, was not a major driver for the changes in inter-Korean 
relations. Obviously, the favourable conditions – especially related to the positive 
relations between North Korea and the Clinton’s administration after the 1994 Agreed 
Framework – played a role in increasing the chances of success for Kim Dae-jung’s North 
Korea policy.  
This relative political stability of the region also created the conditions to reduce the 
number of actors involved in inter-Korean relations to the two Korean states themselves. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The nuclear issues was apparently under control from 1994 and the major powers were 
looking positively to an engagement policy from Seoul to Pyongyang, aimed at reducing 
the isolation of the latter and promoting a process of rapprochement and national 
reconciliation. 
The second main difference that can be found between the June 15 Declaration and 
previous examples of inter-Korean political cooperation that we have taken into 
consideration is related to the inter-Korean relations process itself: the Summit was, at the 
same time, the highest point and the starting point for the “Sunshine Policy”. In other 
words, the meeting between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung marked a clear difference 
with the previous approaches to inter-Korean relations and gave leeway to the huge 
number of meetings, exchanges and cooperation that we described above, as direct results 
of the Declaration, but also to the path of cooperation – mostly economic – that 
characterized the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun, from 2003 onward. 
The 1972 Declaration had a more tactical than strategic character, as a response to the 
changes that came from the outside. The Basic Agreement can be seen as the culmination 
of Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitk, but it had great difficulty in its implementation and 
achieved poor practical results. The Summit of 2000, instead, was part of a context 
characterized by a policy of constructive engagement on the part of South Korea and 
created a ground of political legitimacy for all the subsequent meetings and cooperation 
projects.  
From the perspective of the variable conditions for a positive development of cooperation, 
as we previously described, the process initiated by the Summit of June 2000 acted 
decisively on all three aspects. The institutionalization of the inter-Korean relations 
reached its maximum degree, with regular meetings between the Red Cross, the North-
South Ministerial Talks, the Defence Minster Talks, the Working Level meetings on 
Economic Cooperation and other events of great symbolic and practical value, such as the 
visit to Seoul by Kim Yong-sun and the ceremony for the reopening of the rail link Seoul-
Shinuiju.  
Precisely because of the high degree of institutionalization and the large number of issues 
addressed, also the variable of time is deeply affected. In this way, in fact, the possibility 
of future interactions between the two actors are decisively multiplied and the weight that 
they have on the current decisions increases. The defection is thus strongly discouraged, 
while a strong incentive to cooperate is created, thanks to the possible gains from future 
interactions. This process creates a kind of virtuous circle that increases the chances of 
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cooperation and triggers a process of incremental learning that creates mutual trust 
between the parties. 
 
The Summit and the Joint Declaration had an unprecedented impact also on the third 
category of conditions for a positive cooperative interaction. For a long time, as a result of 
the 1950-53 conflict and the deep ideological and strategic division of the peninsula North 
Korea was labelled the “main enemy” of South Korea. The “communist threat from the 
north”, although a reality, has long been used by authoritarian governments of South 
Korea as a pretext for a tight control and political and social repression within the country. 
The shared meanings between the two States, based on a shared language, a shared 
history, a shared culture, began to fade, undermining any possibility of reconciliation or 
reunification. The idea of one Korean Nation on the peninsula is vital for the improvement 
of inter-Korean relations44. The definition of an in-group, of which both Koreas are a part, 
can foster the creation of mutual trust based on shared meanings. 
As we previously saw, during the years some attempts to change this situation of negative 
mutual perception have been made, especially with the elaboration of plans for the 
creation of a Korean National Community or with important references to the shared 
nationhood between the two states – as in the case of the preamble of the 1972 Joint 
Declaration.  
The Summit of 2000 had an enormous impact on mutual perceptions from both sides of 
the border. In particular, after the meeting between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung, the 
South Korean public opinion experienced a sort of “Kim Jong-il shock”. The kind 
welcome reserved for the South Korean president in Pyongyang and the whole course of 
the meetings, as well as the results achieved with the joint statement, undermined the well-
established negative images of North Korea in the South45. A series of surveys showed 
how the summit dramatically changed perceptions about North Korea in the South and 
pushed things forward in terms of further cooperation between the two parties46.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Ha, Yong-chool 2001, ‘A Summit and the search for new institutional identity’, Asian Survey, Vol. 41, 
No. 1, pp.30-39. 
45 Lee, Dong-bok 2000, ‘Inter-korean summitry: another indian game of elephant versus blind people?’, 
Korea and world affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 207-227. 
46 Kim, Tack-whan 2000, ‘Image of North Korea after inter-Korean summit’, Korea Focus, Vol. 8, No. 6, 
(November/December), pp. 114-132. The survey was commissioned by the Korean Broadcasting Institute 
and originally reported in the Korea Daily News.   
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3.5 After the Summit: Analysis of the Political Cooperation 
during Roh Moo-hyun’s Administration 
 
As we have just seen, the Summit of 2000, as well as being a symbolic event of epochal 
proportions for the two Koreas, started an intensive activity of political and military 
cooperation on the peninsula. Such activism continued throughout 2000, 2001 and also in 
2002. The elections of December of that year ensured the continuity of the approach of 
constructive engagement with the election of Roh Moo-hyun, who, regarding inter-Korean 
relations, was in perfect continuity with the approach of Kim Dae-jung. Nonetheless, 
when the new president took office, the situation was very different compared to five 
years earlier. 
The American president was, in fact, George W. Bush, and not Bill Clinton. The first 
immediately set an intransigent line against Pyongyang and the North Korean nuclear 
issue, pushing even more towards a hard line the North Korean regime itself. As we 
noticed in the second chapter, also, between the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003, the 
second nuclear crisis in North Korea erupted, undermining even more the efforts of the 
new South Korean administration. If it is true that one of the cornerstones of the 
progressive approach was the separation between the economic and political sphere and 
the separation of the inter-Korean relations from the nuclear issue, a tightening of tensions 
of that scale could not have repercussions on the relations between the North and South. In 
the first place, despite the nuclear deterrent was not directed against Seoul, these 
developments created a security problem for Roh’s government, perceived also by the 
public opinion. Also, the situation went to undermine the developments in terms of 
reliability of Pyongyang, as a partner in cooperation – in fact the regime was failing to 
fulfil both the Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the peninsula of 1992 and the 
Agreed Framework of 1994. Finally, the alliance with the US imposed to South Korea the 
strategic imperative of not directly contrast its main ally and, therefore, to look for a 
political balance between the all-out opposition of Washington to Pyongyang and the path 
of cooperation already undertaken. 
This series of external conditioning forced South Korean President Roh to make use of a 
more limited range of options in its inter-Korean policy. This situation will have an impact 
especially on the initiatives of political-diplomatic and military cooperation between the 
two Koreas. Economic cooperation and humanitarian assistance, considered of less 
! 207!
importance in relation to security issues such as the nuclear programme, instead could 
remain active and evolve substantially, even compared to the years of Kim Dae-jung. 
This change in the management of inter-Korean relations is evidenced also by the shift in 
the main issue of the frequent meetings between the two Koreas. With the exception of 
2007, the year of the Second inter-Korean Summit, there has been a significant increase 
for what concerns economy and humanitarian assistance, while politics and military issues 
lagged behind, both in terms of frequency of the meetings and importance of the 
delegations and topics – they were mostly working-level contacts. 
 
Tab 4: Number of Dialogue by year and subject (2003-2007) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Chronology of Inter-Korean Dialogue – Statistics 
 
The most relevant meetings focused on economic issues, through the Inter-Korean 
Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, the meetings for the industrial park of 
Kaesong and the tourism project on Mount Kumgang, and contacts for the reconnection of 
roads and railway lines. 
 
As the successor of the “Sunshine Policy”, Roh’s administration “Policy of Peace and 
Prosperity” had the same intent to promote cooperation and reconciliation on the 
peninsula through enhanced exchanges and cooperation. Nonetheless South Korea’s 
National Security Strategy, issued in February 2004, did not present new or more 
progressive ideas for advancing inter-Korean reconciliation, instead embracing the 
eventual implementation of institutionalized exchanges, cooperation, and confidence 
building through both the June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration and the 1992 Basic Agreement 
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frameworks47. In addition to the constraints that were coming from outside, this lack of 
political initiative gave more strength to early criticisms of the “Sunshine Policy”, that 
were focused on reciprocity and criticized North Korea for its relative lack of a response 
to South Korean generosity, as well as for lack of progress in addressing outstanding 
security issues considered as crucial to achieve peaceful coexistence in practical terms. 
Although during the first years of Roh’s administration, South Korean public opinion 
polls showed a strong support for continued engagement with North Korea48, this support 
started to become thin in 2006 and 2007. In this respect, the “Sunshine Policy” and the 
inter-Korean Summit had profound effects on a South Korean public that wanted to end 
inter-Korean confrontation and no longer saw North Korea’s threat as deriving from its 
military strength, even from the threat of its nuclear weapons development. Instead, South 
Koreans started to consider the North’s threat as deriving from its weakness and thus fear 
the economic costs and consequences of North Korea’s economic destabilization and 
possible collapse far more than the risk of a renewed conflict. The other effect of the inter-
Korean Summit was to expand inter-Korean exchanges, to change the image of North 
Korean leadership in a highly positive manner and to enhance feelings of identification 
and brotherhood with the suffering of the North Korean people. As we pointed out 
previously, the consequences of the Summit were fundamental for the (re-)construction of 
that substrate of common and shared meanings, that become essential for the 
establishment of mutual trust and a long-term cooperation49. 
The possibility of a development of political cooperation under President Roh Moo-hyun 
have been strongly influenced, in a negative way, by a change in the external conditions of 
inter-Korean relations. Following the model outlined in the first chapter, then, the 
structural conditions were the component that influenced more vigorously in this respect. 
The American position and the development of the North Korean nuclear program created 
a vicious circle of intransigence that prompted the South Korean government to focus 
more on the economic and humanitarian interactions, leaving a residual character to the 
political dimension of inter-Korean cooperation. 
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47 Korean National Security Council, Peace, Prosperity and National Security: National Security Strategy of 
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48 Lee, Nae-young 2005, ‘Changing South Korean Public Opinion on the ROK-U.S. Alliance’, presented at 
America in Question:!Korean Democracy and the Challenge of Non-Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, 
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49 Snyder, Scott 2005, ‘South Korea’s squeeze play’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 93-106. 
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Despite the presence of these problematic issues, which began to emerge since the 
inauguration of President Roh’s administration, his government, during his last year in 
office, was able to obtain a significant result also in terms of political and diplomatic 
cooperation. From 2 to 4 October 2007, in fact, the South Korean president visited 
Pyongyang and met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, during the second inter-
Korean summit in history. Just like what happened with his predecessor, even in this case 
the heads of the two Koreas at the end of the Summit signed a joint document on the 
prospects for reconciliation and reunification of the two states. However, unlike what 
happened in 2000, in this case, the symbolic power of the Summit and the political 
implications of the declaration were not so extraordinary important. 
 
The second relevant dimension of inter-Korean cooperation, in political and diplomatic 
terms, of Roh Moo-hyun’s administration is represented by the role of South Korea within 
the multilateral framework of the Six Party Talks. 
The Six Party Talks process has been a negotiating arena for North Korean and the United 
States, through the mediation of China, to solve the Second Nuclear Crisis that abruptly 
erupted between 2002 and 2003. Room for South Korea’s participation has been 
structurally limited from the beginning; but South Korean government played a significant 
role in facilitating the overall process of negotiation through proactive diplomacy. Unlike 
what happened with the First Nuclear crisis, when the government of Kim Young-sam 
played no role in the negotiations for the signing of the Framework Agreement of 1994, 
this time the creation of a multilateral forum gave Seoul the opportunity to play a role. 
When the Second Nuclear Crisis erupted, South Korean government decided to take a 
middle way of sort, condemning the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea but, 
at the same time, departing from the hard stance of Bush’s administration. The main goal 
was to avoid any kind of military conflict on the peninsula; a position clearly expressed 
during his visit to the United States in 200450. On several occasion Roh expressed his idea 
of rejecting any kind of military action against North Korea and of opposing the “all 
options on the table” position adopted by US administration. This very clear position 
created tension with the US ally, which was expecting rather more support from the South 
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Korean administration51. The logic behind the decision of President Roh, based on the risk 
of a military conflict on the peninsula that would inevitably also involved South Korea, 
was linked to the will to keep open the inter-Korean dialogue and the cooperation projects, 
especially in the economic field, that were developing in those years. 
For these reason, during the four years of the Six Party Talks, with Roh Moo-hyun as 
President of South Korea, Seoul’s position has always been that of “facilitator of the 
dialogue”, trying to introduce engagement also in that multilateral framework to solve the 
standoff caused by North Korean Nuclear programm. 
 
As we have just analysed, the Summit of 2000 and the Joint Declaration of June 15 
represent the highest point of the inter-Korean cooperation policy. In addition to the strong 
symbolic meaning, in fact, it started a process of cooperation – military, economic, 
humanitarian, cultural – that will lead to very significant great results for the next seven 
years. Even the outbreak of the Second Nuclear Crisis, between late 2002 and early 2003, 
which will destroy definitively the agreement between North Korea and the United States 
of 1994, will have no detrimental impact on the process of inter-Korean cooperation; in 
fact, it will continue during all the years of the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun, with a strong 
emphasis on the economic and commercial aspects.  
As we have already pointed out in the second chapter, the real breaking point that led to 
the failure of many projects of inter-Korean cooperation will be the election of 
conservative President Lee Myung-bak in South Korea, in December 2007. The situation 
on the peninsula had already deteriorated sharply with the Second Nuclear Crisis, 
nonetheless the administration of Roh Moo-hyun had managed to maintain a conciliatory 
position with Pyongyang and to keep cooperation flowing. 
The numerous attempts in political and diplomatic cooperation that we have analysed in 
this chapter, however, have led to different results and can provide several useful 
information on the development of inter-Korean relations. First, we can note that there is a 
clear difference between the Joint Declaration of 1972 and the Basic Agreement of 1992 
on the one hand, and the Summit of 2000 – which can be considered as the symbol of the 
five years of President Kim Dae-jung’s presidency – regarding the initial propulsive 
thrust. In the first two cases, the main cause of the rapprochement of the two Koreas can !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Bechtol, Bruce E. 2005, ‘The ROK-US alliance during the Bush and Roh administrations: differing 
perspectives and their implications for a changing strategic enviroment’, International Journal of Korean 
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp.87-116. !
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be attributed to changes in the balance of the international system. In 1972, the Sino-
American rapprochement and the Nixon doctrine had led the two countries to seek 
alternative solutions to an al-out conflict, bringing to the emergence of the so-called 
competitive coexistence, where both states accept the presence of the other and moved 
competition on economic and social aspects rather than purely military ones. The end of 
the Cold War then represented a change of the system that makes inevitable a response of 
the two Koreas and an evolution in inter-Korean relations. The Nordpolitik of Roh Tae-
woo precisely tried to face this new challenge and the 1992 Basic Agreement can be 
considered as a result of a changing regional and global balance of power. 
The "Sunshine Policy" instead has been created and implemented in a time when there is 
no breakthrough of the balance of global power, and it derives its thrust directly from 
inter-Korean relations themselves. The proactive attitude of Kim Dae-jung and the 
positive response from North Korean leadership and made possible the path described 
above and culminated with the 2000 Summit. Returning to the model we used in this 
chapter, in the first two cases it is therefore the structural conditions to play the dominant 
role, while in the latter the variables and constructed conditions intervened in a much more 
decisive way. 
Regarding the second, the attitude of the actors it is not much different in the considered 
examples. In all three cases, the will to achieve a positive outcome pushes parties to act on 
the three variable conditions in a way which takes into account the needs and interests of 
the counterpart and re-orient their policies in this sense. Obviously, each of the three main 
events puts its bases on the previous ones – confirmed by the explicit references that are 
placed in each of them about the previous ones – and proceed along a path that increases 
the chances of cooperation. As for the third condition, the results of the Summit of 2000 
play certainly a major role. If, in fact, in 1972 the main result was to move from conflict to 
coexistence and in 1992 to recognize the mutual desire for reconciliation and 
reunification, in 2000 the perception of each of the two states and peoples changes in a 
decisive manner. The symbolic nature of the Summit, its development, the attitude of the 
North Korean leadership will put a new emphasis – at least until 2007 – on the common 
and shared characters and meanings between the two Koreas. 
 
The positive results in terms of political cooperation will also have beneficial 
consequences on other areas of cooperation, such as the economy, the humanitarian and 
the cultural aspects. In addition, they have played a crucial role themselves to ensure that 
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the negotiations in the political and diplomatic field bring positive results. The various 
areas are, in fact, closely related and the development of one inevitably leads to an 
improvement also in the others. For this reason in the next chapter we will analyse this 
further dimension that is crucial for understanding the evolution of inter-Korean relations: 
the cooperative interactions between the two Koreas in the economic, humanitarian and 
cultural fields. 
 
 
 
! 213!
Fourth Chapter 
Analysis of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation 
 
Alongside political cooperation, economic issues have also played a very important role in 
the development of inter-Korean relations. Despite their evolution it has been more recent, 
such relations have proved to be of great value and have had an important impact on the 
overall equilibrium of the peninsula and on the level of tension between the two Koreas. 
Moreover, in many cases these relations proved to be even more durable and stable than 
other projects of political and diplomatic character. Finally, compared to the latter, they 
could demonstrate their practical effects much more rapidly 
For these reasons, in this chapter the focus will be placed on inter-Korean economic 
cooperation. In particular, we will draw the attention in the specific period of progressive 
administrations in South Korea (1997-2007), where economics have assumed a role of 
great strategic importance, arriving, during the years of the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun 
and his “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”, to get the priority over all others. In this 
context, particular attention will be paid to the construction of the industrial park in 
Kaesong, both for its symbolic aspect, but also for its success in practical terms, and, 
finally, to its potential as a model for future development of economic inter-Korean 
relations. 
 
For more than four decades there were no inter-Korean economic relations of any kind. 
The first examples of these exchanges, that will start to have a growing and fundamental 
role in the whole process of inter-Korean reconciliation, took place at the end of the ‘80s, 
during the process of inter-Korean rapprochement launched by President Roh Tae-woo. In 
January 1989, South Korea started importing goods from the North – paintings, pottery, 
woodworking, industrial art – beginning a trade that totalled 18.7 million dollars in that 
year. The following year the Doosung Industrial Complex signed a direct contract with 
North Korea and in 1991 Samsung and Hyundai followed the same path. Since those 
meagre beginnings inter-Korean trade continued to grow and diversify, until becoming 
one of the first aspect of inter-Korean relations1. 
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What is striking about this growth is the fact that it developed after 40 years of strict non-
interaction and the persistence of one of the most militarized border in the world, with 1.8 
million military personnel, including 37.000 Americans. Another very interesting fact 
comes from a brief analysis of the patterns in inter-Korean trade during the main security 
crisis on the peninsula. When, in 1994, the First Nuclear Crisis erupted, creating major 
security concerns not only on the peninsula or in East Asia but worldwide, it had no 
dampening effects and inter-Korean trade continued to grow in 1995 before slightly 
receding in 1996. While the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 had impacts on trade between 
the two Koreas, with a fall of numbers in 1998, even the Taepodong missile crisis of 
August that year could derail the recovery. Also, the revelations about North Korean 
nuclear programme at the end of 2002, and the subsequent Second Nuclear Crisis on the 
peninsula, did not have any effect on inter-Korean economic exchanges, with the year 
2003 reaching new maximums in this field2. 
 
Tab 5: South-North Trade (1989-2002) 
 
Source: KOTRA – Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
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2 Ibidem. 
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The idea of inter-Korean economic cooperation was first broached at a press conference 
on August 20, 1984 by former South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan. At that time, 
President Chun proposed that the North begin trade and economic cooperation with the 
South, expressing his willingness to offer, if agreed to by the North, free technology and 
goods which would contribute substantially to improving the standard of living of North 
Korea’s citizens. During the period between September 29 and October 4, 1984, aid for 
flood victims were transported from the South to the North via the truce village of 
Panmunjom, and the ports of Inchon and Pukpyong. After that, Seoul proposed to 
Pyongyang that a permanent body be set up to deal with matters related to inter-Korean 
trade and economic cooperation and to hold inter-Korean economic talks in which 
government and private-level economic delegations from each side would participate. In a 
message from the Deputy Premier of the State Administration Council on October 16, 
1984, the North responded positively to the proposal, saying it would hold economic talks 
with the South3.  
Subsequently, five rounds of South-North economic talks were held at the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom, starting from November 15, 1984. However, on 
January 20, 1986, the North Korean delegation unilaterally announced its decision to 
postpone indefinitely the sixth round of meetings, citing as the reason, the ROK-U.S. team 
spirit military training. As a result, the bilateral economic talks were halted.  
Economic exchanges between the two Koreas was re-established in the early 1990s. At the 
sixth round of high-level talks held in Pyongyang in February 1992, the two sides signed 
the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, and the subsidiary agreement on exchange and 
cooperation was adopted in August.  
The Kim Young-sam government adopted a very generous approach toward North Korea 
in its early days, as evidenced by the provision of 150.000 tons of rice to the North in 
1995. Nevertheless, this approach did not bear much fruit due to strained inter-Korean 
relations that were exacerbated by Pyongyang’s nuclear program and the submarine 
infiltration incidents. In accordance with the government’s policy of linking North 
Korea’s nuclear issue to inter-Korean economic cooperation, only trade-on-commission 
and simple exchanges of goods were allowed, while joint investment projects were strictly 
prohibited. As a consequence, economic cooperation was pursued on a very limited scale 
and without a long-term vision.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In all these attempts of economic cooperation on the peninsula, however, a projected 
dimension of long term was missing, in most of the cases they were symbolic actions, 
humanitarian gestures – especially during the famine of the ‘90s – or extemporaneous 
experiments. The same Basic Agreement, which contained specific references to this area 
of cooperation, remained largely unrealized. What was most lacking was then a long-term 
vision of economic cooperation as a central factor in the process of inter-Korean 
reconciliation, supported by a legal framework that would support the economic and trade 
relations between the two countries. 
 
This resilience of inter-Korean trade in the face of continuing military standoff is the key 
puzzle of both theoretical and real-world significance. The importance of analysing in 
detail the economic aspects of inter-Korean cooperation lies in the fact that, especially 
from the mid-‘90s onwards, it represented the part on which more progress were made and 
which ensured the highest degree of continuity for the dialogue between the two Koreas.  
With the launch of the “Sunshine Policy” and its concept of flexible dualism, for a decade 
the separation between the economic and the political-military sphere was clearly 
established, thus giving the opportunity to continue the first in moments in which there 
were tensions and provocations regarding the second. 
 
 
3.2.1 Inter-Korean Economic and Trade Exchanges during the “Sunshine 
Policy” 
 
The first trade between South and North Korea was purely symbolic: it was accomplished 
because it could be and because it was impressive that it could be. South Korean President 
Chun Doo-hwan had raised the idea of trade in August 1984, leading to talks that 
collapsed two years later. Only with the cross-border shipment of artistic products in 1989 
was inter-Korean trade truly inaugurated. But as trade developed over the ‘90s, it began to 
have some economic meaning in addition to its continued symbolic importance. Gold, 
zinc, and iron were the first major trade products, imports from the North. After the mid-
‘90s, agricultural, forest, and textile products came to top the list. In 2002, for example, 
animal products – mainly seafood – were the largest North Korean export on a value basis. 
Inter-Korean trade was very strong during the years just before the Asian Financial Crisis 
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of late 1997. Trade fell substantially because of the crisis but then saw a terrific rebound 
in 2000 that was associated with the inter-Korean Summit of June of that year. The Joint 
Declaration produced by that Summit was conspicuously silent on security and military 
issues, in effect indicating economic relations as the practical pathway for the 
development of inter-Korean relations4.  
The most important development has been the quick growth of processing-on- 
commission (POC) trade, which involves South Korean companies sending raw materials 
to the North and then reimporting finished or semi-finished products. This allows South 
Korean companies to take advantage of cheaper labour in the North, since rising wages in 
the South have made production less profitable there. POC trade began modestly in 1992 
and rocketed to one-half of all transactional trade in 2002. For South Korean companies, 
POC trade offers the greatest economic benefit. Besides the benefit of cheaper labour than 
in the South or even China, Seoul government classifies trade with the North as intra-
Korean trade, and therefore duties and rules that would apply under World Trade 
Organization statutes can be avoided.  
POC trade alone is a remarkable development in inter-Korean relations given that it 
requires more and deeper communication than would mere exchanges of finished products 
across a border. It allows more functional linkages between the two countries. The 
willingness of the North Korean government to allow South Korean supervisors and South 
Korean factory organization within its territory indicates a slackening of its fears of 
cultural pollution and of attacks on its political system. Indeed, in April 2001 North Korea 
passed the Processing Trade Law, representing its deep interest in POC, and in 2003 the 
Prime Minister, Pak Pong Ju, led a group of North Koreans on a tour of semiconductor 
plants in the South5.  
In addition to classifying all trade with North Korea as intra-Korean trade, South Korea 
also included in its trade statistics a category of “non-transactional trade.” This was 
actually an accounting of aid sent to the North – including for example goods related to 
the former KEDO nuclear reactor projects, the Mt. Kumgang tourist project, and 
humanitarian aid. The fact that statistically Seoul ties together commercial trade and aid is 
indicative of its perspective on inter-Korean trade: like aid, it is a component of a 
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functional project of expanding interactions and relations with the North in pursuit of a 
more peaceful and harmonious coexistence or reunified existence.  
Non-transactional trade began in 1995 and increased to such a degree that, during the 
“Sunshine Policy” it was almost as great as transactional trade. To a certain extent, even 
the transactional trade is a form of aid. Because of a lack of hard currency, the North 
cannot import South Korean goods to the extent that it might like, and so Seoul maintains 
a trade deficit with Pyongyang in terms of transactional trade. Clearly, given the 
proportion of the South Korean’s total trade, this trade deficit is not fiscally significant. 
Nonetheless, the fact that South Korea is importing more than it exports implies a 
bolstering of the North’s foreign exchange reserves, and South Korea has become the 
largest provider of hard currency to the North, which it uses to purchase indispensable 
imports from other countries. In November 2003, the Inter-Korean Economic Promotion 
Committee agreed to begin conducting more efficient settlement clearance transactions on 
a trial basis in 20046.  
In addition, while the South traditional reunification policy put an almost exclusive 
emphasis on high-level government-to-government talks, the “Sunshine Policy” sought to 
encourage non-official contacts. It aimed to create “a set of interdependencies that in the 
long run would discourage the North from external aggression and perhaps even promote 
the internal transformation of the regime”. The threefold increase in trade over the term of 
Kim Dae Jung’s presidency – from $221 million in 1998 to $641 million in 2002 – is 
indicative of the success of the “Sunshine Policy” in this regard7.  
Since the 2000 Summit meeting, over two dozen agreements have been signed between 
the two Koreas. These agreements can be grouped into three post-summit phases. From 
the date of the summit through the end of 2000, there was a flurry of cross-border activity 
with numerous delegations traveling in both directions, culminating in the four agreements 
of December 16, 2000, on the resolution of commercial disputes, the prevention of double 
taxation, transactions clearing settlement, and the protection of investments. An 18-month 
hiatus ensued, coinciding with the first year and a half of the George W. Bush presidency 
in the United States. In this second phase inter-Korean dialogue stalled and inter-Korean 
trade dropped. The third phase began in August 2002 with a flurry of agreements, many 
having to do with cross-border road and rail connections. The fact that this third phase !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Ministry of Unification 2003, ‘Agreement of the 7th Meeting of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation 
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continued through the North Korean nuclear revelations of October 2002 speaks to the 
strength of the functional relations between the two Koreas. Consistent with a conflict 
management approach, Seoul opted to continue its dialogues and the issuance of formal 
agreements with the North despite the revived security challenge of nuclear proliferation.  
The agreements on roads and railways are indicative of one of the problems of expanding 
trade with the DPRK: the lack of infrastructure. Because of the underdevelopment of 
transportation infrastructure in the North and the lack of connections across the DMZ, 
President Kim Dae-jung proclaimed in March 2000, in the so-called Berlin Declaration, 
“To realize meaningful economic collaboration, the social infrastructure, including 
highways, harbours, railroads and electric and communications facilities, must be 
expanded. . . . The Government of the Republic of Korea is ready to respond positively to 
any North Korean request in this regard”8.  
Inter-Korean trade served as an economic purpose for North Korea and a broader 
functional purpose for South Korea. Ultimately, however, inter-Korean trade has been 
constrained by several structural factors. Both production facilities and infrastructure in 
the North are dilapidated and in need of serious updating. Pyongyang’s lack of hard 
currency reserves mean that it cannot import as much as it otherwise might from the 
South, and because of the state’s control of the economy and the general poverty in the 
country, there are no free domestic markets for South Korean products. To increase the 
efficiency of trade and the willingness of South Korean companies to engage in trade with 
the North, Pyongyang will need to continue revising its laws, institutionalizing its 
commercial practices, and demonstrating rule of law. For Seoul to continue using trade in 
a functional way, it will need to see progress of this sort in the North. Many of these 
problems that emerged in the first years of the increase of inter-Korean trade were faced, 
and partly solved, during Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency, in particular with the construction 
of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
 
The prospects for inter-Korean investment was less clear between the end of the ‘90s and 
the beginning of the 2000s. While North Korea certainly needed investment to the same 
degree that it needed trade – if not to a greater degree – South Korean firms, were less 
willing to pursue investment, given the uncertainties surrounding the rate of return, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  Kim, Dae-jung 2000, ‘Lessons on German reunification and the Korean peninsula’, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March, 9. !
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liquidity and ultimate safety of any investment in the North. Establishing the economic 
institutions for trade to provide the necessary perception of certainty has been difficult 
enough; establishing institutions to make investors feel secure in North Korea was even 
more problematic. South Korean investors have been content thus far to observe the North 
as a potential investment partner and not actually to invest in it9. Nonetheless, evidence of 
tentative investment by South Korean companies were present and the beginning of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex project represented the North Korean best push to catalyse 
Southern investment.  
Inter-Korean investment has not only lacked the two-way flows of inter-Korean trade but 
has also lacked the progressive time frame of that trade. Only after Kim Dae-jung 
inaugurated the “Sunshine Policy” was the possibility of investment in North Korea 
effectively opened. Kim removed the upper limit on the amount of investment possible for 
South Korean companies, allowed for investment in all fields unless strictly prohibited (as 
opposed to maintaining a list of the only acceptable sectors for investment), and simplified 
the approval process. Yet a survey two-and-a-half years later found that South Korean 
companies were alarmed by the lack of institutional framework, the possibility of double 
taxation, and the impossibility of investment guarantees.  
These concerns have been addressed both at the domestic level and at the bilateral level. 
Congruent with the launch of the “Sunshine Policy” in the South, North Korea 
promulgated its 1998 Constitution and then three subsequent laws focused on external 
economic cooperation: the Foreign Equity Law, the Contractual Joint Venture Law, and 
the Foreign Enterprises Law10. At the inter-Korean level, four agreements were signed in 
December 2000 on commercial disputes, double taxation, transactions clearing settlement, 
and investment protection. It took another three years, however, for negotiators to agree to 
implement these agreements, leading many to question the worth of the Inter-Korean 
Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, which should have been exactly the 
institutional mechanism needed to spur investment. In the interim, though, Pyongyang did 
pass domestically the Foreign Trade Act of February 2001 and the Enforcement Decree of 
the Foreign Investment Protection Act of December 2001. The Committee finally issued a 
declaration in August 2003: “The South and the North will take follow-up steps to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Flake, Gordon L. 1999, ‘Patterns of Inter-Korean Economic Relations’, in Hahn Bae Ho and Lee, Chae-jin 
eds., Patterns of Inter-Korean Relations, The Sejong Institute, Seoul. 
10 Lee, Eric Yong-joong 2000, ‘Development of North Korea’s legal regime governing foregin business 
cooperation: a revisit under the new Socialist Constitution of 1990’, Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business, Vol. 21,  No. 1, pp. 199-242.  
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‘four agreements’, which institutionally guarantee inter-Korean economic cooperation.” 
One auspicious component of the June and July 2003 talks leading to the August 
declaration was that the South Korean negotiating team “commuted” each day through the 
DMZ on land in June, while the North Korean team made the journey southward through 
the DMZ in July11.  
The slow pace of these developments is not at all remarkable. Laws about taxation of 
foreign investment, control over foreign exchange, the role of foreign banks, leasing of 
land and customs are in many ways discordant with the Juche philosophy that undergirds 
North Korea. The regime was certainly aware of this threat and this explained some of the 
foot-dragging that has occurred. The investment that was indeed allowed was not 
completely divorced from Juche principles. According to a Korean Development Institute 
survey, of 672 companies that started doing business in the DPRK in 2000 or 2001, only 
171 were still involved in North Korea in November 2001, and only one-third of the 115 
firms who responded said that they were making a profit in their Northern ventures.37 
While some companies were willing to overlook these low returns either in deference to 
the grander goals of peaceful coexistence and reunification or because of a belief that they 
can capture market share at an early stage, others were not so willing.  
South Korean companies have also cited the lack of transportation infrastructure as a 
factor militating against investment. Negotiators undertook this issue in 2003, signing in 
January an agreement for “military assurances” that would allow for work to begin on 
roads and railways crossing the DMZ. Kim Dae Jung referred to the reconnection of the 
lines, severed just before the Korean War in 1950, as de facto reunification. Road and rail 
reconnection is both a component of the developing trade and investment linkages and 
also a functional connection between the North and the South. The fact that the two 
Korean states can cooperate to build transportation infrastructure across the most heavily 
militarized border in the world is a powerful statement at several levels and one rightly 
judged as a contribution to a broad program of engagement.  
As an indicator of the seriousness of the rail and road projects, 12 out of 17 inter-Korean 
agreements signed between August 2002 and November 2003 dealt with the procedural 
and operational details of the work on the Sinuiju–Seoul (Kyonggi) and Donghae rail lines 
and highways. The completion of de-mining work in December 2002 was described by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Dong, Yong-seung 2001, ‘After the Summit’, p. 90.!
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North as “a shining fruition of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration, a landmark of 
national reunification, and product of the desire of all the Koreans”.12 
Despite all these motivating factors there was little progress on the rail project in the 
northern half of the peninsula because of a simple lack of investment, whereby the North 
needed better infrastructure in order to get investment but needed investment in order to 
improve its infrastructure.  
In this light, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) – the largest inter-Korean economic 
project – became all the more important. Forty miles north of Seoul, the KIC was 
designed to lure South Korean businesses to use cheap North Korean labour, with the 
expectation of the kind of effects that China’s SEZ reaped from its proximity to Hong 
Kong13. With 22,000 Korean companies having set up factories in China, it would have 
appeared that there was an ample investment base waiting to move into the KIC. Hyundai 
announced the project in February 2001 as part of the Mt. Kumgang tourism agreement. 
According to Hyundai Asan, Hyundai’s North Korean arm, production at the KIC should 
have been around $2 billion in its first year and should have reached $14.5 billion in its 
ninth year. The KIC certainly appeared better positioned to reap gains than the remote and 
infrastructure-less Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic Zone, which, despite having been in 
existence since over a decade before, boasts of only a hotel and casino as its main 
investments14.  
 
The efforts put in place during the “Sunshine Policy” to increase cooperation in trade and 
investment can be considered as remarkable, also because it is the first time in which a 
South Korean government tried to create the necessary conditions – from the legislative 
and institutional point of view – to make those interactions successful and contribute 
significantly to the improvement of inter-Korean relations. The effects have been visible 
in the increasing year-on-year of the total amounts of trade between the two Koran states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Decemeber 17, 2002. 
13 Tait, Richard 2003, ‘Playing by the rule in Korea: Lessons learned in the North-South economic 
engagement’, Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 2, p. 316. 
14 Foster-Carter, Aidan 2003, ‘Symbolic links, real gaps’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 5, No. 2,  p. 93. 
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Tab 6: Inter-Korean Trade by year (Unit million dollars) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Data & Statistics – Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation 
 
The progresses made during the period 1998-2002 will constituted a solid foundations for 
the development of the subsequent engagement policy brought forward by Roh Moo-
hyun: the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”, in which the economic dimension of 
cooperation will achieve the highest degree of importance. 
 
 
3.2.2 Economic Cooperation at the Forefront: the “Policy of Peace and 
Prosperity” 
 
Under the Roh Moo-hyun government, it was increasingly clear that the goal of 
reconciliation through economic cooperation with Pyongyang had become the top priority. 
Through the improvement in inter-Korean relations, it aimed “to reinforce peace on the 
Korean Peninsula and promote co-prosperity of the both South and North Korea” so as to 
build a foundation for peaceful unification.4 Furthermore, through the successful 
implementation of the policy, the Roh government hoped to transform South Korea into 
the economic and financial hub of Northeast Asia. This is why Roh has been quoted to 
have said that “he would not mind the failures of all other policies only if the North Korea 
policy were successful”.15 
In spite of the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, triggered by the North Korean 
nuclear crisis, the Roh government decided to promote economic cooperation and cultural 
exchanges with North Korea through various channels, including inter-Korean ministerial 
talks on economic cooperation. Apparently, it assumed that the promotion of inter-Korean 
reconciliation through economic cooperation would help to reduce tensions and stabilize !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Kim, Choong-nam 2005, ‘The Roh Moo-hyun Government’s policy toward North Korea’, International 
Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 14. 
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peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it expected that the South’s 
economic assistance would contribute not only to alleviating the North’s economic 
hardship but also to moderating Pyongyang’s behaviour and policy toward the outside 
world.  
Since 2003, it has provided more economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea than the 
total amount provided by its predecessors from 1995 to 2002.  
 
Tab 7: South Korean Assistance to North Korea (Unit hundred million won) 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Data & Statistics – Humanitarian Projects 
 
The Roh’s government believed that the improvement in reconciliation and cooperation 
between South and North Korea is essential to the reduction of tension on the Korean 
Peninsula and for the eventual resolution of the nuclear standoff. Thus, while cooperating 
with the USA and other powers in seeking the peaceful resolution of the North Korean 
nuclear issue, Roh’s government has endeavoured to promote inter-Korean economic 
cooperation by supporting three major economic cooperation projects: the construction of 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC); the linking of two key railways and roads between 
South and North Korea; and  the continued development of the Mount Kumgang Tourism 
Zone.  
First, on the basis of the agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang on the reconnection of 
the Seoul-Shinuiju (or Kyongi) Line, a cross border section of the railway between 
Dorasan Station (in the South) and Kaesong (in the North) was completed together with a 
parallel road by the end of 2003. It was followed by the construction of the Tonghae (East 
Coast) Line (involving railway and a parallel road) between Jeojin (the North) and Ongjin 
(the South) in 2004. As North Korea also built its share of the cross border railways and 
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roads in accordance with the agreement with the South, the Kyongi and Tonghae lines 
were reconnected by November 200416. As a result, South Korean tourists could start 
visiting Mt. Kumgang via the Tonghae road instead of using sea-lanes which were more 
time-consuming and costly. At the same time, the reconnection of the Kyongi road has 
made it possible for South Korean workers to use the overland transport from the South to 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). About 300 buses and trucks started to travel to the 
North daily using the two newly reconnected highways17. 
In order to operate the two reconnected key railways, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed to 
schedule test runs for the railways on May 25, 2006. However, the trial runs were 
cancelled abruptly by North Korea one day before the scheduled event. This was the third 
consecutive time that Pyongyang failed to honour the agreement on the test run of the 
reconnected railways. Seoul strongly criticized the North for unilaterally calling off the 
test runs. However, instead of apologizing to the South, North Korea blamed South Korea 
for the cancellation, specifically criticizing the South Korean military’s refusal to 
accommodate North Korea’s demand on the adjustment of the existing sea boundary (the 
Northern Limitation Line, NLL) separating the two Koreas in the West Sea. Pyongyang 
wanted to draw a new sea boundary further south from the existing line, the one set by the 
U.N. Command at the end of the Korean War in 1953. It was clearly not an issue directly 
related to the reconnected railway. Apparently, North Korea wanted to squeeze major 
concessions on the NLL (boundary of the existing territorial waters between the South and 
North) out of Seoul before agreeing to the operation of the reconnected railways. When 
South Korea refused to give in to the North’s demand, North Korea refused to agree on 
the safety measures for the operation of the reconnected railways on May 18. Infuriated by 
the North’s failure to honour the agreement on the railway test runs, it was reported that 
the Roh government was reconsidering its agreement with the North to provide millions of 
dollars worth of raw materials for the North’s light industries. The unilateral cancellation 
of the opening of the reconnected railways has not only disappointed the Roh government 
but has also undermined the trustworthiness of the Kim Jong-Il regime.  
Second, the Roh government has helped Hyundai Asan to revitalize the Mt. Kumgang 
Tourism Project. Following its debut in 1999 as a pioneering inter-Korean cooperative 
venture, the Mt. Kumgang project had stagnated shortly thereafter due to the decline in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Lim, Kang-taeg and Kim, Kyu-ryoon 2006, ‘North Korea Economic Reform and Inter-Korean Economic 
Cooperation’, Korea and world affairs, Spring, p. 40. 
17 ‘Inter-Korean Business Park in foreign media spotlight’, Korea Policy Review, April 2006. 
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demand and popularity of the tour program. However, it began to show signs of 
revitalization after the North agreed to accept the South’s proposal to make overland tour 
programs to Mt. Kumgang available in September 2003. To provide a more secure 
atmosphere for tourists, North Korea agreed to set the boundary on the estimated 19.8 
million square meters as a special tourism zone in October 2003. Apparently, the 
availability of the overland transport from the South to Mt. Kumgang following the 
reconnection of the Tonghae Line has revived the popularity of the Mt. Kumgang tourism 
project and made it financially viable. The tour project has drawn over 1.2 million visitors 
since the beginning of the program18.  
In spite of the symbolic value of the Mt. Kumgang project for inter-Korean reconciliation 
and cooperation, it has had very little effect on North Koreans’ perceptions and attitudes 
toward South Korea, for the tourists from the South are not allowed to interact with 
ordinary North Koreans who were kept out of the tour zone, except for a small number of 
North Koreans who are recruited by the North to work for the hotels and restaurants in the 
Mt. Kumgang tour zone.  
Third, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) has become a showcase project of inter-
Korean cooperation under the Roh government’s peace and prosperity policy. Both in 
terms of visibility and significance, the KIC overshadowed all the other joint projects 
between South and North Korea. Located about 37 miles (or 60 kilometers) north of 
Seoul, the industrial complex covers an area of about 66 square kilometers in Kaesong, 
North Korea. After some initial disagreements over such issues as wages for North Korean 
workers and the price of the land plots, the two Koreas were able to hammer out a package 
deal by April 2004 when the Hyundai Asan (the South) and the Asia-Pacific Peace 
Committee of North Korea (the North) concluded an agreement on the construction of the 
KIC19.  
According to the agreement, the industrial park was to be completed through three stages 
of development. Stage 1 involved the development of 3.3 square kilometers land plot, 
including a pilot site of over 92,500 square meters, to be leased to domestic and foreign 
companies by the end of 2007. The land involved in the first stage was leased from North 
Korea for 50 years. The remaining 62.8 square kilometers were to be developed later in 
accordance with further consultation between Hyundai Asan and North Korea later to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  Kim, Hong-nack 2006, ‘South-North Korean relations under the Roh Moo-hyun government’, 
International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 40. 
19 Kim, Yong-hyon 2006, ‘South-North exchange and cooperation and peace on the Korean Peninsula’, 
Korea Policy Review, April, p. 10. 
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accommodate the participation of over 2,000 South Korean and foreign firms. Already 
fifteen South Korean companies started operating in the KIC, where some 6,500 North 
Korean workers were employed by these companies with salaries averaging $57.50 per 
month at the beginning. By the end of 2006, it was expected that approximately 15,000 
North Korean workers will be employed by South Korean firms; and by the end of 2007, 
70,000 North Koreans were expected to be employed by about 250 firms. Eventually, the 
number of the Northern workers had to rise to over 350,000 by 2012, making the 
industrial park a pivotal model of South-North economic cooperation20. 
As a joint venture, the KIC was expected to benefit both sides. It would benefit South 
Korean companies by easing the cost burden in such area as wages and rents, while 
helping economically hard-pressed North Korea by providing an important source of hard 
currency. By combining South Korean capital and technology with North Korea’s cheap 
labour and land, it would have become a profitable and cost-effective joint venture. Thus, 
it is regarded as a “win-win” strategy for both sides. It is by far the largest and most 
ambitious project of economic cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang to date. It is 
also a key to South Korea’s strategy for inducing North Korea to adopt market-oriented 
economic reform. For North Korea, the Kaesong model could lead to a revitalization of its 
economy with only a limited dose of openness to the outside world. While the financial 
risk is assumed fully by South Korea, which invested more than $2 billion, North Korea 
may have to take a political risk, as contacts with South Koreans could have become 
contagious and may affect adversely the Kim Jong-Il regime’s grip on power built around 
the Juche ideology.  
From the beginning, the future of the KIC was by no means secure or rosy, as the 
unresolved dispute over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program could derail or delay any 
large-scale expansion of the KIC. Furthermore, South Korean firms could not produce 
certain strategic or high-tech products in the KIC under the existing agreements between 
South Korea and the United States. Moreover, the unwillingness of the USA to recognize 
products manufactured in the KIC as those made in South Korea could cast a dark shadow 
over the future of the Industrial Complex. Unless these products were treated as those 
manufactured in South Korea, the American tariffs would be prohibitively high for them 
to be exported to that market. Such a development in turn could substantially diminish the 
attractiveness of the KIC for many South Korean companies.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Ibidem. 
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Reflecting significant progress in economic cooperation between South and North Korea, 
the inter-Korean trade volume increased from $697 million in 2004 to over $1 billion in 
2005. In 2006, South Korea ranked as North Korea’s second largest trading partner 
surpassed only by China. Moreover, under the Roh government, South Korea has 
increased economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea. The amount of such aid 
increased from 1,888 million won in 2003 to 2.984 million won in 2004. In 2005, it 
totaled 2,138 million.15 In terms of South Korean currency the total amount of aid to 
North Korea under the Roh government exceeded the combined total aid provided by its 
predecessors from 1995 to 2002. It should also be noted that, under the Roh government, 
South Korea has increased cultural and personal exchanges with the North. For example, 
in 2005 more than 87,000 South Koreans visited North Korea, while over 1,500 North 
Koreans visited South Korea. Meanwhile, over 10,000 members of separated families had 
family reunions from June 15, 2000, to the end of 2005, and more opportunities will 
become available to them as video meetings have been introduced21.  
Although the Roh government maintained that inter-Korean reconciliation and 
cooperation through the increased exchange of people and goods between South and 
North Korea would alleviate tensions, improve bilateral relations and foster peaceful 
coexistence between the two Koreas, there were clearly limits to promoting reconciliation 
and peaceful coexistence through economic cooperation and cultural exchanges between 
the two entirely different political systems. Unless and until North and South Korea can 
work out a significant agreement in the military field, including a comprehensive peace 
treaty that would end the Korean War, the dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear 
weapons program and conventional arms control and reduction, it is doubtful that there 
can be genuine rapprochement and peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea.  
 
 
3.3.3 The Kaesong Industrial Complex 
 
Battered by a nearly bankrupted economy and continuous food shortages, North Korea has 
been cautiously opening its doors to strike economic deals with South Korea in recent 
years. The closed nature of the North’s economy has resulted in low industrial 
productivity and efficiency, technological backwardness, and, in the end, economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21!Kim, Hong-nack 2006, ‘South-North Korean relations under the Roh Moo-hyun government’.!
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stagnation. The North is also concerned that with the disparity in economic levels, 
unification with the South might result in the virtual absorption of the North into the 
South. Thus, the South’s policy during Roh Moo-hyun administration in this regard has 
been to reassure the North that unity through absorption is neither feasible nor desirable 
under the current state of military confrontation.  
In this context, both sides appear to prefer a gradual narrowing of the economic gap 
between the two nations prior to unification, and a practical, business-like approach 
represented the simplest and most efficient way to accomplish this goal. While economic 
negotiations have been erratic and stymied at times by political difficulties, the South’s 
business community has engaged in serious efforts toward developing trade and 
investment. Hence the mutual economic benefits perceived by both the South and the 
North constitute the permanent and crucial ingredients of possible unification.  
Some signs indicated that the North not only responded positively toward the South but 
also took specific measures to accommodate itself with the South. The North specifically 
designated the Kaesong special economic zone as an industrial complex site aimed 
primarily at accommodating the South’s investments under commissioned processing, 
joint ventures and direct investment. In November 2002, the North Korean government 
announced plans to develop Kaesong into an industrial complex, making a significant 
impact on the current level of inter-Korean economic cooperation.  
Understanding the past track records of the two Koreas’ respective business paths would 
help both the South and the North in the task of accelerating and securing inter-Korean 
business transactions. Such increased economic cooperation led to market extension with 
the concomitants of economies of scale, learning curve effects, competition, and trade 
creation.   
 
The Kaesong Industrial Park is an administrative zone with special economic legal status, 
and it is physically and legally separated from the rest of the North. Strong economic 
autonomy is provided under the guidance of market economy principles, and special 
economic considerations are given to the South’s firms investing in the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex. Thereby the Kaesong Industrial Park is expected to create a favourable 
environment enabling the largest-ever combination of factors of production from both the 
South and the North. The Kaesong Industrial Park, when it began full-scale operation, 
should produce positive effects, practically influencing over all economic sectors of both 
sides.  
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The South’s successful economic development has greatly increased the wage level of its 
domestic labour force, and many of the South’s companies have been forced to either hire 
foreign labour from China and Southeast Asia or to transfer their manufacturing bases to 
those countries. However, due in part to North Korea’s compulsory education system, the 
common Korean language, lower transportation costs and the exemption of tariffs on the 
transfer of goods between the North and the South, the North’s workforce is generally 
considered to be more valuable to the South than their Chinese and Southeast Asian 
counterparts.  
Furthermore, the productivity of the North’s workforce would be enhanced by the 
technology transfer and management know-how from the South. Thus, the North’s 
inexpensive labour offers a cost effective option for the South’s companies operating in 
the Kaesong Industrial Park. The Kaesong Industrial Park would also facilitate the 
industrial transformation of the South, as it would be able to transform its industrial 
structure at a lower cost toward high-value-added industries. The South and the North are 
benefited by this project since the South accesses low cost labour, and the North earns 
hard currency from the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Park.  
Small companies have pursued investment opportunities in the North, as part of their 
survival business strategy, and under the current managerial difficulties such investment 
has grown all the more important for small companies. The wage differential between the 
two Koreas is substantial, pushing the South’s small companies to shift their production 
facilities to the North in search of lower labour costs. Inter-Korean trade and investment 
are closely linked to each other. The North’s lower labour cost with the South’s 
investments has produced not only favourable commercial transactions between the two 
countries but international competitiveness along with factor equalization between them22. 
Having participated in the Kaesong Industrial Park, the South can assist the North’s 
structural reforms and infrastructure build-up in order to make it easier for the North to 
adopt a market economy. The South has a major stake in how the North’s economy will 
accommodate the inflow of foreign capital in the Industrial Park. The development and 
networking of industrial and business clusters on the Korean peninsula and expansion of 
the transportation and logistic infrastructures also constitute the core part of South’s plan 
to establish itself as a regional hub, as the Kaesong Industrial Park tries to induce 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Lee, Jong-woon 2004, ‘Economic Opening of the Hermit Kingdom: current status and future tasks of the 
new SEZs in North Korea’, Journal of International Economic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 123.129. 
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investment, technology, and management know-how initially from the South, and then 
from Japan, the US and European Union by injecting a number of incentives23.  
After the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Park, more investment were expected, not 
only for labour-intensive industries, such as: clothing, shoes, appliances, parts and 
components of communications and information technology from the South and other 
countries, but these developments would lead to further expansion of foreign investment 
in the service sector, including transportation, energy and tourism.  
The Kaesong Industrial Park could reap substantial economic benefits by creating a 
mechanism of sub-regional economic cooperation with its bordering regions. And if the 
Kaesong Industrial Park would have been geared toward actively utilizing the 
infrastructure and economic resources of the Seoul metropolitan area, there have been 
great potential for the Park to spread into a second and third one as well. Thereby, 
resources would be used more efficiently as a result of eliminating unnecessary 
competition, and a sizeable economy would be created, thus increasing economic 
specialization and economies of scale, and further inducing investment.  
The developments between the South and the North after the South-North Summit of 2000 
have accelerated the volume of inter-Korean trade, which increased from $ 13 million in 
1990 to $ 724 million in 2003. In order to promote business relations by nurturing 
goodwill and reassuring the North, the South should endorse the North’s membership in 
the World Trade Organization and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, along with 
demanding a special status for the two Koreas.  
Hyundai Asan and the Korea Land Development Corporation, in conjunction with the 
North, made comprehensive and detailed plans for improving Kaesong Industrial Park’s 
infrastructure, an endeavour that will entail site preparation, an energy supply, 
communalizations and transportation.  
Hyundai Asan projected that the Kaesong Industrial complex would create jobs for 
360,000 South Koreans and 250,000 North Koreans, with value additions of $ 6 billion for 
the South and $ 6.2 billion for the North, plus spin-off effects. The Federation of Korean 
Industries also estimated that the Kaesong Industrial Park would generate $ 18.9 billion in 
production and $ 7.8 billion in additional value creation for the South24.  
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23 Nam, Sung-wook 2001, ‘Theory and Practice: Kaesong and inter-Korean economic cooperation’. 
24 Park, Suhk-sam 2004, ‘An analysis of Economic Effects of the Kaesong Industrial Park’, Vantage Point, 
August, pp. 67-68. 
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Tab 8: Projected Size of the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
 
Source: Hyundai Asan Corporation, Investment Environment in Kaesong Economic Free Zone, 2000 
 
With a resolution of the present nuclear problem, the international community would 
provide a concrete blueprint for moving beyond the current diplomatic stalemate. With the 
Six-Party Talks (North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia) 
concluded, inter-Korean economic transactions along with the Kaesong Industrial Park 
should increase rapidly. Moreover, as the infrastructure of the industrial complex is 
incomplete, manufacturing products of the South’s investment are increasingly exported, 
and the Kaesong Industrial Park should attract Japanese, American and other foreign 
investment in the industrial complex.  
Several suggested methods for financing include combining funding sources from the 
South’s developers and the international financial markets through the project financing 
method, incorporating public and commercial loans and/or issuing investment bonds for 
international investors. The South has the inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Fund 
designed to reimburse companies for losses incurred in doing business with the North, and 
this program requires more funds as the volume increases. The Fund should mandate the 
South’s trading companies to become members since the entity serves as a kind of 
insurance. And the South should consider issuing internal bonds for sales abroad so as to 
increase financial resources.  
Since many American companies are eager to be involved in the North’s economy and in 
Northeast Asia at large, the American government would look to expand contacts with the 
North. Japanese companies already made basic preparations for expanding into the North, 
and with a legal apparatus in place, Japanese companies could consider to increase 
consigned production with the North and more joint ventures in the Kaesong Industrial 
Park.  
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The Park can also take advantage of the economic resources of the Seoul Metropolitan 
area. The majority of foreign enterprises entering the Kaesong Industrial Park during the 
initial stages of its development have been focused on export activities, and the South’s 
market. As development of the industrial complex progresses, and investment from the 
South flourishes, the KIC will also spur increased interest from Japanese, American and 
other foreign direct investments. Thus, such investment can be directed to labour-intensive 
manufacturing, and these developments in turn can lead to expansion of foreign 
investment in the service sectors, in such areas as transportation, energy and tourism.  
Inter-Korean economic cooperation has been evidenced by talks between the two Koreas 
on the reconnection of the trans-Korea railway through the demilitarized zone (DMZ), 
which would dramatically reduce the cost of transporting to and from the South, and 
would transform the Kaesong Industrial Park into a critical transportation centre. The 
reconnection of the Kyongi railway through the DMZ greatly reduces the cost of 
transporting parts and goods and thus makes the Kaesong Industrial Park much more 
attractive and competitive than Chinese counterpart cities.  
Moreover, the Park not only represents a symbol of the two Koreas’ increasing economic 
cooperation but also an opportunity to contribute to the South’s plan to develop the 
Incheon Free Economic Zone (FEZ) as a business hub in Northeast Asia with the Kaesong 
Industrial complex serving as a key part of the broader plan to link business clusters on the 
peninsula. The KIC would thus become a production base for a key network of business 
clusters, including the Inchon FEZ and the city of Seoul. Kaesong is only an 80-minute 
drive from the centre of Seoul, and can be linked to inter-Korean railroads, which the 
South also plans to connect with the Trans-Siberia, Trans-Mongolia and Trans-China 
railways.  
 
Since the North’s companies are often not able to pay regularly due to frequent 
suspensions of operations as a result of power shortages and a lack of basic raw materials, 
their workers have found it increasingly difficult to make ends meet on their wages. 
Because a growing number of workers have abandoned their worksites, the North has had 
to reform its policy to encourage workers to return to their workplaces by providing them 
with increased wages as well as material incentives. Of particular concern has been the 
massive exodus of workers who abandoned their assigned worksites in search of other 
work opportunities, such as peddling and private businesses, in order to improve their 
economic situation.  
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Thus, the North’s leadership has known that reform had to be introduced in response to 
this aggravating situation to jumpstart an economic recovery. The leadership was also 
aware that introducing reform creates the so-called “reform dilemma” and endangers their 
regime unless improvements are adopted at an accelerating rate. Thereby, the North 
launched efforts to reform and open up its economic system. Since the adoption of its 
“Economic Improvement Measures” on July 1, 2002, Pyongyang has implemented a 
series of surprisingly tangible measures aimed at promoting economic reform, which has 
included the recent authorization for individuals to engage in activities related to 
marketing. Based on these economic reform measures, the Kaesong Industrial Park has 
tried to induce direct investment from the South. 
In November 2002, the Basic Law (five articles and forty-six sections) articulated specific 
provisions for the South’s investors. This reform received much attention due to the 
extraordinary content of the Basic Law since it reflected elements of market economies, 
such as allowing individuals to own private property and have rights of inheritance, and 
also delineated the development implications for the ‘one country, two systems’ strategy. 
It is composed of investor’s rights, development methods, and duration of land leases, 
labour utilization and commercial dispute-settlement procedures.  
Furthermore, the Basic Law articulated special immigration procedures, residential status, 
personal safety, and the unrestricted usage of inter-Korean postal/communications 
services. Free movements within designated routes between the South and the Kaesong 
Industrial Park have been facilitated and expedited with entry certificates, instead of visas, 
issued by the Kaesong Industrial Park management authority. These measures have also 
simplified immigration processes and customs clearance procedures for the South’s 
investors.  
The Economic reforms have specified the adjustment of state-controlled prices to realistic 
levels, the partial abolition of the public rationing system, the rationalization of a foreign 
exchange rate and partial decentralization of the state planning system. With respect to the 
partial decentralization of the state planning system, the role of the national Planning 
Committee has been reduced to only announce provincial targets for industrial production 
and major infrastructure construction, while provincial and city administrations increased 
their roles in managing the economic activities of relevant regions. Individual production 
units, including state-owned enterprises and local- level factories, were authorized to 
implement their own production plans and decide the prices of their products.  
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The North’s centralized industrial management system was restructured between mid-
1999 and early 2000 to improve the productivity of state-owned enterprises. New 
economy/political ideologies including the “New Way of Thinking Movement” and 
“Practical Socialism” emerged as slogans for facilitating economic recovery. Hence, the 
recent expansion of the special economic zones could be interpreted as part of the North’s 
attempts to tackle the economic decline through economic policy adjustments and partial 
economic openness. 
The North was also under pressure from the dilemma caused by the eventual breakdown 
of a civil society that could not sustain law and order due to the illegal mobility of its 
population, unless a market system were introduced. Thus, under the name of market 
pragmatism, the North granted its workers the right to move to pursue higher wages, and 
that has in turn led to higher productivity.  
Since the economic reforms were instituted in July 2002, prices of most goods and the 
wages of workers rose significantly in the North due to the initial effects of the market 
mechanisms. Accordingly, price and wage levels seemed to be measured and guided by 
the market in terms of production costs and buyers’ utility, namely supply and demand, 
under the initial stages of competition and resource allocation. Through interactions of 
supply and demand, pricing appeared to prevail along with reflecting market signals.  
Prices of consumer goods, agricultural products and services rose ten-fold or higher, while 
the decade-long system of state subsidies for price differentials between the actual 
production cost and retail price was almost abolished. As noted earlier, the North 
implemented a series of surprisingly tangible measures aimed at promoting economic 
reforms, which included recent authorization for individuals to engage in activities related 
to the marketing and even distribution of intellectual property rights.  
Socialist economies would now be too complex to plan from the centre and would require 
more information on technology, prices, quantities, and assortments than a central 
planning board could digest. Moreover, the task of planning and management could not be 
effectively decentralized, because in the absence of private property, even the best-
intentioned managers of state enterprises could not make economically feasible decisions.  
By allowing individual participants to respond to market incentives, the new market 
socialism offers greater inducements to combine resources efficiently at the local level. 
The North’s current status could be compared to that of the regulated markets that existed 
during the early stages of economic reform in China. Indeed, the North is now in the 
initial phase of a partial transition toward a market economy.  
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As a reference point, the Chinese stance has been backed by policies designed to boost the 
domestic economy by expanding the market price system. In general, Chinese economic 
reform policies, including the agricultural contract system and industrial sector autonomy, 
have been developed gradually in a form that supports external liberalization policies. 
Having had foreign capital and technology, China’s economic growth has been 
phenomenal by mobilizing its dormant labour and site resources, and the North saw 
opportunities in China’s model in which China’s abundant supply of labour and land 
resources and huge influx of foreign capital and technology have realized China’s speedy 
economic development.  
In the late 1970s, the reforms of Deng Xiaoping fundamentally altered the Chinese 
economy while at the same time maintaining state and party control. The post-1978 
reform era fundamentally changed the landscape of the Chinese economy as it has moved 
toward market socialism. Major changes were introduced in industry, services, and foreign 
trade in particular. Privatization of the small-scale industry proceeded earlier than that of 
large- and medium-scale industries, and the service sector expanded and the rigidities of 
the foreign trade arrangements were altered, along with the introduction of special 
economic zones25.  
The Chinese special economic zone was viewed as: a special economic zone to function as 
a window linking China’s domestic economy with the outside world; a special economic 
zone to be able to function as a base for experimental economic reform associated with 
market-oriented polices; and a special economic zone to function as a developmental core 
that could induce spill-over effects to neighbouring areas.  
An examination of the Kaesong special economic zone proved that the North has 
incorporated a large part of China’s experiences in terms of both special economic zones 
and the legal infrastructure in its special economic zone formulation under the name of 
economic pragmatism. The institutional arrangements and incentive packages to induce 
foreign capital showed the North’s setup was similar to China’s coastal special economic 
zones.  
 
The North and South have pursued contrasting industrial policies for economic 
development, with distinctively different institutional arrangements. The North’s 
industrial policy has been characterized by a central command economy: heavy industry-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Wei, Ge 1999, ‘Special Economic Zones and the Opening of the Chinese Economy: some lessons for 
economic liberalization’, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 7, pp. 1267-1285. 
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led development, Juche orientation, and science/technology policy. The North also 
adopted state ownership of the means of production as a major principle of its industrial 
policy. Its pricing mechanism was based on the value of socially needed labour, and the 
prices of goods and services were derived from labour costs, not through the pricing 
mechanism of supply and demand interaction. 
Until the mid-1970s, North Korea’s economic development, bolstered by the benefits of 
foreign assistance, outperformed that of the South. But the North’s central economy ran 
into trouble as it grew more complex, eventually slipping behind the South at an 
accelerating rate. The North experienced difficulties in handling the increasing complexity 
of its economy in the absence of market mechanisms, as its commercial management 
system was made up of wholesale commerce, which was controlled by the central 
government, and retail commerce, which was controlled by regional governments. That 
provided the North with only one channel for the entire distribution of goods and 
resources.  
By contrast, the development of South Korea's economic system has relied on the market 
mechanism, though the national government assumed a vital developmental role in 
deciding major projects, allocating financial resources, and offering tax incentives to those 
who undertook production and export in strategic industries. The South adopted a policy 
of export-oriented industrialization. This policy extended preferences to exporters 
regarding import licenses, duty-free imports of intermediate products for exports, and 
generous capital depreciation allowances. Domestic savings were promoted through 
higher interest rates on deposits. Such measures eventually resulted in reduced inflation 
rates and lower rates of real interest, which in turn further promoted export-led industrial 
growth.  
In order to import scarce resources, the export-led strategy, based on comparative 
advantage, expanded industries that used the South’ s abundant labour supply. Labour-
intensive manufactured goods were exported, and, to facilitate an open economy, the 
South gradually reduced its protectionist policy by encouraging domestic industries to 
compete at home and abroad.  
When the USA announced troop reductions in the 1970s, the South perceived this action 
as foreshadowing the necessity for a greater industrial base for its own military purposes 
and began to promote the development of chemical and heavy industries. The South also 
saw Japan’s pattern of industrialization as one that its own export industries should 
pursue. The government considered conglomerates, or “Chaebol,” as suitable institutions 
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to implement industrialization in chemical and heavy industries, shipbuilding, steel, non-
ferrous metals, machinery, petrochemicals, and automobiles.  
In response to the South’s rapid industrialization, a distinct change in the North’s 
development policy occurred, adopting a turnaround policy from the centrally planned, 
self-reliant economy towards more cooperation and partnership with Western countries so 
as to acquire the necessary capital and technology. In this process, the North’s foreign 
trade and external debt increased rapidly from the 1970's, accompanied by substantial 
growth. The North’s trade with foreign nations increased from $390 million in 1965 to 
$1.91 billion in 1975.  
A major turning point in inter-Korean relations took place in 1984 as North Korea’s 
proposal to provide aid for flood victims in the South was accepted. Shortly thereafter, the 
North for the first time proposed tripartite talks with the U.S. and the South, a change 
from its previous insistence on bilateral talks with the U.S. only. Talks between the North 
and the South continued on several different levels. While inter-parliamentary discussions 
failed to get off the ground, due to a lack of an agreed agenda, and economic talks were 
aborted due to procedural differences, Red Cross negotiations bore fruit in September 
1985 when family reunion exchange visits between the North and the South took place. 
Efforts also commenced, although eventually unsuccessful, to organize a joint Korean 
team for the 1988 Seoul Olympics.  
As we previously saw, the first inter-Korean exchange of goods occurred in 1988; this 
development had the potential to alter significantly both the North’s future economic 
development and its foreign economic relations. Trade began modestly with the 21 
November 1988 arrival of forty kilograms of Northern clams at the South’s port of Pusan. 
A second transaction, in January 1989, involved the South’s imports of the North’s art 
such as paintings, pottery, woodwork, and industrial artworks.  
Nevertheless, the North tried to avoid direct trade with the South. Thereby small-scale 
trade was carried on through third countries with country of origin labels removed. The 
South imported raw materials from the North via foreign intermediaries in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, China and Japan after 1988. While rejecting direct trade, the North 
increasingly engaged in indirect trade while the North’s trade officials busily contacted the 
South’s businessmen in China to explore possible investment projects in the North.  
Up to 1994 inter-Korean trade totaled $930.8 million. Trade was transacted through 
counter-product arrangements by clearing third countries’ cash accounts, evolving 
gradually toward counter-trade. The South’s chaebol played a dominant role in the inter-
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Korean trade, while its small and medium-sized firms participated only marginally. The 
North exported to the South zinc ingots, gold ore, thermal coal, steel billets, anthracite 
coal and copper, and imported capital goods, sock-weaving and vacuum packaging 
machinery, and consumer goods such as rice, televisions and clothes as well as semi raw 
materials, plasticizer, petrochemical products and polyester textiles. 
Trade between the South and the North has been intermittently expanding. Inter-Korean 
trade in 1997 increased a sizeable 22.7% over 1996. Steel and metal items accounted for 
more than 50% of the South’s imports from the North. Gold and zinc ingots comprised the 
lion’s share of these imports, with gold ingots representing fully 25% of all the North’s 
exports to the South.  
Because of the IMF crisis in 1997, however, imports of gold ingots from the North 
declined sharply. In the first 10 months of 1997, an average of $ 4.36 million worth of 
gold ingots were imported every month from the North. This figure plunged to $ 2.64 
million in November 1997. Zinc ingots suffered a corresponding drop: in the following 
January-October period, imports averaged $ 3.07 million each month, falling to $ 1.41 
million in November. Imports of the North’s steel and metal items declined as well in 
1998-1999 because of the on-going gold-collection campaign and sluggish production 
activity in the South. 
Moving to direct trade enabled both Koreas to save transaction costs such as trans-
shipment, warehousing, and insurance costs. If inter-Korean direct trade were fully 
realized, the mineral resources of the North would be shared with the South, and the 
South’s labour shortage would be relieved by employing workers from the North. Both 
domestic markets would be expanded, and the competitiveness of both Koreas in the 
global market would be greatly enhanced.  
In the 1980s the North’s external policy began to change, following the introduction of the 
Joint Venture Law of 1984. The North set up the economic and free trade zone of Rajin-
Sonbong with introduction of laws and special provisions for foreign companies and 
investment.  
To relieve the heavy burden of its foreign debts and to induce foreign investment and 
technology, the North introduced a first-time joint venture law in September 1984. The 
North had high hopes for this law: 
 
1. joint venture could bring about economic modernization programs using foreign 
capital and technology;  
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2. this was integrated into the economic plan, solving bottlenecks in necessary inputs;  
3. joint ventures would blend the North’s management and production with foreign 
inputs so as to upgrade the North's products and international marketing.  
 
To the disappointment of the North Korean government, however, this law resulted in 
only 35 joint ventures to May 1989. In the economic and trade zone, security and political 
considerations were given greater priority over economic goals such as attracting foreign 
investment. The North even failed to provide adequate follow-up measures to promote the 
zone. It turned out to be a miserable failure caused by poor logistics and by a rigid policy 
within the system.  
On December 30, 1991, the North announced the creation of economic and free trade 
zones in Sonbong, Rajin and Chongjin, south of the Tumen River. The zones offered 
foreign investors customs reductions, tax incentives, and capital protection. Specifically, 
the North established the free trade zone in the Rajin-Sonbong area as an alternative to 
China’s Tumen River Development Plan. The North aimed to capitalize on the Tumen 
project in advertising its free trade zones worldwide to induce foreign investment. 
It was Rajin-Sonbong, a web of obsolete port facilities proclaimed a free-trade zone in 
1991, where the North hoped to incubate its economic turnaround. The North agreed to 
develop this region, leasing out Chongjin harbour to China and solidifying its position in 
shaping Northeast Asian economic cooperation centred on the Tumen River. The zone 
occupied a strategic transportation point for cargo between Japan and China, and it was 
remote enough to keep foreign ideas from infiltrating North Korean cities. The North was 
developing Shinuiju and Nampo regions, since these were closer to China’s economic 
mainstream and had better social overhead capital.  
As the Tumen River Project developed, it was expected to facilitate inter-Korean business 
transactions. Once the North carried out economic reform and attempted economic 
development, the South’s business community was expected to share management skills, 
information and experience with the North. Through these efforts, a new economic system 
was likely to take root in the North. Its significance laid in a blending of the North’s 
labour and the South’s capital and technology.  
The North adopted a consignment production law and a foreign investment law in October 
1992. Unlike the 1984 joint venture law, these laws had a special provision implicitly 
designed for the South’s investment. This was because the North realized that foreign 
companies were less willing to invest due to risk as well as foreign debt, while the South’s 
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companies were more willing to venture, as demonstrated by how overseas Chinese 
businessmen undertook investment ventures in China’s economic free trade zones.  
The emerging environment of the North was toward an initial stage of market economy, as 
shown by the Tumen River Project and Rajin-Sonbong zone in particular. Since then, the 
North’ s economy has gone through a slow transformation, starting with agriculture and 
trade. The operation of trading companies and the relaxation of agricultural collectives 
were considered to be signs of reforms toward a market economy. The reforms involved 
the increasing use of markets and profit incentives to achieve larger foreign exchange 
earnings and more output. Thereby, the economy became more responsive to outside 
market signals after 1993.  
Increasing competition occurring as a result of market reforms put a tremendous pressure 
on many production units. Increasing competition required the state enterprise sector to 
achieve the flexibility that existed in market economies. Especially, firms should be able 
to determine the size of their labour forces strictly on the basis of their needs of 
production, and dismiss redundant workers.  
If the North’s major policy emphasis was to raise the people’s living standard and to 
establish a self-reliant economy with market principles, then the North should promote 
leading sectors of the people’s economy, such as the coal, energy, and railroad industries, 
and also implement reforms in the ownership system, moving from the past cooperative 
union ownership to private ownership. In short, impending economic openings with 
attendant political risks would force the North to adopt gradual reforms in its domestic 
economic system. To achieve gains from adopting a market system and reap the benefits 
of opening its economy with minimum political risks, the North needed to establish more 
free trade zones.  
Consigned production was an arrangement in which investors in the South provided 
intermediate materials and equipment and the North exclusively managed all the 
production processes. In other words, under a consigned production agreement, the South’ 
s investors sent processed materials, product designs, equipment, and technical personnel 
to the North. In return, the South’s investors received finished products, compensating for 
the risk and costs incurred in supplying those inputs. This contractual joint venture let 
production and management be assumed by the North, and the South’s partners were 
redeemed under the provisions of the joint venture contract. It was reported in 1994 that 
the North’s average wage was $40 a month, while a worker for a joint venture firm under 
consigned production agreement received an average of $150 a month.  
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As economic contacts evolved, a commercial relationship based on mutual gains and trust 
was expected to develop, accompanied by laws and regulations and transfer payments. 
The South’s investment largely took the form of consigned production, although there 
were yet limited direct investments by the South. The joint development of Mount 
Kumgang into an international tourist attraction had been planned between the North and 
Hyundai Asan Corporation.  
South Korean companies invested very heavily in China, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia. 
However, these companies considered North Korea a better investment opportunity than 
these countries, because there exists no language barriers and cultural differences and 
transportation cost advantages.  
The North signed processing contracts not only with the South, but also with Japan, 
China, and Germany. This implied that the arrangements were favourable for the North, 
reaping benefits from competition among investors. The consigned production provided 
the North with productivity enhancement derived from the inflow of capital, management 
know-how, marketing apparatus and technology.  
The North’s government-sanctioned trading companies implemented the foreign-trade 
portion of the economic plan, negotiated with foreign counterparts, executed contracts, 
and held final responsibility for actual transactions. As long as implementation was within 
the economic plan, the trading companies set their own terms of export and import as 
independent units. In other words, the North’s trading companies exercised an exclusive 
right as agents representing powerful authorities such as the party’s central committee and 
army headquarters to earn foreign exchange for financing import much needed 
merchandise.  
It is noteworthy that the North’s trading companies played an important role in the inter-
Korean trade. The trading companies used to deal only in such specialized commodities as 
mineral and marine products. However, the North had adopted an independent accounting 
unit practice for each trading company. The trading companies handled exports and 
imports like general trading companies in the South and Japan. Therefore, they played the 
same role as the general trading companies in these countries, i.e., they sought strategic 
marketing arrangements for Northern manufacturing units and acted as channels of 
information about the outside world to the North Korean people. In short, they played a 
very important role as a catalyst in transforming the North Korean economy.  
As for the overall assessment of the North’s economy, there were three factors 
contributing to the dramatic changes in the North’s policies. First, the rapid demise of the 
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Soviet Union and other communist governments caused the most traumatic political 
difficulty which the North had ever experienced. Second, the agreement between the 
former Soviet Union and the North, signed in November 1990, establishing the payment 
settlements of trade in hard currency at world prices, was a crushing blow to the North’s 
economy. The North had to settle its bilateral account with convertible hard currencies 
instead of acting on the traditional long-term barter basis. The gravity of this change could 
be understood when it was recalled that the North imported from the Soviet Union about a 
third of its crude oil and petroleum products, coking coal, and parts for machinery and 
equipment. Third, the North had no other choice than turning to China for crude oil, raw 
materials, and food items, and The North’ s government-sanctioned trading companies 
implemented the foreign-trade portion of the economic plan, obtained capital goods and 
consumer products from Japan and the South.  
 
Kaesong industrial complex project does not just mean an improvement of Inter-Korean 
bond. It is a large scale national policy business where the two Koreas pursue mutual 
interests by combining capital and technologies of the South with land and manpower of 
the North.  
Kaesong industrial complex project provides geographical conditions that enable the 
South and the North to utilize their strong points, such as capital and technologies of 
South Korea and competitive manpower and resources of North Korea. Using these 
conditions, it can take ‘the Inter-Korean economic cooperation stronghold’ role, leading 
Inter-Korean economic community construction, by making less competitive small and 
medium sized enterprises work in this complex, creating rational division of labor 
structure of inter-Korea and developing the South and the North into a physical 
distribution center26. Besides, it symbolizes confidence in the improvement of Inter-
Korean relations such as connecting railways and roads between two. It has potentials to 
become a key place of human and material exchanges in Northeast Asia which may be a 
hub even to Europe. It is a business that will contribute to balanced improving relations in 
the Inter-Korean.  
Inter-Korean economic effects of Kaesong industrial complex project are several. First, 
economic effects in the South are as follows. Annual amount of production will be 
reached at 84 billion won; value-added amount of production will amount to 24.4 trillion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Shin,! Ji Ho 2002, ‘Successful Conditions of Kaesong Industrial Complex and its Development Plan’, 
Research on North Korea, Institute of Unification Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 171-221. 
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won which is 3.4% of gross national income (GNI) in 2003, considering 9 years from the 
development. Besides over 10 thousand job positions will be created which corresponds to 
0.46% of economically active population in 2002.  
Second, economic effects on the North are as follows. The annual gross income is $0.6 
billion that corresponds to 3.3% of GNI of North Korean in 2003. More than 720 thousand 
job positions will be created, which amount corresponds to 6.14% of economically active 
population of the North in 2002.  
Economic effects of the Kaesong industrial complex project in the North are as follows. 
First, it helps North Korea to overcome financial difficulties. Direct foreign currency 
earning effects such as labor cost revenue, raw and subsidiary material sales revenue, and 
freight revenue will be acquired during its construction operation process. Summing it up 
with foreign currency from building industrial park and infrastructure will be reached 
around $96 billion. It is 4 times of the amount of annual budget of North Korea and its 
trade amount27.  
Second, North Korea may show its public open-door image by pursuing this project. A 
remarkable progress hasn’t been made although North Korea continues to amend 
regulations and institutions for attracting foreign investments since 1990s. It is well shown 
in Sinuiju special economic zone (SEZ) in 2002. However, Kaesong industrial complex 
project is different from that it is an economic joint venture through a direct agreement by 
two Koreas. Therefore the North may outgrow it closed image by this project28. Third, it is 
possible to acquire technology and management know- how for economic development. 
Technology and manufacturing facilities of the South will bring about intra-industry 
relation effect such as constructing infrastructure around the industrial park like railroads 
and roads; and developing industries related to the industrial park. It is expected that 
respectively 3.3 trillion of production effect and 1.1trillion of value-added inducement 
effect. Besides about 39 thousand job positions will also be made29. 
Economic effects of the Kaesong industrial complex project in the South may be divided 
into three. First, it will revitalize domestic economy. It will be less competitive small and 
medium sized enterprises because of high-cost structure with new opportunities. We may !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Hong, Soon Jick 2004, ‘Kaesong Industrial Complex Project and Economy of the Korean Peninsula’, 
Economic Issues, Hyundai Research Institute, Vol. 1, No. 5. 
28 Cheon, Yeong Seon 2003, ‘The Progress of Kaesong Industrial Complex and its Prospects. Asia-Pacific 
Regional Trend’, Asia- Pacific Region Research Center, Hanyang University, Vol. 143, pp. 62-88. 
29 Yoon, Yeong Seon and Kim, Tae Hwang 2002, ‘Analysis of Inter-Korean Economic Effects of Kaesong 
Industrial Complex Project, Construction and Industry Trend’, Construction & Economy Research Institute 
of Korea, Vol. 2002-20, pp. 1-26. 
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become more competitive in the world by expanding our productivity and developing 
industries which can be done by concentrating on high value-added business and 
production process.  
Economic effects of the project in the South encompass labour cost reduction, sales effects 
of raw and subsidiary materials, production and value-added inducement effects. When 
the first step of Kaesong industrial complex project is completed, total $3.1billion effects 
will be revealed. By the time all the three steps of the projects are completed in 9 years 
later, the total effect will be summed to approximately $73.7 billion.  
Second, South Korean may secure a production base. South Korea may become more 
competitive in the manufacturing industry from the labour-intensive industries, such as the 
textile industry to the high-tech industries, by securing a production base where 
technology may be transferred easily and management skills may be taught with ease.  
Third, South Korea may establish a bridgehead to the northern direction. Although there 
were diplomatic relationships with China and Russia, they have had barely economic 
exchanges. By doing this project, human and material network of North Korea become 
connected to companies in South Korea so that companies in South Korea may play a 
bridgehead role to the northern direction.  
 
At a time when the North is cautiously adopting policy changes to overcome its 
international isolation, it is important that the neighbouring countries create a favourable 
environment in which the North will be able to direct its efforts toward economic 
openness so as to adopt market principles nationwide. The Kaesong Industrial Park is 
rationalized having economic development along with maintaining the North regime by 
earning hard currencies to relieve the North’s severe balance of payments problem.  
The Kaesong Industrial Park develops into thriving special economic zone through sub-
regional economic cooperation with bordering area, and technology and management 
skills are also transferred to the Kaesong industrial park, enhancing Northern workers 
through Inter-Korean economic cooperation. What is important is that investments from 
the South and other countries are essential for establishing and implementing a special 
economic zone that enables the North to overcome the country’s unfavourable economic 
conditions.  
While many obstacles still remain in the path of achieving the success of the Kaesong 
Industrial Park, North Korea does offer incentives to perspective foreign investors, but 
overall, it fails short of their expectations. A host of political obstacles coupled with the 
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passive and rigid attitudes of North Korean workers stand in the way of facilitating 
business activities. In addition, the non-existence of a consumer market, poor 
infrastructure in transportation and communications, and, consequently, high logistics 
costs are all factors that discourage investors. These negative factors need to be removed if 
the Kaesong industrial complex is to be successful. Its success would result in a major 
boost to the North’ s economic rehabilitation and create a spill-over effect for the rest of 
the North.  
The inter-Korean joint ventures and industrial relocations have to be arranged based on 
regional comparative advantages associated with factor endowments, market access, and 
other attributes since international capital flow is determined by a thorough comparison 
and examination of many special economic zones and free trade areas all over the world. 
Therefore, it is about time to establish the Committee for Inter-Korean Economic 
Adjustment to prepare for economic integration.  
North-related issues cannot be resolved though the efforts of the South alone, since the 
Korean peninsula has long been a place where the interests of major powers – the U.S., 
Japan, China, Russia – collide. Therefore, along with the tasks faced by the South for the 
recovery of the North economy, there are political/economic problems that have to be 
resolved with neighbouring countries under the framework of multilateral cooperation. 
Thus, consistent support from major powers is required for the North to make a smooth 
transition.  
The South promised to send 500,000 tons of food to the North in the form of a loan. It is 
South’s biggest pledge of food to impoverished North since 2000. Due to the possibility of 
confusion in moral values among its populace and subsequent political instability, 
cautions in the North’s opening its doors and introducing the price mechanism should be 
in place. As the North intends to immerse itself in the world economy, the foremost 
requirement is to adopt market-oriented policies derived from reforming its centralized 
economy.  
Under the current favourable premise that the Six-Party Talks on the nuclear crisis will be 
peacefully resolved, various economic projects that promote the full-scale development of 
the Kaesong Industrial Park could be undertaken. These projects could be conducted with 
international assistance. The Kaesong Industrial Complex has easy access to raw 
materials, as well as semi-processed goods, components and information, and in terms of 
location, where the South and the North can link their electricity, railways, roads, and 
water for use by the Kaesong Industrial Park.  
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At this juncture, the South should play the leading role in helping advance the North’ s 
economic openness and in encouraging neighbouring countries to provide technical and 
financial support for the North’s special economic. Currently, the construction of the 
Kaesong Industrial Park is in progress, despite the unstable political and military 
conditions that surround it.  
The South’s proposal has been rather simple: to supply two million kilowatts of electricity 
annually to the energy-starved North, if it completely scraps its nuclear weapons program. 
Then Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young announced that if the North accepted the 
offer, the South would begin to build power transmission facilities immediately for the 
cross-border power supply scheduled to start in 2008. Until then, the South intended to ask 
other participating nations of the Six-Party Talks collectively to provide fuel oil to the 
North. This offer must be attractive for the North, given its dire energy shortage and the 
serious food and foreign currency shortages. Among them the various problems, the 
energy shortage is most acute; without securing energy, the North cannot make any 
serious attempt to jumpstart its moribund economy. 
As the inter-Korea railway restoration project is completed, the Kaesong Industrial Park is 
ideally located to develop into a major hub of transportation and trade between North and 
South Korea. The Kaesong Industrial Park is connected to Russia and China through the 
Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-China Railway. The Kaesong Industrial complex is 
in the centre of the Korean peninsula, and with the Kyongi railway passing through it, it 
would be a natural transportation hub not far from the Seoul metropolitan area. If land 
transportation can be facilitated through the Kaesong Industrial Park, it will considerably 
reduce the high logistics costs that have been a heavy burden on inter- Korean economic 
cooperation.  
When the Trans-Korea Railways are eventually reconnected with the Trans-Siberian 
Railway and the Trans-China Railway, the Kaesong Industrial Park will become a major 
transit point for transporting Japanese and the South’s products inland to China and Russia 
and for transporting Chinese products to the South and Japan. The Kaesong Industrial 
Park is also located only 89 kilometers from the Incheon economic hub and its 
International Airport. As the South has undertaken to building Korea into a hub of 
Northeast Asia, the Kaesong Industrial complex would complement this project.  
The potential gain from such cooperation is virtually incalculable, but continued 
engagement in positive inter-Korean relations is critical to achieving stability and 
economic growth over a long period. For instance, under the recent agreement of July 
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2005, the North will guarantee the South the rights to mine mineral deposits in the North, 
including coal, zinc and magnesite. In return, the South will provide raw materials 
allowing the North to produce basic necessities such as soap, clothing and footwear.  
The two Koreas must coordinate the legal mechanisms and economic framework so as to 
improve inter-Korean business relations. South Korea’s government has until now 
intervened and regulated all interactions, but this policy should evolve to allow business 
decisions to take over government-level economic activities. The North should be 
recognized as a developing country, and the South should undertake a revitalization 
program considering the North as a part of the entire Korean economic plan involving 
integration, trade promotion and dynamic international divisions of inputs.  
The ultimate objective of the two Koreas has been political union through economic 
cooperation. Political gestures and diplomatic compromises between the democratizing, 
capitalist South and the rigidly communist North by themselves cannot go very far. As 
preparation for unification, the North’s living standard must be improved in order to avoid 
massive population movement. Combined with the substantial benefits of expanding trade 
and investment, such efforts should lead to enhanced relations between the two Koreas.  
Economic cooperation will have many positive effects on growth and welfare: market 
extension, economies of scale, learning curve effect, competition, and trade creation. It 
would, as well, have positive spill-over effects on political negotiations, eventually 
leading unification. The two Korans must undertake serious studies on structural reforms, 
monetary integration, industrial relocation, privatization of state assets, foreign trade 
zones and investment, and other related problems.  
The aim of inter-Korean economic cooperation is to create a new form of value added, 
which will bring about tangible benefits to both sides. This is possible through the 
combination of the South’s capital and technology and the North’s labour and land. If 
successful, it will result in reducing unification expenses as well.  
Economic cooperation between the two Koreas has increased substantially since the 2002 
summit conference, and the Kaesong Industrial Park has set an example for overcoming 
the major barriers that the South’s businesses have previously experienced in the North. It 
now appears that inter-Korean cooperation is moving to a higher level, encompassing 
more comprehensive investment activities in the North, including trade, commissioned 
processing and either joint-ventures or exclusive investments. These economic 
engagements have spread to a broader range of inter-Korean relations over the past few 
months, including talks on key cultural, financial, military and political issues.  
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As the inter-Korea railway restoration project is completed, the Kaesong Industrial Park is 
ideally located to develop into a major hub of transportation and trade between South and 
North Korea. The Kaesong Industrial Park will be connected to Russia and China through 
the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-China Railway. When the Trans-Korea 
Railways are eventually reconnected with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-
China Railway, the Kaesong Industrial Park will become a major transit point for 
transporting Japanese and South Korean products inland to China and Russia and for 
transporting Chinese products to South Korea and Japan. The Kaesong and Inchon 
complexes together could become the Northeast Asian hub of business, industries and 
finance.  
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Conclusions 
 
The presidency of Lee Myung-bak has shown a return to hard line in dealing with North 
Korea was not a harbinger of positive results, nor with regard to inter-Korean relations in 
the strict sense, nor as regards the most wide view of the security system of Northeast 
Asia, where you can also register the issue of nuclear proliferation. 
The termination of cooperation and the almost total suspension of humanitarian aid 
headed to Pyongyang have pushed the country to turn increasingly to Beijing to receive 
that assistance, since the end of the Cold War, is a matter of survival for North Korea. The 
democratization of 1987 and, even more so with the decade of the "sunshine policy" and 
"policy of peace and prosperity", the network of addiction had thickened increasingly 
between Seoul and Pyongyang, going to places like Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang, thus 
removing North Korea from the orbit of influence of Beijing and providing an important 
lever of pressure on South Korea. The presidency of Lee has instead brought the situation 
back several years on this side, making China the ' only country with the power to 
influence the issue and the key mediator in the six party talks or any other negotiating 
infrastructure will be set up to handle the situation. 
The insistence on reciprocity conservative administration led him to lose sight of what is 
the main purpose of engagement: to create relations of interdependence that, in the long 
term, can make a country more prone to changes and, at that moment, try to steer changes 
themselves. The rationale behind the logic of give-and can only work if it gives the 
possibility to the other party to make the openings; the approach taken with the project is 
the beginning of the "Vision 3000", and thereafter, was instead built to not be acceptable 
to the Pyongyang regime because, as we saw earlier, would have meant a kind of suicide 
for the regime same. No concessions were made unilaterally, on charges that had been 
paid to the government of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, but at the same time you is 
not got nothing in return, except a further escalation of tension. 
The election results obtained in the elections in April 2011, joined to the polls released 
over the same period showed a need to soften the hard line held by the president, became 
increasingly intransigent during his tenure. In this direction should be read as the 
appointment in July to lead the GNP of Hong Joon-pyo, who has distanced himself from 
the political inter-Korean Lee, embodying the idea of the majority of his own party, and 
recalled the need a new approach to inter-Korean relations. For this purpose can be read 
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also the replacement of Minister Hyun In-taek reunification, considered in the group of 
"hawks" within the administration, with the more moderate Yu Woo-ik,. In the same 
direction goes also the article published in Foreign Affairs by a possible presidential 
candidate in 2012 for the Conservative Party, Park Geun-hye that the only way forward is 
to return to a dialogue with North Korea and to a policy that is based on a minimum level 
of mutual trust and that, alongside a strong military deterrent against possible 
provocations, present but also its flexibility to be able to return to the negotiating table. 
The critical approach of the government of Lee Myung-bak, had multiplied in recent 
months, mainly bind to this intransigence, he is challenged by his own party. The events 
of 2010, particularly the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling on the island of 
Yeongpyeong, have left deep scars on the popularity of the president and his crisis 
management. The criticisms focus on two points in particular: the conservative front of the 
public disagrees that it is the national security interest priority and, nevertheless, have 
shown serious flaws in the defense system, just in time for the two crisis; also its decision 
not to take any retaliation against North Korea has caused it to be accused of weakness. 
Across instead the policy of closure and intransigence carried out have stirred criticism, 
especially from the Democratic Party and the progressive circles, regarding the fact that 
the very context created had led to provocations by North Korea. 
Policy Lee, who at the beginning of its mandate had been defined as "pragmatic", is losing 
all its pragmatism moving to an opposition in some ways "ideological", in which are 
placed preconditions to any form of dialogue and are abandoned cooperation projects, 
such as those signed by Roh Moo-hyun during the summit in 2007, which are not so much 
a unilateral economic aid to the North, but rather a project "win-win" in which both parties 
gain a benefit. 
It is therefore clear that we need a change in strategy by the administration of Lee, both 
for strategic reasons and for the interest of the policy that is already reflected. The strict 
conditionality in every possible step has been shown to not work because, not only did not 
lead to any improvement in inter-Korean relations and the nuclear issue, so much 
emphasized by the South Korean government, but has not increased the level of security 
on the peninsula. Also with the appropinquarsi presidential elections, scheduled for 
December 2012, a change becomes necessary to recover the consensus in public opinion. 
The situation at international level seems to move towards a new approach that seeks a 
dialogue with North Korea. The serious crisis of 2010 have alarmed especially China and 
the United States, concerned that the rising level of tension could lead to an open military 
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confrontation on the peninsula; for this reason, as early as the January 2011 summit in 
Washington between Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao, the two leaders had reached an 
agreement to jointly manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula through the restoration 
of the six party talks and a new form of engagement towards North Korea, trying to 
reduce the distance between the positions of the two Koreas, supported by their respective 
allies, regarding the issue of preconditions to the resumption of negotiations. In this sense 
the risk for South Korea is to be cut out precisely because of the intransigence fielded by 
President Lee, now superseded by the will of the other powers involved in the matter of 
finding an agreement to ease tension on the peninsula. 
In light of the analysis in this paper we can draw some conclusions about the management 
of inter-Korean relations over the years. 
Firstly it is clear that this was a long and complex process, full of progress and of falls, the 
one that led to the formulation of an approach of constructive engagement on the 
peninsula, then based on cooperation and interdependence rather than competition and 
confrontation. As outlined in the second chapter the groundwork for such a paradigm shift 
had been laid already in the early 70s and chairs like that of Roh Tae-woo had shown a 
real engagement policy toward North Korea, supported by a international situation that 
would give the opportunity to develop it, could lead to fundamental breakthroughs in 
relations between the two countries; the management of Kim Young-sam can instead be 
seen as the most striking example intermittent feature of this process. The same step back 
taken by Lee Myung-bak after the decade characterized by the "sunshine policy" and 
"policy of peace and prosperity" shows how the lack of continuity in the approach has 
caused the greatest difficulties to reach the expected results, in as being a policy that is 
developed on the medium to long term its sudden interruption frustrates most of the 
achievements so far. 
Despite these problems arising in the implementation times of constructive engagement 
results obtained from this approach, particularly during the decade in which it was 
implemented in the most complete, and also in sporadic incidents in which it was adopted 
by previous governments to Kim Dae-jung, are obvious. First you have to register as 
voltage levels have come in recent years to their historic lows, as well as the risk of a 
large-scale military confrontation. We have to remember that the two Koreas are still 
technically at war and then a relaxation of the dispute on the military is the prelude to the 
progress in the various areas and how a key objective for the population itself. 
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Added to this are the substantial achievements in the economic and cooperation between 
the two countries, just think of the industrial park in Kaesong, which is also a model for 
further development in the future this way linked to the creation of special economic 
zones in Korea north, or to the Mount Kumgang tourism project; also the humanitarian 
field has been the scene of important improvements, with the many family reunions and 
aid sent to the North to alleviate the dramatic consequences of the famine of the late '90s. 
All these measures have done nothing but intensify the growing interdependence between 
the two countries, an interdependence decidedly skewed in favour of the Seoul 
government that it could rely on in the negotiations. 
Beyond the positive results obtained there have been numerous problems in the 
implementation practice of constructive engagement within the policies of Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun; these shadows, analysed in detail in the last paragraphs of Chapters 3 
and 4, rather than undermine relations between the two Koreas or the strategic alliance 
with the US has caused the loss of consensus in the South Korean population to this new 
approach, also contributing to the Lee's victory in 2007. In particular the lack of 
transparency in the management of relations between the two countries and of economic 
aid for the North, as well as the over-personalization of decision-making in the hands of 
the president, both highlighted by a communication system, in particularly the print 
media, tied to the conservative, were alienating the public from the new policies, which 
have started to be increasingly seen as a waste of resources unilaterally to a country that 
used only for military purposes and that did not change the His provocative and 
irresponsible attitude toward South Korea. In this issue joined the concept of reciprocity 
flexible which made even more difficult to understand why it was necessary to continue 
on the path of engagement when the attitude of Pyongyang showed no change. 
The advent of the new inter-Korean policy put forth by Lee Myung-bak shows how, 
despite the difficulties described above, the policies of Presidents Kim and Roh had 
improved the situation, in fact, a return to an approach of uncompromising closure had 
reported voltage levels very high, deterioration materialized in events like the bombing of 
the island of Yeongpyeong. The free iron that had been set in place for Lee in inter-
Korean cooperation and nuclear file, in which the end of 2010 is added to the request of an 
official apology for the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyeong as a 
precondition to any form of dialogue, had led to the suspension of contacts between the 
two countries so going to undermine, if not to completely erase, the progress in terms of 
cooperation achieved by previous governments. 
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The error of the administration of Lee Myung-bak, and one of the key orientations for the 
future South Korean administrations in terms of relations with the North, was to eliminate 
the distinction that was made between the scope of cooperation and that of the Safety, in 
this case the nuclear file; especially the latter question did not directly concern the 
relations between North and South but rather those between it and the United States, 
whose main concern was the inherent risk of nuclear proliferation and the state of relations 
between the two Koreas. Pyongyang being well aware of this situation, he used the lever 
to bring the nuclear negotiating table just the administration of Washington, hoping for 
bilateral talks, to address vital issues such as the signing of a final peace treaty, the 
presence of troops American peninsula, the possibility of receiving financial aid from 
international institutions. Against this background it is clear that in any discussion of the 
nuclear issue, the six party talks in the first place, the inter-Korean relations could not 
have a pivotal role, as the issues on the agenda were other; similarly, as borne out by the 
facts, the role of South Korea in forum of this kind could not be decisive because the stage 
was occupied by North Korea and the United States as the main actors, with China to 
mediate Main; what could be up to Seoul was at most a role of "facilitator" in the 
dialogue, as demonstrated by the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun and his role in the 
management of the second nuclear crisis. 
One final point to make, which must be taken into account in setting future of inter-
Korean relations, as is the intransigent policy of Lee Myung-bak has removed North 
Korea from the influence of the South, pushing it closer and closer to China and the 
United States. The interruption of economic and humanitarian aid decided by the 
conservative Seoul has in fact severed ties of interdependence created by the two previous 
administrations, while eliminating the influence that South Korea had built against 
Pyongyang, based on the strong asymmetry their interdependence. In this way the policy 
of Lee has also increased the already considerable power to influence China on North 
Korea, leaving the first as the only provider of those resources for which the latter can not 
help but to survive. Add to this the fact that the same US administration, with which Lee 
had set out to mend the relationship to build on it the basis of the South Korean foreign 
policy, held the position of intransigence of the South Korean government as it is no 
longer sustainable, looking to create a context of dialogue with North Korea, with or 
without the consent of the South Korean government. 
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